Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 18 Series

Report by the National Security Council to the President ¹

top secret
NSC 18/4

Washington, November 17, 1949.

United States Policy Toward the Conflict Between the USSR and Yugoslavia

the problem

1. To determine desirable United States courses of action in the event of possible developments in the conflict between the USSR and Yugoslavia.

analysis

United States Interests in the USSR-Yugoslav Conflict

2. Soviet success in destroying the Tito regime in Yugoslavia and supplanting it by a puppet government completely subservient to Moscow would represent a renewal and intensification of threats to the security of Greece and Italy and a serious political reverse for the United States and the Western European nations. The Western position in Trieste and Italy would immediately become more difficult and the present possibilities of a Yugoslav-Italian agreement on a Trieste solution would undoubtedly disappear. Direct Soviet control of all Yugoslav territory would have disastrous consequences for Greece. Because of the great blow to Greek morale and the opportunities for renewed and intensified guerrilla operations, it would be doubtful whether Greece could be saved from Soviet domination. While the limits of the area of Soviet control would merely be restored to what they were before the Tito–Kremlin break, the situation would in fact be worse, in that recent Western gains would have been lost or offset and increased momentum given to Soviet expansionism. Soviet success in subjugating Yugoslavia would have a tremendous psychological impact on Europe, which would be increased if Soviet action encountered only indecision and ineffective counter-measures on the part of the United States and other Western powers. In consequence, all the gains we have made in Central and Western Europe and in Greece during the past two years would be jeopardized.

3. The suppression of the Tito heresy could not fail to have a profound and perhaps decisive influence upon all those elements within the communist world which are presently resisting the absolute control of the Kremlin under the leadership and inspiration of Tito’s successful resistance.…

4. The United States is currently endeavoring to encourage continuation of Tito’s resistance to Moscow both through our general attitude toward the USSR-Yugoslav conflict and through limited measures of economic assistance (NSC 18; NSC 18/2²). However, present indications are that the USSR is contemplating more drastic action against Yugoslavia. In the event of such action, the Tito regime may well require additional support from the West as a means of encouraging further resistance. In particular, the expectation of receiving at least a limited amount of support in military supplies from the West would be an important factor in the calculations of the Yugoslav leaders. Assurances from the United States that military supplies would be obtainable in the event of direct or indirect Soviet aggression, even without specific commitments to provide fixed quantities of arms, would strengthen their determination to resist such aggression. Such assurances would aid the top leaders in keeping the support of their subordinates in key positions of the party and the army and in maintaining army morale.… Hence it is important that the United States immediately be in a position to give Yugoslavia a general assurance as to the availability of limited military supplies in the event of attack. However, the question of the types and amounts of assistance to be furnished would be determined at the time specific requests were received and on the basis of what appeared desirable and practicable in the light of conditions then prevailing. Such assistance would in any case be subject to the necessity for maintaining United States ability to implement emergency war plans.

Possible Soviet Courses of Action

5. Possible courses of action open to the Soviet Union in its present endeavor to liquidate the Tito regime fall into four categories:

a. Continuation and intensification of the present political, economic and psychological pressures, linked with attempts to instigate internal revolt within Yugoslavia and possibly accompanied by endeavors to assassinate Tito and his principal lieutenants.

b. Intensive guerrilla operations within Yugsolavia directed and supported from the outside.

c. Armed attack by the military forces of the satellite states not supported directly by the Soviet Army.

d. Direct armed attack by Soviet military forces, with or without assistance from the armies of the satellite countries bordering on Yugoslavia.

These possible courses of action are examined below in the light of (a) the likelihood of their adoption in accordance with estimates based on information available at this time and (b) their implications, if adopted, as related to United States security and national interests.

Continuation and intensification of present pressures, linked with attempts to instigate internal revolts in Yugoslavia and possibly with attempts to assassinate Tito and his chief lieutenants

6. Tito has shown his ability to withstand political, economic and psychological pressure. With the assurance of economic and financial support from the West, he should continue to hold his own, short of serious deterioration of conditions within Yugoslavia. His security forces should be able to thwart any attempts at internal revolution. Although the possibility of assassination cannot be overlooked, the removal of Tito alone from the scene would not be likely to change immediately³ the basic situation since the other Yugoslav Communist leaders are equally committed to his policies and involved in his heresy.

