Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

450.6031/5–2450: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Acting Secretary of State

secret niact

Paris, May 24, 1950—8 p. m.

2492. Excon. 1. As previously reported (Embtels 2367, May 17,¹ 2390, May 19²), present status 1B negotiations is:

(a) PC acceptance individual 1B items for List II (or alternatively List I or III)—even on basis List II concepts—deferred for further CoCom discussion. Such discussion deferred pending technical review most items tentatively scheduled through June (Embtels 2413, May 21, 2440, May 23³). Time and extent ultimate acceptance for international lists uncertain. CoCom discussions forecast considerable PC resistance reflecting highly selective approach, economic impact, administrative difficulties, and claimed intent that List II be kept short.

(b) List II control procedures scheduled for CG discussion May 31. Two issues may be involved. First, France and UK have informally indicated possible interpretative question on List II concept as approved January meetings. (See January 19 report by Working Committee on List; reference Embassy despatch 962, May 2, 1950.²) French suggest concept does not obligate PC’s to pre-shipment control. UK suggests concept does not obligate PC’s to immediate pre-shipment control, but allows surveillance with later introduction formal or informal unilateral control where found necessary. Second, discussion US proposal for new multilateral List II controls (preconsultation and quotes in addition to current information exchanges) is scheduled.

2. Subject concurrence Department, Embassy recommends that US CG delegate position on above issues be:

(a) Confirmation that January CG agreement List II requires

(1) institution by PC’s of formal or informal pre-shipment controls,

(2) restriction exports to EE in administering such controls, and

(3) exchange of relevant information;

(b) Exposition of US pre-consultation and quota proposals at CG, but deferral of decision until next CG meetings; and

(c) CoCom be instructed expedite technical expert review of items and proceed soonest consider addition 1B items to international lists as presently defined by CG.

3. CG will also consider May 31 following general aspects control problems applicable both to 1A and 1B lists:

(a) Basic difference in PC policy approaches to further control i.e., UK approach of controlling only key items in fields which normally contribute directly to military potentials vs. US thesis that, in current situation, all items having major industrial significance contribute directly to Soviet war potential. (UK approach reportedly represents cabinet decision according informal remarks UK CoCom delegate. Apparently scheduled for review according London telegram 2838, repeated Paris 899, May 22.⁴ Informal remarks French CoCom delegate indicate possible similar French review.

(b) Difference between US and UK concepts in selecting specific items to be controlled. UK proposes restricting selection to relatively smaller number so-called key items.

4. With respect 3(a) above, split seriously hampers conduct and results of negotiations. If CoCom consideration of technically reviewed 1B items to be constructive policy, difference must be immediately resolved. Such resolution could be produced by CG agreement that multilateral control program is directed to limiting export to Soviet bloc of items of high value Soviet bloc war potential and not limited only to items normally employed in West for direct military item production.

Subject concurrence Department, it is recommended that US delegate to CG indicate (1) that current control program is another facet of basic mutual security effort recently discussed London; (2) that US is of opinion, based on available intelligence, Soviet bloc currently making wide use normal peacetime industry to build up maximum war machine and therefore 1B items properly classified as war potential for Soviet bloc notwithstanding peacetime uses some of these items in Western countries; (3) that permitting export significant quantities 1B items to Soviet bloc (thus aiding increased power Soviet war machine while Western nations undertaking major effort to establish more effective Western industrial war potential) would be inconsistent with recent London discussions, even with due regard to balancing relative advantages in East-West trade. If above approach acceptable, request Department provide soonest maximum information regarding utilization of Soviet industry for building war machine. Provide illustrative examples for disclosure to PC’s and estimated percentage total national income Soviet bloc being directed military effort.

5. With respect to 3(b) above, subject concurence Department believe position CG delegate this issue should be: (1) that US has consistently employed selective approach this control as evidenced by narrowness of listings on 1A List and by partial or complete exclusion many industrial and other fields from 1B List; and (2) that PC selection of specific items for control should not be governed by arbitrary principle that control lists should contain only few items, but instead should depend on analysis of individual items.

6. Embassy believes most progress obtainable by (1) going on record at CG regarding US proposal preconsultation and quotas; (2) not forcing decision now such proposals in absence agreement regarding items to be so controlled; and (3) pressing strongly for resolution above policy issues now obstructing CoCom consideration individual 1B items and for earliest CoCom consideration such items. Believe this approach if successful will achieve at least some degree effective control List II items. Still believe (1) above closely related final implementation control List II items, but believe final consideration can await further developments and disposition items.

7. If Department agreeable above CG position, US delegation suggests authority for immediate high level approach Paris and if Embassy London agreeable, in London for advance presentation US views.⁵ Regard such approach as reasonable follow-up Secretary’s recent talks Bevin and Schuman and timely in view UK and French review mentioned 2 (a) above. Without such approach, doubt definitive results can be expected from May 31 CG discussion.

8. Above approach viewed as fruitless if US technical experts not made available as urgently requested (Embtel 2931, May 19⁶).

9. Above discussed with Martin of Department and with Baldwin and Bartlett of London Embassy.

10. May 31 date for CG meeting now confirmed.

Repeated information London 699.

Bruce

1. Ante, p. 128.
2. Not printed.
3. Neither printed.
2. Not printed.
4. Supra.
5. In telegram 2450, May 29, to Paris, repeated to London as 2589, not printed, the Department of State approved the proposed position for the Consultative Group meeting and the approach to the British and French Governments set forth in the telegram printed here (450.6031/5–2950). The substance of sections 2 through 6 of this telegram were set forth in an aide-mémoire of May 30 from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the British Foreign Office, a copy of which was transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to despatch 2752, June 7, from London, neither printed (450.6031/6–750).
6. Not printed.