S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 18 Series1

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Secretary of Defense2

top secret

Subject: United States Policy Toward the Conflict Between the USSR and Yugoslavia

In accordance with the request contained in your memorandum of 10 November 1949,3 the Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied NSC 18/3, a report by the National Security Council Staff, which you enclosed, entitled “United States Policy Toward the Conflict Between the USSR and Yugoslavia”, and are in general agreement with those sections of the report which have military implications.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff fully concur in the thought expressed in paragraph 3 of the Analysis in the report that it is in the important interests of the West that Tito maintain his resistance. They perceive significant security advantages to the United States if the rift between Tito and the Kremlin continues and especially if Tito’s example gives impetus to defections by other satellite states. Yugoslav success in opposing Soviet domination could, in fact, present opportunities which the United States might capitalize on to attain certain of its national objectives as set forth in NSC 20/4.4 Because of the advantages which we may obtain through this rift, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that, from the military point of view, United States aid to the Tito regime, both economic aid and military aid short of participation, is sound.

It appears, however, that there are two considerations which are unfavorable to the course of action under study.…

The second unfavorable consideration is our present apparent difficulty in providing any form of immediate gratuitous governmental aid to Tito. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will not agree to military aid in support of the Tito regime furnished at the expense of United [Page 1340] States ability to implement our emergency war plans. At the present time, the Department of Defense is faced with a supply situation which does not admit foreign military aid other than to an extremely limited extent without impairing our ability to prosecute a war, if war were now forced upon us. Implementation of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 is predicated upon this fact. Moreover, Yugoslavia cannot become a beneficiary within the present provisions of that Act. Thus, the United States capability of providing immediate gratuitous governmental assistance to the Yugoslavs is practically negligible. On the other hand, our Government could facilitate Yugoslav purchases of war material from private sources in the United States and could expedite the export of these purchases. The United States could also use its influence to facilitate Yugoslav cash purchases of war materials in other countries. If necessary, the Department of Defense could justify military support of legislation to provide funds necessary for Yugoslav military assistance. In addition, there rests in the President certain emergency powers and budgetary decisions which can be used by him, if in his judgment circumstances demand it.

The major policy decision which should be made now is the extent to which we are willing to back Tito against the Kremlin. In the subject paper, the amount of military aid is stated in indefinite terms. The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest that the conclusion in sub-paragraph 22–a of the paper be altered to indicate that “he [Tito] can count on obtaining military aid from the West appropriate to the Yugoslav situation.…” Any lesser policy statement would be temporizing with the situation. If we are not prepared to go this far should the situation warrant it, the Joint Chiefs of Staff doubt if we should give any further aid to Tito, since without appropriate and probably substantial aid from us, we cannot expect to profit from his success. Furthermore, we stand to suffer loss of prestige if Tito fails.

This policy … would, of course, be predicated upon the continued success of that regime. Consequently, it would be necessary to keep the situation in Yugoslavia under constant review. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would suggest deleting sub-paragraph 24–d from the report since it would be better if the United States position in the Security Council were related to the situation existing in Yugoslavia at the time and in the light of all attendant circumstances.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that sub-paragraph 27–a of the Conclusions to the report provides merely a device for anticipating in some measure the military supply requirements of Yugoslavia. In all probability, the estimate of probable requirements would be based primarily upon intelligence and its principal use would be in justification and in support of military aid legislation for Yugoslavia. Such estimates would require revision as Yugoslav requests for military [Page 1341] supplies are received. Accordingly, it is suggested that a sentence be added at the end of the subject sub-paragraph as follows:

These estimates, however, would require revision as Yugoslav requests for military supplies are received and, therefore, should be prepared in the broadest terms to be considered as tentative estimates only.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Omar N. Bradley
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
  1. Lot 63 D 351 is a serial master file of the National Security Council documents and correspondence and related Department of State memoranda for the years 1947–1961, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.
  2. This memorandum was circulated to the National Security Council in connection with the Council’s consideration of NSC 18/3, November 10. The amendments and deletions proposed in this memorandum were subsequently incorporated in NSC 18/4, November 17 (infra) which was approved by the Council. Differences between NSC 18/3 and 18/4 are indicated in annotations to the latter document.

    This document was not available for public release at the time of publication of the other 1949 documentation on policies toward Yugoslavia described in footnote 1, supra.

  3. Not printed.
  4. The reference here is to the Report by the National Security Council to President Truman, dated November 23, 1948 and entitled “U.S. Objectives With Respect to the USSR To Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security”. For text of NSC 20/4, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. i, Part 2, p. 662.