Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

125.7141/1–1050: Telegram

The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State

secret

Peiping, January 10, 1950—4 p. m.

65. Two possibilities discussed penultimate paragraph Contel 56, January 9¹ assessed as follows: It is presumed Communists undesirous in ultimate analysis create international incident resulting our withdrawal in toto from Peiping. Seems probable they desire speed up recognition by such actions as present taking such profit as possible in process. Assume both Communists and Soviets desire hasten day when Communists shall have representation UN and be able sit in on Japanese treaty. This view truly probably not shared [garbled group] national Communist quarters, there would be more rabid elements possibly desirous see USA humbled and crippled much as possible regardless international considerations. Army elements probably included in this group. As reported previously it has been rumored Commies desirous pushing foreign missions from ex-Legation quarter. This would be in line old Chinese desire manifested on various occasions in China moving in on well-built foreign structures and causing foreigners, including missions, build elsewhere at considerable expense, with profit going to Chinese.

It is theoretically possible that if we are ousted from ex-Marine compound we can still save main, quartermaster and Sankuanmiao compounds and, basing case on circumstances ex-Marine compound was requisitioned by force and contrary to treaty provision, in due course with establishment relations stage comeback and try recover ex-Marine compound. It is however axiomatic that withdrawal from whole of premises Peiping would be followed by occupation entire property with result that recovery of compounds not excluded from action would be difficult, whereas if we stay we still possess enough land to be used mission. This possibly realized by Communists extremists and by those who desire oust Foreigners from ex-Legation quarter, and it may therefore be their design or willingness that matter lead to our complete withdrawal. How well we could carry on in truncated form would depend upon attendant circumstances.

Actual invasion consular premises is, of course, serious matter and it may be Communist leaders have failed realize office is located in ex-Marine compound and that when this information duly considered in higher echelon, policy will be adjusted accordingly. This seems only chance matter is of major importance, and procedure should, of course, be determined accordingly.

Seems doubtful here whether, when time so short and matter in such delicate balance, publicity re matter would serve any useful purpose. Believe only reliance is on notes to Chou En-lai. Making matter public issue might crystallize Communist determination due considerations prestige. Therefore personally inclined recommend against release matter to public unless until violation consulate occurs.

Colleagues appreciated Department’s keeping their Embassies informed. Coordinating this end to fullest.

Factors reported here in and Consul’s reftel seems to include main elements involved.² Recommend we be fully prepared meet any eventualities.

Clubb

1. The paragraph referred to read as follows: “Possibly but improbably, Communists may desire our removal from Peiping; or, may back down before strong stand.” (125.7141/1–950)

2. Telegram 56, January 9, from Peiping, read, in part, as follows:

   “… there is possibility we shall permanently lose radio communication in shuffle. Seems possible also further restrictions will be placed on local representatives non-recognizing governments. Believe, therefore, present situation merits consideration by Department advisability closing office and removal personnel if even part of our premises occupied, this on two grounds: (1) Reduction of our usefulness which would follow upon, still hypothetical application of new disabilities and (2) fact that we should probably be in better moral and legal position both vis-à-vis Chinese population and Communist authorities if we were to protest and withdraw entirely upon such infringement of our rights, thus putting full responsibility on Chinese authorities in being able in due course to demand full restitution, than if we protested but remained after having been forcibly ejected from main part of holdings by Communist military. In event that we sit tight we may lose some moveable property but could ultimately hold Communists fully responsible. In event that we made preparations to move now, we should be lost for authorities would know they had us on run.” (125.7141/1–950)