Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

602.0093/1–2050: Telegram

The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Peiping, January 20, 1950—3 p. m.

157. ReContel 151, January 19.¹ As regards Communists requisition property foreign governments Peiping offer following further analysis motivations:

British ConGen informs me his Foreign Office telegram authorizing extension recognition on January 6 was sent Embassy Nanking en clair January 5. Matter had been publicly mooted for month and Communists, therefore, fully informed in advance pending recognition. Placards proclaiming requisition were printed showing preparation. Communist posting placards prior date January 6 were then fully apprised fact UK was recognizing that date. Dumb show of posting and taking down placards and omission order to British, therefore, seem to have been designed as intimation other governments they could keep property as quid pro quo recognition.

Opinion this office has been and remains that Communists desire American recognition for both political and economic reasons. Posting proclamation at first glance possible effort Communist military to commit other government organs such as Foreign Office irrevocably in advance. Denouement indicates, however, that more probably decision use this strategem was reached in high Communist council. If plan truly is of three months standing even Mao Tse-tung concerned.

Presumably Communists unassured in advance of success, but probably had envisaged three alternative developments: (1) speeding up American recognition, (2) withdrawal Consulate to main compound with Americans humiliated and prestige reduced, while Communists could claim “victory over imperialists,” (3) at worst, complete withdrawal of Consulate from Peiping. It seems improbable Communists anticipated present consequences, that is, complete withdrawal from China.

With Communists decision carry out plan, therefore, by hypothesis approved in highest echelon, and especially since committed publicly, they felt under compulsion proceed per schedule. They could still, of course, have taken exit from their predicament by occupation glacis and Johnson Hall as offered by USA. Information contained Conreftel purporting Communists believed American note was bluff, evolved by myself, must be considered suspect. Chou En-lai and others know enough of American practice to realize communication was genuine. True, our translation and writing of Chinese translation may have puzzled them (who have different ideas of security from our own) but it would be; daring stretch imagination for them conclude that I was bluffing. In same way, one must look askance at report that person who granted time extension has been punished for act: although extension was first granted, then withdrawn, and granted again, our logic tells us Communists really desired we clear out all movables, thus obviating any responsibility of [on?] their shoulders that regards.

French ConGen was offered extension time but only after his staff had worked all night January 13 and 14 and cleared out compound before p. m. January 14. That contacts report was informed, however, is shown by his knowledge of note which unknown to most of conference itself.

In other terms, it seems unlikely that move was engineered by Soviets or pro-Russian Chinese Communists with aim getting our withdrawal from China, or that Communists realized possibilities serious backfire leading to serious ultimate loss for their economic program. Particularly, this office has already noted possibility Communists, with aim further self-justification, might demand “expulsion” from China of Consulate officials nonrecognizing states. Note, however, from Contel 151, January 19, that thus far, Communists have only indicated that it is immaterial to them whether we go or stay. Standard for judgment Communist motives immediate future can be tentatively set up as follows:

(1) If Communists shortly impose distinctly heavier restrictions on Consulate officials nonrecognizing states or demand our “expulsion” from China, there is added reason to believe pro-Soviet elements have top hand and are assiduously continuing with burning of China’s boats behind it.

(2) If, however, Communists limit themselves to impression indifference to our presence or absence, their attitude can be taken as indication only acute case sour grapes; and

(3) If, finally, there begins some leak reports purporting “military got out of hand,” “Mao was away in Moscow² and junior official made mistake” or “Communists think USA has taken matter too seriously,” it can be deduced Communists are suffering real regrets. Whether report contained Conreftel is first “leak” seems unlikely, but if others of same nature appear in relatively near future from “informed sources” pattern Communist desires international field would soon be discernible.

Note Communist difficulties: note particularly Communist recognition Vietnam regime Ho Chi Minh³ may cause French take umbrage. Netherlands Government can hardly view present situation with equanimity. British Consul General per instructions his Government on January 16 called Foreign Office, referred to Chou En-lai reply to British recognition and said British Government considered exchange note tantamount establishment diplomatic relations and asked Foreign Office confirmation this understanding. To date in non-receipt. At Moscow, Mao probably trying resist sweeping Soviet demand. In China itself famine is growing acute. Communist problems are in short increasing in grand intensity and they will soon learn all walls are not reduced by Communist trumpets. Communist political passion is undoubtedly to play great role “liberator of Asia,” and USSR can be expected play on this theme, but Mao stands in danger returning from Moscow despoiled of certain sovereign rights and at same time disappointed re desire Soviet aid for China’s hungry masses and shattered economy.

Re radio report American protest being sent Communist Government (unreceived this office, presumed being sent by British channels) offer opinion USA should settle for nothing less than full restitution of or stiff compensation for requisitioned property (note here Communists themselves included Glacis property in area designated “former American barracks”). Communists have legal escape in technicality that property was requisitioned not confiscated. They, moreover, stated in both proclamation and semi-official news item January 18 matter on restitution of buildings would be undertaken. They further deny vehemently if vainly requisitioned offices American Consul. In circumstances believe situation might well be exploited by my seeking interview Foreign Office after, but only after, lodging protest for clarification matter in point. Timing could well be set after date Mao’s return from Moscow, say month hence, when full shock presumed Moscow machiavellianism will have been felt in nationalistic Communist circles and famine become more acute still. If interview granted, our attitude could be set forth clearly as being that treaty in question was valid, that American Government regards requisition as illegal and improper by international law and comity, that requisition, however, was in any event fixed to period of “military exigency”, that, therefore, it is assumed and expected that Peking regime will effect restitution to American Government its rightful property at an early date, that upon such restitution American Government will be prepared turn its attention again to question recognition. Success problematical, but submit that American Government has nothing lose by this process and that if theory previously advanced by me is valid, would be our gain and possibly China’s if matter in point were satisfactorily adjusted (Contelad 374e), it is to be granted that, if USSR is successful, pattern in China will probably continue be such as might lead us with reason feel ourselves economically and politically well out of it, relieved of that much burden and freed for more fruitful efforts elsewhere. But China situation is still uncrystallized and there is still much popular sentiment in favor USA rather USSR, disillusionment with USSR can be expected increase. Feel we should continue exploit all possibilities in situation pending our departure.

Clubb

1. Not printed. In this telegram, Mr. Clubb reported information from a reliable source to the effect that Chou En-lai himself was directly responsible for the plan, drafted as long as 3 months ago, to requisition the foreign consular property. The motive allegedly was to force recognition, with the Communists being interested in American recognition most of all. Mr. Clubb’s letter to Chou En-lai of January 12 was said to have been completely misinterpreted; the fact that the letter was written in Chinese by a foreign band gave rise to the belief in the Foreign Ministry that it was a bluff by Mr. Clubb designed to scare the authorities out of the takeover plan. When the Foreign Ministry discovered that the American Government meant business in the withdrawal of its personnel, heavy gloom descended and guarded criticism and discontent were voiced at the consequences of the requisition. At the same time, the local official who extended extra time to the Consulate General during the evacuation of the premises was reportedly punished, since his superiors felt that his action had deprived the local authorities of the chance to get as much loot as possible. (602.0093/1–1950)
2. Mao Tse-tung was in Moscow in connection with negotiations on the Sino Soviet Treaty, signed February 14, 1950; see p. 311.
3. President of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam; for documentation on Indochina, see pp. 690 ff.