Intensive guerrilla operations within Yugoslavia directed and supported from the outside

7. The most likely development in the intensified Soviet offensive against Yugoslavia, along with increased political, economic and psychological pressures, is a campaign of guerrilla operations within Yugoslavia directed and supported by the USSR from neighboring states. Present indications are that the guerrilla effort against Tito will be focused on Yugoslav Macedonia, the weakest spot in the present Yugoslav political structure. It would be based chiefly on Bulgaria and Albania. Probably the remnants of the Greek guerrilla forces would be utilized and would operate alongside “Macedonian” formations from bases in these two countries. Troop movements, “frontier incidents”, and lesser guerrilla activities are likely along the borders of Rumania and Hungary. (Guerrillas could not operate, except by air, from the Soviet Zone of Austria, which is not adjacent to Yugoslavia.)

8. Yugoslav security forces are presently able to protect the Tito regime from attack from within and the Yugoslav army should be able to deal with guerrilla operations unless they are on a large scale and supported by Soviet direction and supplies. Yugoslavia, however, would soon run short of military equipment, since its military establishment was largely built up with supplies from the Soviet bloc from which it has now been cut off for months. Tito would need arms from the West as well as economic and financial support. In a long struggle, his increasing dependence upon the West would make possible greater accommodation with Greece and also with Italy and thus increase the possibilities for a Yugoslav-Italian settlement of the Trieste problem. In the eventuality of such a protracted guerrilla campaign, in which Tito would have a good chance of maintaining his position, the United States and the West would have greater opportunities, by helping him to maintain Yugoslavia’s independence, of drawing Yugoslavia closer to the West.

9. The use of Albania by the Soviets as a base against Tito would raise questions concerning counteraction by Tito against Albania, the future of the Albanian regime, the interests of Yugoslavia, of Greece and of the Western powers in Albania, and the possibilities which are open to the United States and other Western powers in that strategic area. At present there appear to be four alternatives in the Albanian problem:

a. the continuance of the present Soviet-controlled regime of Enver Hoxha;

b. a revolt which would bring in a pro-Tito regime;

c. a revolt which would bring in an anti-Communist and pro-Western regime;

d. occupation and partition of Albania by Greece and Yugoslavia.

10. There are presently about one thousand Russians in Albania who are in complete control of the Government. The USSR desires to maintain this control as long as possible as a menace with at least nuisance value against Greece and Yugoslavia. Internal disaffection and economic distress have reached a point where the present regime faces serious internal difficulties which might invite intervention from both Yugoslavia and Greece.⁴ A pro-Tito group of Albanians in Yugoslavia has been formed and may at some future time enter Albania in an attempt to seize power. Tito has recently said that it was vital to Yugoslavia that Albanian independence be respected. Moreover, at the present stage of the USSR-Yugoslav conflict, Tito can hardly afford to court trouble by open intervention in Albania at a time when he is under pressure from the USSR.

11. Should intervention in Albania from Yugoslavia occur, there would be a danger of direct Greek intervention with a view to occupying at least southern Albania, which the Greeks claim as “Northern Epirus”. Renewal of guerrilla activity based on Albania might also provoke the Greeks to march in. Such events might have grave international consequences possibly leading to a general conflict; in addition, they would seriously complicate the Balkan picture and might operate to arrest and reverse the Yugoslav-Greek trend toward mutual cooperation against the Cominform. Direct Yugloslav or Greek intervention in Albania, moreover, would operate to prevent the seizure of power by anti-Communist, pro-Western Albanian elements.

Armed attach on Yugoslavia by military forces of Soviet satellite states

12. Yugoslavia’s armed forces should be able to defeat any attack by neighboring satellite states (Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary) not given substantial support by the USSR. In numbers, quality and morale the Yugoslav forces are stronger than the combined forces of the four satellites. It is not likely, therefore, that the USSR would direct the satellite states to attack Yugoslavia unless it were sure of their success. Thus, any such military campaign by the satellites would certainly have Soviet direction, Soviet support, and probably the assistance of Soviet military personnel in satellite uniforms.

