611.94A/1–1650

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)1

confidential

After lunching with Governor and Madame Wu2 on January 16, the Governor and I retired to an ante-room where we proceeded with our discussions. We were accompanied by Chargé d’Affaires Strong and Mr. Gibson.3

Wu opened the interview by stating that Taiwan can be saved and that it will not be given up to the Commies. He described the Taiwanese as being very patriotic by instinct and not at all given to Communism. During the Japanese occupation there were 101 uprisings in 51 years. The Taiwanese thus proved their opposition to alien rule and this may explain partially their aversion to Communism. All other Chinese territory has always had Commie minorities but not Taiwan. The Taiwanese are emotional and the Japs took advantage of this in their policy of divide and rule. The Japanese gave them no responsibilities.

At the time of the Chinese restoration the Taiwanese were divided into three groups: 1) those who worked with the Japanese in order to make a living but were not collaborators, 2) the patriots who went [Page 279] underground and wanted the Island restored to the mainland, and 3) the patriots who left, went to the mainland and worked from there.

The Taiwanese gave those in group three a hearty welcome upon their return but their enthusiasm later changed because of: a) corruption, b) the bad discipline of the troops and police, and c) the monopoly of high offices by mainlanders. Wu explained that the Central Government had to rely on group 3 because they knew nothing of those in groups 1 and 2. They could not be sure of them until they were tested.

The elections after restoration were not really free because practical considerations made it impossible. They (the Central Government) were thus forced to rely even more on Group 3. They thus took office promptly and are, in great part, still in office. Wu described the uprising of February 1947 as being as much against them as against the Chinese.

In order to correct present ills there must be three steps taken: 1) political reform, 2) economic reform, and 3) military reform.

Under (1) the Central Government must assure that more Taiwanese take positions in the Government and take a United Front with the Central Government. Next they must eradicate the privileged classes and open Government owned industries to the Taiwanese. They must permit freedom of opinion. The press is now free, persons must be made free. The secret police must be purged. Free elections must be held as soon as possible. They must be timed properly to avoid any danger of coinciding with an attempted invasion.

Ambassador Jessup asked if the press is permitted to criticize the Central Government and was told it could with two exceptions: 1) it must not be pro-Communist, and 2) it must not divulge military secrets.

Regarding economic reform Governor Wu spoke of the need for more production, free enterprise and land reform. In regard to the latter he has written General MacArthur to ask for guidance in putting into effect a land reform program based on that used in Japan. Dr. Wu spoke of the desirability of putting a social security plan into effect.

The big snag in political and economic reform Wu stated is that they will be ineffective without military reform, the military budget is a very important item; the top men in the military are incompetent. They are not bad but are simply ignorant of modern means of warfare. The young officers, American and British trained, are much more capable but are powerless. The top military chiefs do not, for instance, even know what radar is, they have never seen it.

The caste system in the army and navy was described as very bad. The lower ranks cannot speak to the top ranks; their superior military knowledge must therefore remain useless.

The Gimo is aware of all this according to Wu and would like to [Page 280] do something about it but he is very proud and surrounded by people who fail to tell him the truth.

Wu’s final conclusions were that:

1) Taiwan is not beyond hope, 2) as U.S. policy is definitely anticommunist the U.S. must do the following with regard to Taiwan:

a)
Furnish economic aid, b) permit the Government to use a part of this economic aid to employ foreign military advisers. These men can break up the military clique and advise the Gimo and his officers that they must give up any thought of reinvading the continent (purely political in motivation in the first place and not really serious) and concentrate on defending Taiwan, then concentrate on the training of a small but effective force. Wu felt this policy could be followed without disturbing our policy regarding Formosa as recently stated by the President.

Dr. Jessup asked questions concerning the provincial and central government budgets. Wu explained that a limited portion of the provincial government tax receipts goes to the Central Government, that this limit is soon reached and cannot be surpassed as there simply isn’t any more money. Wu claimed that he has been supported by the Gimo in his refusal to exceed the limit after being pressed to do so by the Central Government.

  1. Ambassador Jessup visited Formosa, January 15–17, in the course of a 3-month tour of the Far East, for documentation on which, see pp. 18 ff.
  2. K. C. Wu was Governor of Taiwan.
  3. Foreign Service Officer William M. Gibson accompanied Ambassador Jessup on his trip.