Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

PPS Files: Lot 64 D 563: Germany

Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff Representative on the National Security Council Staff (Wooldridge)¹

top secret

Washington, October 30, 1950.

1. Paragraphs 42 and 43 of NSC 73/4,² “The Position and Actions of the United States with Respect to Possible Further Soviet Moves in the Light of the Korean Situation,” pertain to the possible blockading of Berlin and/or Vienna by the USSR. The Department of Defense has made a study of our present airlift capabilities, the results of which are summarized below. As used herein, the phrase “short-term requirements” means those minimum essential needs which will maintain the city on a strict austerity basis for a short period of time. The phrase “long-term requirements” means those needs which will maintain the city over an extended period of time, without a loss of morale.

a. Berlin

(1) At the present moment, the United States, with the estimated U.K. effort, has the capability of establishing an airlift which can supply 29 per cent short-term, or 22 per cent long-term requirements by the end of the second month. By increasing current personnel, primarily through recalls to active duty and security and maintaining aircraft from reserve stocks, this capability can be increased so that a total of 87 per cent short-term, or 67 per cent long-term, requirements can be lifted during the fifth month. By continuing this effort further, a total of 124 per cent short-term or 100 per cent long-term requirements can be lifted after seven months.

(2) Considering the current stockpile (4–5 months) and current airlift capacity, we have a capability of remaining in Berlin in event of a blockade for 5½–7 months. By increasing our airlift capability, as noted above, we can remain in Berlin indefinitely.

b. Vienna

(1) We are limited by the fact that no Allied airfields are located within the Western Sectors of the City; therefore, an airstrip would have to be constructed in case of a blockade. Materials are on hand to construct one C–47 airstrip within the British Sector of the City which could be in operation within three months. Current stockpiles will cover this period. Local conditions are such that construction should not be undertaken until a blockade is actually imposed. Therefore, utililizing available C–47’s, we have the capability of supplying 20 per cent of the short-term, or 16 per cent of the long-term requirements. To improve this capability additional construction material would have to be prestockpiled in order to convert the C–47 airstrip for heavy aircraft and to construct a similar parallel runway. If this were done the maximum effort would be reached in the sixth month, when slightly more than short-term, but 20 per cent less than the long-term requirements could be lifted.

(2) Considering the current stockpile (3–4 months), we have a capability of remaining in Vienna in event of a blockade for 4–5 months. By increasing our airlift capability, as noted above, we can remain in Vienna for approximately one year.

c. In case both cities are blockaded simultaneously, the Vienna airlift could be maintained with C–47’s, as shown in subparagraph b (1) above; however, this might, depending upon the priority of the project, produce an unacceptable drain upon the personnel considered available to support the Berlin airlift.

d. Aircraft capabilities, as limited by the availability of aircraft to meet the requirements set forth above, will necessarily fluctuate with the magnitude and priority of current military operations and areas of deployment.³

2. This study has been based upon the assumption that, in the imposition of a blockade, the Soviets will avoid any action which can be construed as an act of war. However, a combined U.S.–U.K. study indicates that the Soviets have, and will exercise, a capability of interference with an airlift. The factor of Soviet interference has not been included in the above capabilities. Such interference may be negligible, or it may be such that aircraft are forced to operate under visual flight conditions only, or possibly forced to suspend operations entirely.

3. While a study of airlift capabilities indicates that we can probably remain in Berlin or Vienna, the diversion of the large numbers of multi-engined aircraft required to sustain this capability is considered to be militarily unsound under present conditions.

4. The extent of our capability to establish an airlift to Berlin and/or Vienna contains implications beyond those of a purely military nature. Therefore, it is recommended that the National Security Council Staff note the conclusions contained herein.

1. The source text was an enclosure to a memorandum dated October 31, not printed, from Executive Secretary Lay to the Senior NSC Staff, which circulated the JCS memorandum for the information of the Staff.
2. Vol. i, p. 375.
3. For further documentation on the possible blockading of Vienna, see pp. 367 ff.