13. If Soviet participation in such an attack by the satellites were sufficiently open and large-scale, the USSR itself could be charged as a party to the aggression, and the same considerations would apply as in the case of direct attack by Soviet forces (paragraphs 16–20 below). If Soviet participation were veiled but in sufficient strength, the satellites might succeed, after a relatively extended struggle, in winning a military victory over Tito unless he could replenish his military equipment from Western sources. In following this course, the Russians could hardly count on a quick victory. They would incur the risk that the satellite armies would suffer some military reverses and that a long drawn-out struggle would bring increasing possibilities of a general conflict. The West would be given time to take stock of the developing situation, and the United Nations probably would have time to take up the question before military operations terminated.

14. For the United States, the implications of a military conquest of Yugoslavia by the Soviet satellites with Soviet support would be the same as in the case of a military campaign waged by the Soviet Army itself.

15. Three of the satellite states in question (Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania) were Axis states in the last war, and the peace treaties with them have been in effect only two years. The fourth satellite (Albania) was considered neither an Allied nor an Axis state during the war, but since the war it has a record of treaty violations and of aggression against Greece.

Armed attach by Soviet military forces, with or without assistance by satellite forces

16. Although Tito’s heresy represents an intolerable challenge to Soviet authority, the Soviet Government is not likely to risk a direct military attack on Yugoslavia which might develop into a general conflict. Without doubt the Kremlin will exploit all possibilities short of war to liquidate the Tito regime. Our knowledge of Soviet methods indicates that Moscow will probably exercise patience and restraint in this operation, resorting to direct and overt force only under conditions where the Kremlin would believe that⁵ there exists little or no risk of a general war, which the Soviet Union apparently desires at this time to avoid. It is the considered view of United States diplomatic missions in Moscow and in southeast Europe that the present Soviet threats accompanied by troop movements in the satellite areas represent one phase of the war of nerves against Tito rather than preparations for an actual military attack. The increasingly hysterical tenor of Soviet accusations against Tito, however, and the extent to which Moscow is staking its prestige on the early elimination of the Tito regime indicate the possibility that the USSR may launch a blitzkrieg with the aim of destroying Tito’s power in Yugoslavia and replacing him with a puppet regime completely subservient to Moscow. It should be constantly borne in mind that the Kremlin regards the Yugoslav problem as a communist family affair rather than a conflict between two sovereign states. This Soviet view coupled with the extreme importance which the Politburo undoubtedly attaches to an early solution of the Yugoslav problem may well distort its appreciation of the international consequences of overt military action on the part of the Soviet Union against the Tito regime.

17. Should the Soviet Army undertake a full-scale attack on Yugoslavia, it could quickly overrun the flat northern part of the country and take Belgrade. The Yugoslav forces, however, should be able to maintain resistance for some months in the mountainous central area, and in any case to continue widespread guerrilla operations for a long period. According to present military estimates, the Soviet Army would meet substantial obstacles to complete and rapid conquest of Yugoslavia owing to the geographical situation of the country, the terrain, the training and morale of the Yugoslav Army and the difficulty of subduing a hostile population.

18. A direct Soviet military attack on Yugoslavia would represent a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter, Article 2 of which requires all members to settle their international disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.

19. In addition, such aggression would raise certain questions relating to the right of the USSR to use the territory of other states for the purpose of attacking Yugoslavia. Inasmuch as Russian territory is not adjacent to Yugoslav territory, any Soviet attack would probably come through Hungary and Rumania and possibly Bulgaria. Under the peace treaties, the Soviet Union is entitled to keep in Hungary and Rumania “such armed forces as it may need for the maintenance of lines of communication of the Soviet Army with the Soviet Zone of Occupation in Austria”. If Soviet troops in Hungary and Rumania were used for another purpose, i.e., aggression against Yugoslavia, such would represent a violation of treaty obligations which the United States might protest. While the legal grounds for protest would be weakened by the consent of the Rumanian and Hungarian Governments to such use of their territories by Soviet forces, the abuse by the USSR of this specific limited treaty right in order to prepare and carry out aggression against a former allied state and member of the United Nations would justify the United States in protesting strongly. These clauses of the peace treaties were the product of long negotiation between the Western powers and the USSR and from our point of view were intended to contain the Soviet military position in Europe and not merely to protect Hungary and Rumania. The situation is somewhat different in Bulgaria as under the Bulgarian peace treaty the Soviet Union was required to withdraw all of its occupation forces, but here again the Bulgarian Government would undoubtedly invite the Soviet Army to return.

