Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

460.509/6–1550

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs (Martin)¹

secret

[Washington, undated.]

Discussion of East-West Trade at London Meetings

In addition to official level discussions with the British in London and with the British and French in Paris in advance of the ministerial meetings, at which the U.S. point of view was vigorously presented, I put forward the U.S. position at Paris with Mr. Schuman, in London with Mr. Bevin, and in London at the Tripartite Meetings with Mr. Bevin and Mr. Schuman.²

To Mr. Schuman in Paris I emphasized the major importance which the United States attaches to the control of east-west trade and the necessity of concentrating not only on growing stronger but also on reducing the potential of the USSR. I expressed the hope that the forthcoming meetings of the Consultative Group³ would reach rapid and fruitful conclusions. Mr. Schuman expressed the view that the French had thus far agreed to renounce all deliveries which had strategic value and could strengthen the military potential of the USSR. He expressed concern over too strict limitations on Germany which would cut her off from her natural markets to the East. He feared that what he referred to as “useless limitations such as trucks” might ruin the German economy, and hoped that limitations could be based on Strictly military and strategic limitations.⁴

With Mr. Bevin I went into the difference, as we saw it, between the 1–A and 1–B list, recognizing that controls affected balance of payments but emphasized that they also were of great importance to security and that we felt it necessary to press for an agreement which would be as close as possible to the U.S. position. I pointed out that it was, in our judgement, foolish to give the USSR the economic advantages of much of the present trade. Mr. Bevin thought that we were pretty well in agreement on this whole issue. The U.S. Delegation explained the differences which existed with respect to the 1–B list and the question of pre-consultation instead of post-review. Mr. Bevin asked what exactly we wanted them to do and I urged that the present differences among the experts on the relative importance to security and to trade of denying, for example, trucks involved questions of broad political judgement which we hoped would be considered in that light at the ministerial level. The British Delegation then raised the question as to whether our proposals for what seemed to them to be tantamount to an embargo on a large number of 1–B items was not really a change in policy, looking to economic blockade or warfare. I urged that we not emphasize labels but analyze on an individual basis the relative advantage to the Soviets and to ourselves of trade in items of this character. Mr. Bevin concluded by saying that he thought the British were in full agreement with us but on the basis of this discussion he would take the matter up with the Board of Trade.⁵

At the Tripartite Meetings the question arose in connection with a paper prepared by the officials of the advance delegations, in which the British and French objected to the strictness of present controls of trade between West Germany and the Soviet orbit, and recommended that these controls be relaxed to the level being followed by the other European countries.⁶ I expressed myself as quite unable to agree to this proposal. Rather I thought the emphasis should be on prompt consideration by the other governments of bringing their controls up to the level of Western Germany and the United States. I hoped that it would be from this standpoint that they would give instructions to their experts in the forthcoming talks and that not until we had made a maximum effort to bring their controls to the highest possible level should we reconsider present policies in Germany. This was agreed to by Schuman and Bevin.⁷

[Edward M. Martin]

1. A brief covering memorandum drafted by Martin, dated June 15, not printed, indicates that the memorandum printed here was prepared for the possible use of the Secretary of State in reporting to the National Security Council on the discussion of East-West trade at the London Tripartite (U.S.-U.K.-French) Ministerial Meetings, May 11–13.
2. Preliminary to the London Tripartite Ministerial Meetings, May 11–13, Secretary of State Acheson and his advisers held a series of conversations with French Foreign Minister Schuman and his advisers in Paris on May 8 and with British Foreign Secretary Bevin and his advisers in London on May 9 and 10. These bilateral and trilateral discussions covered a wide range of topics. The full record of these discussions is printed in vol. iii, pp. 828 ff.
3. The Consultative Group was originally scheduled to meet on May 25 but instead met on May 31. For the report of that meeting, see telegram 2644, June 2, from Paris, p. 136.
4. The discussion summarized here occurred during the morning session of the American-French Ministerial conversations in Paris on May 8.
5. The discussion summarized here occurred during the closing session of the American-British Ministerial conversations in London on May 10.
6. Regarding the paper under reference here, see footnote 7, p. 105.
7. The discussion summarized here occurred during the May 12 session of Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meetings in London.