Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

460.509/8–550: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France ¹

top secret

Washington, August 5, 1950—1 p. m.

667. Excon. Dept has determined upon approach in Excon negots for parallel action during next 2 or 3 months as described below FYI. Instrs will follow where pertinent.

1. In reaching decisions Dept aware that full report and formal recommendations USDel CoCom as result recent Paris negots not yet recd, but prelim comments and summary results 1–B review carefully studied in Dept.² Assume later reports will not materially alter recent Paris analysis of situation emphasizing probability other PCs, esp UK, will not go along with our 1–B proposals.

2. Dept is taking position in document being presented NSC that E–W trade is still impt to econ and polit health of West (relative advantage still our objective) and that best way of deciding what parallel controls shld be adopted is by free negot.³ Dept opposing coercive measures to achieve complete parallel action. If this position accepted by NSC Dept will be in better position to seek agreement on a somewhat shorter control list more effectively implemented, when CG has acted on present discussions.

3. Primary consideration at this time, in Dept view, is necessity obtain favorable decisions NSC level on these policies despite opposing views some other agencies. Dept considers it essential, esp in view present world situation, be able demonstrate to other agencies that most complete and forceful approach other PCs, short of coercion, has been made not only in CoCom but also in CG (we feel policy issues were not seriously discussed at last CG mtg) and at FonMins level (where policies just touched upon last mtg). All such past mtgs were pre-Korea. Accordingly, Dept believes it essential continue to stand firm on present policies, incl 1–B proposals, in forthcoming exchange views with Brit, in Sept FonMin mtg and in CG mtg assumed to follow, assuming UK position continues unchanged on basic policy issues. Meanwhile Dept will proceed with own review 1–B lists and control proposals and urge other agencies, esp Commerce, undertake similar review in light entire history this negot and recent CoCom developments in preparation for development new US position based on extent of agreement reached at next CG mtg.

4. Instrs re note to Brit will follow to London, reiterating previous US position, noting continued wide divergence views on policies, esp as to strategic nature our 1–B items, and declaring we believe it necessary seek consideration these matters at FonMins level. Somewhat stronger UK support our position, esp as to coverage lists, is not in our opinion yet out of question.

5. Dept believes no impt purpose served by effort at this time to work out relationship between CG/CoCom structure and NATO.

6. Your comments, which shld be addressed for Dept only, wld be welcome.

Acheson

1. Repeated to London as telegram 665.
2. Telegram 580, August 1, from Paris, not printed, observed that through July, Coordinating Committee consideration of 288 American 1–B List items had resulted in 15 being recommended for International List I, 30 for International List II, 75 for International List III, and 153 rejected as not of sufficient strategic importance to warrant control. An additional 15 were referred to the Consultative Group because they involved matters of policy. It was the opinion of the Embassy in Paris that, in the absence of a resolution of the basic policy differences between the United Kingdom and the United States, the saturation point had been reached on additions to the international lists (460.509/8–150).
3. The Department of State position referred to here is presented as Appendix A to document NSC 69/1, August 21, p. 167.