20. Although the Soviet Zone in Austria is not contiguous to Yugoslavia, the Soviet Army might make use of that Zone in connection with an attack on Yugoslavia probably as a military staging area and as a base for air attacks. In this event, the United States, the U.K. and France would have legal grounds to protest such action as a violation of the agreements which form the basis for the allied occupation of Austria.

United States Psychological and Information Measures

21. The Information and Educational Exchange Program of the Department of State attempts to counteract Soviet propaganda by disseminating in all areas, and particularly in Soviet-dominated areas, developments relating to the Moscow–Belgrade controversy. Soviet actions and the resultant Yugoslav revelations concerning methods used by the USSR in its international relations, provide useful material for this purpose. In its propaganda the Soviet Union champions peace, the equality of nations and national sovereignty; it poses as defender of small nations from imperialist economic exploitation. Recent developments in Yugoslav-Russian relations demonstrate Soviet violation of the very principles it professes to champion. United States information media should continue to document this discrepancy between Soviet myth and reality. The information and educational exchange programs should also (a) emphasize our concern for the national independence of the Yugoslavs as well as of other peoples, and (b) strengthen the Yugoslav people in their resolve to defend their independence and sovereignty.…

conclusions

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1. This report was prepared by the Staff of the National Security Council with the advice and assistance of representatives of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the National Security Resources Board, and the Central Intelligence Agency. It was based on document PPS 60, September 12, 1949, Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. v, p. 947. This report was originally submitted to the National Security Council as NSC 18/3, November 10, 1949, and was circulated to the Under Secretary of State’s Meeting as document UM D–60a, November 10. The Under Secretary’s Meeting of November 15 approved the report with a few minor suggested changes. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were set forth in its memorandum of November 16 to the Secretary of Defense, supra. At its meeting on November 17, the National Security Council adopted NSC 18/3 subject to amendments suggested by the Secretary of State (to paragraphs 6, 10, 16, and 26h) and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (to paragraphs 22a, 27a, and the deletion of 24d). On November 18 Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, informed the Council that President Truman had that day approved the report as printed here and had directed that it be implemented under the coordination of the Secretary of State.

   Differences between NSC 18/3 and the final approved text printed here are indicated in annotations at the appropriate places.

   On December 20 a Department of State top secret aide-mémoire dated December 19, not printed, summarizing the principal conclusions and recommendations of this Report was delivered to the British Embassy in Washington (860H.00/12–1949). The following day, Officer in Charge of Balkan Affairs John C. Campbell and Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs Charles W. Yost called John H. English, Commercial Counselor of the Canadian Embassy, to the Department of State in order to make available to the Canadian Government the general conclusions contained in this Report and to lay the basis for cooperation between the two governments. The Canadian Government had recently been approached by the Yugoslav Government with a request for the shipment of TNT. Campbell’s memorandum of this conversation is filed under 660H.119/12–2149.

   This document was not available for public release at the time of the publication of the other 1949 documentation on policies toward Yugoslavia referred to in footnote 1, p. 1338.

2. NSC 18, July 6, 1948, entitled “The Attitude of This Government Toward Events in Yugoslavia” is the same as document PPS 35, June 30, 1948, Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. iv, p. 1079. Regarding NSC 18/2, see the editorial note, ibid., 1949, vol. v, p. 868.
3. The word “immediately” is not included in NSC 18/3 (UM D–60a).
4. In NSC 18/3, November 10 (UM D–60a), this sentence reads as follows: “Internal disaffection and economic distress have reached a point where the present regime faces revolt, thus inviting intervention from both Yugoslavia and Greece.”
5. The phrase “the Kremlin would believe that” in this sentence does not appear in document NSC 18/3 (UMD–60a).