Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

762A.00/10–2350: Airgram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfort¹

secret

Washington, October 23, 1950.

A–1172. In order to avoid development of parallel but disconnected interchanges on the subject of United States ability to maintain an airlift to Berlin in the event of Soviet re-imposition of the blockade, upon which problem Top Secret Deptel 2760² was sent HICOG on October 13, there is quoted below another cable which was sent to Mr. Spofford at London no. 1977 Oct 17 on the same subject.

The purpose of the message below was to supply Mr. Spofford, as the United States Defense Deputy, with the Department’s present intelligence summary of probable Soviet intentions and potential regarding Berlin. Mr. Spofford had requested such a paper (a) as background for a series of meetings on intelligence topics which the defense deputies wish to initiate among themselves, and (b) to reinforce his position in working toward NATO cooperation on a program for joint counterblockade measures in the event of serious Soviet or Soviet-inspired harassment of West Berlin communications.

For details on “(b)” above, attention is invited to Deptel 1943 to London, October 16, repeated to Frankfort as Deptel 2803 and to Paris as Deptel 1947.³

The verbatim text of the intelligence summary on Berlin which has been cabled to Mr. Spofford follows:

“Secret niact AmEmbassy, London. For Spofford. Subj: Estimate—Berlin.

1. Current Sov intentions are to make Berlin the capital of Sov Ger, and it may be expected that efforts to realize this end will be intensified now that the Oct 15 elections in the Sov zone⁴ have been held. It is quite possible that these efforts will include giving “sovereignty” to the Sov puppet regime in East Ger and attempts to use this regime as an instrument to force us out of Berlin.

2. The Sov offensive against West Berlin may take the form of force action or blockade. Force-action capabilities of the Sovs are in turn capabilities of the East police and of the Red Army. There is no present indication that the Sovs anticipate using its own armed forces for this purpose, and it is not estimated that they wld be so used unless the USSR had made a decision to enter a general world conflict. Force capabilities of East Ger police (specifically the Bereitschaften, now numbering between 50 and 60 thousand men) will probably not be sufficient, after the contemplated strengthening of Western forces, to permit overrunning West Berlin against Ger and Allied forces without a long range struggle likely to lead to broader military action including the defeat and collapse of the East Ger regime and the possible involvement of Sov units presently situated in Eastern Ger. The Bereitschaften have a capability of being expanded rapidly, and though the USSR is unlikely to order East Ger police action this fall, it is quite likely such action might be undertaken in the not-too-distant future.

3. Most likely type of interference and harrassment to be undertaken against our position in West Berlin is that of an intensification of the economic cold war and possibly a re-introduction of the blockade. Shld the blockade be re-introduced, this wld represent a Sov estimate of Allied unwillingness or inability to supply their Berlin outpost. It shld be noted in this connection that any such blockade wld result in a counter-blockade of East Ger—a counter-blockade effective for vital items insofar as other Western countries wld cooperate.

4. Shld the Sovs limit themselves and their Ger puppets to a continued or intensified econ cold war they have the capability of preventing the econ recovery of West Berlin to anything approaching normalcy, and the Western Allies have equally the capability of keeping up necessary standards of living if they have the will so to do.

5. The loss of Berlin—by arms or otherwise—wld be one of the most serious blows the West cld suffer in Eur, and it is so important for the Western powers to remain in Berlin that they must be willing to take a calculated risk of war to accomplish this.

6. The Sovs feel that if they can seize all of the former capital of Ger they will have taken a significant step toward seizure of all Ger, which, in turn, is often described as the present key to all Western Eur. To the NATO countries, the maintenance and enhancement of Western prestige by remaining steadfast in Western Berlin is high among psychological considerations, and from polit, moral and strategic standpoints as well. The presence of a continuing exhibition of Western freedom in the midst of a region otherwise oppressed is a credit to the NATO countries and a psychological advantage for them. Holding firm in Western Berlin appears to have been a daring and worth-while move. It has taken hold of the imagination of the Sov-dominated area as well as in Western Ger and the free world. The spirit of the West Berlin population, in its isolated position, has been of marked advantage to the Western powers.”

Acheson

1. Copies also sent to Berlin and Paris.
2. Not printed; it noted that the “past JCS reluctance to re-examine question of possible ground break-through leaves us without satisfactory blockade plan except as to stockpiling and counter-blockade.” This was felt to be insufficient and the Department of State was asking the National Security Council to give full consideration to the problem of maintaining or restoring communications with Berlin. (762A. 0221/10–1350)
3. Not printed.
4. For documentation on the October 15 elections in the Soviet Zone, see pp. 942 ff.