Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

446G.419/8–250: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

top secret

London, August 2, 1950—5 p. m.

711. Excon. 1. Makins,¹ FonOff, yesterday handed Embassy officer two aides-mémoire concerning strategic trade controls which are summarized herein.

2. First says (a) HMG have taken steps prohibit all exports from UK to North Korean destinations and instructed governor Hong Kong Singapore take necessary steps in respect exports North Korea from those colonies; (b) HMG have also taken steps control exports strategic items from UK to destinations in China and have instructed governor Hong Kong and Singapore take corresponding action in connection strategic exports to China from those colonies. (No information given exact meaning term “strategic exports”.²)

3. In response to Embassy officer observation that controls applicable Hong Kong Singapore to ships to China appear only partly adequate, Makins indicated HMG could go no further at present time; expressed hope problem could be solved by exchange information between colonial, US officials. Stated would welcome specific information re inadequacy controls. Embassy aware statements contained Hong Kong 11, July 29, sent Department 252 and Deptel 468, July 26, but would appreciate current and comprehensive evaluation from ConGen Hong Kong for submission FonOff. Makins did not provide any additional information along lines Embassy request referred to Embtel 372, July 17.³

4. Second aide-mémoire⁴ along same general lines Franks statements to Perkins as contained Department memo conversation July 25 but classified top secret.⁵ Slightly different specific content, however, and Makins attempted stress flexible nature British position. Stated whenever change international situation makes advisable, added weight could be given security concessions, pointing to recent action re POL products. Embassy officer asked Makins to confirm impression gained from discussion that HMG presently regards economic value EE trade as major factor influencing British decision not to meet US position. Makins said this impression correct.

5. Embassy officer also asked if aide-mémoire reference “items which can be accepted from 1–B list” indicated British willingness transfer additional items I/LI.⁶ Makins replied affirmatively. Also said British willing enter bilateral technical discussions with US soon as possible emphasizing desirability commencing these discussions without delay in order avoid further US–UK controversy in CoCom. As Department and other agencies Washington aware, this has familiar ring and disregards extensive bilateral and multilateral technical discussions which have taken place for more than one year. Embassy endeavoring clarify British views re scope such discussion and indication which 1–B items Britain has in mind.

6. Aide-mémoire did not suggest detailed discussions basis British POL as mentioned Deptel 474, July 26. Instead, Makins stated policy outlined in aide-mémoire fully reflected ministerial judgment after most careful consideration and expressed hope that, for reasons advanced in aide-mémoire and because of additional burdens, UK would assume as result rearmament program, US would not consider it necessary insist upon alteration UK policy.

7. Copies aides-mémoire being pouched today. Further Embassy comments will be submitted separate telegram and will not refer this telegram order avoid top secret classification.

Sent Department 711; repeated info Paris 184.

Douglas

1. Sir Roger Makins, British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
2. The aide-mémoire summarized here is not printed. Documentation on the control of trade with China and the Far East is presented in volume vi.
3. None of the messages under reference here are printed.
4. The text of the aide-mémoire under reference here was transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to despatch 606, August 2, from London, neither printed (460.509/8–250).
5. In a statement dated July 25 and handed to Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs George W. Perkins the same day, British Ambassador Sir Oliver Franks reported on the British Cabinet’s recently completed review of British East-West trade policy. The British concluded that they were in complete agreement with the United States on the ultimate objective of East-West trade controls—the limitation of Soviet war potential. The British maintained their previous attitude, however, that the mechanisms of export control proposed by the United States, involving prior consultation between participating countries before certain 1–B exports were approved and prior agreement on specific quotas for other 1–B exports, would be difficult, if not impossible, to carry out and would unnecessarily hamper trade with Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the British felt that the logical outcome of American control proposals would be a complete economic blockade of Eastern Europe, a course of action on which the United Kingdom could not embark. The United Kingdom was far more dependent upon trade with Eastern Europe than the United States and would be economically weakened by any severe curtailment of trade. The British asked the United States to consider a change in its views in the light of the analysis (460.509/7–2550). Telegram 474, July 26, to London, not printed, reported the receipt of this statement and that Ambassador Franks had expressed the desire of the British Foreign Office to discuss the matter with the American Embassy in London (460.419/7–2650).
6. International List I.