Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

460.419/8–2250: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom ¹

secret

Washington, August 22, 1950—6 p. m.

972. Excon. ReDeptel 474, July 25, rptd Paris 475.²

A. As reply to UK Aide-Mémoire to Emb and Franks statement to Perkins re Excon policies,³ you shld inform FonOff that we have carefully considered UK position as expressed by Amb Franks and have also made prelim review outcome recent Paris negots involving US 1–B list. (We note direct connection between these two inasmuch as Brit view re strategic importance items on 1–B list has largely prevailed in Paris, and nature List II controls has been that acceptable to Brit, so that outcome Paris mtgs seems fair reflection results to be expected while Brit views continue unchanged.)

Aide-Mémoire to be presented by Emb shld cover fol points; and of course shld take account of recent Emb conversation with Br Gov.

1. We recognize that there has been progress in expanding internatl embargo list, arriving at agreed definitions for items which may be controlled, and developing useful proposals for control of transit traffic.

2. We had hoped that experience of examining our 1–B list item by item, category by category, wld have demonstrated to the PC’s merit in US view that controls of varying scope, ranging from exchange of info to near embargo, are justified with respect to selected lists of items of major industrial importance to Sov bloc. We recognized that Brit views wld have considerable influence on attitudes other PC’s.

3. We are disappointed result this examination at Paris and Brit review their position has only been to confirm Brit in their opinion controls shld be limited to items of “direct strategic importance”, defined by them as excluding major industrial items which we consider are used to large extent by Sov bloc for mil rather than civilian production. Franks’ presentation and Aide-Mémoire restates views already expressed by Brit, and contain no new facts which might lead US to modify its evaluation of export control requirements.

4. We concur question of strategic criteria rather than quantitative control techniques is major issue between US and UK.

5. We are concerned to observe that if Brit position continues unchanged in near future, more than one half of all items on our 1–B list wld remain subj to no internatl control or even surveillance, having been rejected for control on grounds of insufficient strategic importance. The comprehensive nature of UK and CoCom recommendations for rejection (covering, for example, about three-fourths of items in categories of metal machinery, chemical equipment, steel mill products, and one-half of items in precision instruments and scientific apparatus field) convinces us current Brit and US views on basic policy questions diverge more sharply than we had expected.

6. We believe such divergence of view damaging to our mutual security interests in present internatl situation. Accordingly, we consider it essential explore these differences further, particularly our differing criteria as to what is strategic. We propose request matter be given serious consideration at next FonMins mtg in Sept, if difference cannot be resolved before that time.

B. We believe it worthwhile reemphasize to Brit in discussions certain fundamentals US position outlined below. Since we have made these points nr of times before, it may not be necessary include them in Aide-Mémoire.

1) US view is that objective of export control program is to promote and protect our mutual security by curbing development of Sov bloc war potential to extent possible and to extent consistent with building up western strength relative to that of East. (This is consistent with UK objective of “equality of advantage” in East-West commercial exchanges, and with efforts to increase E–W trade in nonstrategic items.) Econ health, polit stability, and continued close coop between Western countries are all recognized as essential elements contributing to western strength.

2) US view that industrial potential cannot be separated from war potential, and that both are of strategic importance, does not mean we favor indiscriminate embargo or severe limitation of such wide variety of exports as to constitute “general embargo”. We have tried to be selective and believe that such course can logically be pursued within framework of promoting and protecting our security. US view of Sov economy, however, leads to a definition of key areas to be controlled wider and deeper than that of UK.

3) Necessity for controlling items of “major industrial importance” is clear and immed, in US view. We are interested in items or categories which contribute substantially to war potential. We do not consider it possible to draw distinction in certain basic industrial categories between strategic fields or uses and normal peace-time industry or peacetime uses, when we are dealing with the controlled economies of Sov bloc which have kept to a bare minimum their “peace-time” production in order to divert large proportion natl production to direct mil preparations and to development mil potential. It is obviously essential to limit present mil strength of Sov bloc by denying direct mil end-products. US considers it equally essential to slow down rate development Sov war potential. Controls affecting immed or short-term striking power of potential enemy must be supplemented, we believe, by controls over many items which are basic to productive power and of greatest importance to mil power in the longer term. We cannot afford export materials and equipment which build up, or remove limits from industrial potential of nations which clearly have aggressive intentions.

4) Those who advocate controls only over very limited nr key strategic items underestimate ability of Sov bloc to concentrate attention toward solution of immed technical problems and, by giving high priority, produce any item which can be made in West (e.g., atom bomb). What USSR lacks is ability to engineer and produce in quantity sufficient variety of items requiring technical perfection in production process. Thus, restriction to Sov bloc areas of complicated mechanical items such as machine tools and precision instruments which USSR cannot produce in sufficient quantity forces diffusion of natl effort and esp of skilled technicians into activities less essential from mil viewpoint. Selection of items for control must in our view be broad and deep enough to affect an entire production complex and not merely such as wld create purely temporary shortages of one or two “key” components.

5) We hope UK will give further consideration to US views as stated above. We believe security considerations are deserving of greater weight than they have recd in past, even at risk of some econ losses. The emphasis on expansion of Western rearmament programs fol the action in Korea is a recognition that economies of Sov bloc are already on an advanced war-time footing. We consider this recognition shld be carried over to the field of export controls where one of major differences between US and UK has been degree to which items of basic industrial importance are likely to be used in support of mil, rather than civilian production. We feel recent internatl developments confirm need for stronger export control program of type envisaged by US.⁴

Acheson

1. This telegram, which was concurred in by the Department of Commerce and the Economic Cooperation Administration, was repeated to Paris as 900.
2. Not printed, but see footnote 5, p. 161.
3. Regarding the aide-mémoire and statement under reference here, see telegram 711, August 2, from London, p. 160.
4. The substance of the American position set forth in this telegram was communicated to the British Embassy in Washington in an aide-mémoire of August 24, not printed (460.509/8–2450). Telegram 1206, August 25, from London, not printed, reported the major points set forth in the telegram printed here were included in an aide-mémoire delivered to the British Foreign Office that same day. The Foreign Office doubted that there would be any change in official British policy until the matter could be discussed during the American-British-French Ministerial meetings in New York in September (460.419/8–2550).