Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

450.6031/5–1750: Telegram

The Ambassador in Sweden (Matthews) to the Secretary of State

secret

Stockholm, May 17, 1950—5 p. m.

659. Re Depcirtel April 28, 10 a. m.¹ We do not believe it desirable attempt Joint US–UK assessment Swedish position this time. We have reported British views (Embtel 442, April 4, repeated London 63, Paris 95 and Embtel 503, April 18, repeated Paris 109, London 76 and Embdes 430 April 20²).

British have made only occasional inquiries to Foreign Office on certain special aspects East-West trade. To our knowledge they have not stressed basic policies nor desire for parallel Swedish action except in casual manner. Embassy has requested that British Foreign Office be approached in effort obtain instructions to British Ambassador Stockholm³ to approach Swedish Foreign Office on high level and to give firm assurance that British approach this problem is along same lines. To date no such action has developed.

Accordingly, while we are satisfied British Embassy officials individually believe Swedish controls and information not satisfactory, we believe it premature attempt joint assessment Swedish position before British have taken more aggressive action.

British recently requested Harris Chief ECA Mission⁴ to discuss history ECA talks during 1948–1949 with Swedes on East-West matters. Harris assumed British Ambassador wanted full story negotiations, possibly for background before urging action on Swedes. He found however that British Ambassador evidenced practically no interest in making representations to Swedish Foreign Office and that his main concern was on satisfactory solution Freja mines case (see Embtels 508, April 19, and 492, April 17⁵). British anxious obtain ECA Mission export for an agreement on Freja which would provide satisfactory settlement British interests even though would result some expansion export strategic items, including bearings to Czechoslovakia. Harris refused to be drawn into this issue, but came away with strong impression lack of intention British Ambassador make any vigorous move East-West trade in absence definite British Foreign Office instructions.

At present, we are only prepared to comment briefly some main factors Swedish situation:

1. Reference Swedish production. As OSR reports have indicated, Sweden is one of few OEEC countries which has maintained trade with Eastern Europe above prewar levels. Some of this trade and some of the expansion is in strategic items, for example, ball and roller bearings. Thus, we are concerned about tendency volume of trade to expand when strategic items constitute an important part. Other items of importance, although possibly not on American list; include for example, iron ore. Also, we do not have sufficient official timely information on this trade with Eastern Europe. We have been piecing the picture together bit by bit, and believe that ultimately we should obtain Foreign Office agreement to current and complete information.

2. While we have of course Government decree of November 1949 we have only vague assurances from Swedish officials as to how that decree will be administered. We believe that we should work towards increased information on the supplementary lists re the items listed in decree and should obtain better current record of export controls in terms of American and international lists.

3. Understand consultative group will determine whether international lists I and II informal report progress CoCom activity should be made available by Belgians to Swiss on informal basis. If CG so determines believe US should request permission transmit same information Swedish Government. Embassy would take advantage such opportunity to reemphasize US concern absence more adequate Swedish control.

4. Control of reexportation and in-transit shipments. The recent report of CoCom to the CG on transit controls appears to represent marked progress this area. If recommendations which appear to be applicable both to transit control and reexportation are accepted by CG, Embassy would propose; subject concurrence Department, approaching Swedish Government to obtain its concurrence institute comparable control. Application principles involved would likewise be sought for Swedish freeports. While not optimistic, results such efforts, believe attempt worth while.⁶

Sent Department 659; repeated information Paris 114 for Excon, London 117, pouched Moscow.

Matthews

1. Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 105.
2. None printed.
3. Sir Harold L. Farquhar.
4. Michael S. Harris, Chief of the Economic Cooperation Administration Mission in Sweden.
5. Neither printed.
6. Telegram 2561, May 26, to London, repeated to Stockholm as 365, not printed, asked that the British Foreign Office be approached on a high level with a view that more affirmative British action was necessary to progress trade control discussions with Sweden (450.6031/5–1750). In early June the British Foreign Office agreed to make an approach to the Swedish Government, but the initial action was delayed until early October 1950.