Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

450.119/6–250: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

secret

Paris, June 2, 1950—6 p. m.

2644. Excon. A. CG meeting report (per agenda Embtel 2514 May 25¹):

1. All CoCom recommendations agreed subject: UK undecided some items; US accepted lists subject clarification or expansion some items; Belgium unprepared accept lists in view lack French translation; Norway uninstructed on lists and information exchanges.²

2. Tanker decision³ suspended pending Dutch and Danish consideration Italian proposal (strongly supported by French) that no list I acceptance be qualified but each PC entitled have special CoCom consideration of hardship cases before making trade commitments. Dutch and Danes considered such pre-consultation unfeasible and therefore probably unacceptable to their governments. If unacceptable CoCom will consider further.

3. Danes repeated January general reservation claiming special economic situation and small volume strategic exports. Also noted lack existing controls. However, will submit 1949 export figures and maybe reconsider position if CoCom considers amounts “dangerous”. Extension Italian proposal (see 2 above) to Danish general reservation considered by Danes unacceptable now. France and UK opposed Danish position as endangering common front.

4. No decision basic policy conflict. US discussed US system, stressing selectivity and evaluation extent Soviet concentration on war potential. USDel stated total embargo logical extension of general approach but would relay US remarks to London. French stated general agreement US objective but felt proposing PC should demonstrate how control would affect Soviet vulnerability and relative East-West advantages. CG agreed on early CoCom reading 1–B items after current technical review for prompt listing of items mutually acceptable regardless of policy approach.

5. Accepted US suggestion for deferring decision on new list II procedures until list II selections made. January list II principles confirmed for interim.

6. Agreed any PC could submit special information in addition to export statistics and CoCom could discuss.

7. Chairman stressed importance of transit trade controls. CoCom urged to develop effective methods promptly.

8. Confirmed November trade agreement principles without discussion. Italy made no new proposals.

9. CG chairman will present Int lists I and II and CoCom progress information to Swedes and Swiss and inquire possibility their adopting similar controls. Chairman suggested individual PC’s also make individual approaches.⁴

10. Agreed CoCom could consider any matter within CG competence. Also agreed any unanimous CoCom agreement on basis government instructions be treated as action decision for immediate PC adoption without CG confirmation. CG also agreed CoCom authorized to discuss any matter within CG competence. Also agreed CG could be called into special sessions on request any PC when necessary without awaiting regular periodic meeting.

B. Per Deptel 2450, May 29,⁵ US representative held preliminary discussion May 30 with CG chairman Alphand re general US policy and CG agenda. Alphand said France prepared control or embargo any item on showing vulnerability Soviet economy which he agreed largely devoted military preparation. Re agenda, Alphand expressed hope tanker reservations might be rejected by CG in order avoid French necessity entering similar reservations on oil pipe. (This situation reflected in CG meeting during which Alphand attacked reservation and persuaded Danes and Dutch to agree consider acceptance Italian proposal, thus avoiding general retreat from list I principles.)

C. At suggestion Alphand, US representative at executive session June 1 gave delegation heads resume of reasons for US attachment importance export controls, basing talk on OIR study as authorized Deptel 2458, May 29,⁶ stressing degree to which Soviet economy devoted to military preparation, and that US selection items made on basis lend-lease, military, trade and US wartime industrial experience. Feel definite impression made on CG delegates, some of whom stated that this was first time they understood reasons for deep US interest.

D. Believe progress made, although reservation to list I and Danish problem not settled. If policy problems resolved (item 4) we might expect substantial progress in listing 1–B items.

E. Summary decisions of CG and full report of meeting will follow by air pouch.

Sent Department 2644; repeated info London 736, Bern, Brussels, Copenhagen, Frankfort, Hague, Oslo, Rome, Stockholm, Trieste, Vienna unnumbered.

Bruce

1. Not printed.
2. The Consultative Group was considering a report of May 25 from the Coordinating Committee reviewing the Committee’s work since February on such matters as the policy towards Yugoslavia, the special position of Austria and Finland, the question of transit trade, and the consideration of International Lists I, II, and III. The report asked the delegates to the Consultative Group to signify their governments’ acceptance of the various Coordinating Committee recommendations on these and other subjects.
3. In early May the Coordinating Committee agreed to include tankers and whalers on International List I. In agreeing, Denmark reserved the right to issue export licenses for tankers if it were found that they were indispensable for the conclusion of trade agreements with Eastern European countries, and the Netherlands agreed subject to the reservation that prior trade commitments would have to be fulfilled. The matter was referred to the Consultative Group for resolution. Both Denmark and the Netherlands withdrew their reservations during the summer of 1950.
4. Consultative Group Chairman Hervé Alphand (Director General for Economic and Financial Affairs, French Foreign Ministry) carried out the agreed upon démarches to the Swedish and Swiss diplomatic representatives in Paris in early July. The September 12 meeting of the Coordinating Committee was informed by the French Delegate that Alphand had received no definitive responses to his approaches (Despatch 650, September 13, from Paris: 460.509/9–1350).
5. Not printed, but see footnote 5, supra.
6. Not printed. It authorized the American Delegation to the Consultative Group to emphasize that the current high rate of Soviet industrial production devoted to military purposes constituted a real threat to Western security. Any export to the Soviet bloc of essential raw materials or industrial components added directly to the strength of an industrial organization already geared for war production at a rate higher than that of the West and thereby contributed to a greater relative increase of Eastern Europe’s military potential. In advancing this argument, the American Delegation was authorized to use OIR Report 5204, May 5, 1950, a 25-page report by the Division of Research for Europe of the Office of Intelligence Research entitled “Impact of Export Controls on East-West Trade” (450.6031/5–2950).