794A.00/1–250

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk)

secret

Subject: Formosa

Participants: Deputy Under Secretary Dean Rusk
Deputy Assistant Secretary Llewellyn E. Thompson2
Sir Derick Hoyer Millar, Minister, British Embassy
Mr. H. A. Graves, Counselor, British Embassy

I referred to the articles that had appeared in the press on our policy in regard to Formosa. I stated that in fact our policy remained unchanged. I summarized this policy as follows: We hope that Formosa would not fall into the hands of the Communists. We had been giving some economic aid to Nationalist China. The Nationalists still have some funds and might purchase further supplies for shipment to Formosa. We would not allow heavy items, such as bombers and heavy tanks, to be shipped to Formosa. We did not intend to become engaged in the defense of Formosa, however, and we had no plans to send a big military mission there. With respect to shipments of military supplies, I said there would be some borderline cases and we would endeavor to keep the British informed about these.

Hoyer Millar said that the British would be very grateful for any information. They were naturally interested to see that no supplies which could be used to attack Hongkong fall into the hands of the Communists. They had themselves been guilty with respect to the shipment of some tanks but this was now straightened out.

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Hoyer Millar referred to press reports of a decision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the National Security Council on this question.3 I confined my comment to saying that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had expressed themselves on some aspects of the situation and that the National Security Council had only considered this matter in connection with some other problems it was considering. I agreed that we would keep the British informed on shipments of major military items to Formosa.

  1. Mr. Thompson was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.
  2. Presumably, the reference here is to NSC 48/2, approved December 30, 1949; text in Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. vii, Part 2, p. 1215. On December 23, 1949, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended a “modest” program of military aid to Taiwan; see ibid., vol. ix, p. 460.