762B.00/5–150
Memorandum by the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs (Byroade) to the Under Secretary of State (Webb)1
Subject: Suggestions by Walter Lippmann concerning East-German Communist Youth Rally.
Reference is made to Mr. Sheppard’s memorandum of April 262 informing me of your conversation with Senator Lucas concerning a recent article by Walter Lippmann dealing with the rally and demonstration of East German Communist Youth scheduled for Berlin May 26–30.
In the article in question, Mr. Lippman recommends that this Government address a communication to the Soviet authorities in East Germany setting forth the information which we possess concerning the rally and explaining the reasons behind our refusal to allow the Communist youth to demonstrate in West Berlin.
This communication would also include an appeal to the Soviets to cooperate with us in preventing violence and bloodshed. In the absence of a satisfactory reply from the Soviets, Mr. Lippmann further recommends that we place the Security Council of the United Nations on formal notice that there is a threat to the peace in Berlin.
With respect to the second recommendation, i.e., referring the matter to the Security Council, GER, UNA, and EUR have given very careful consideration to this possibility but consider that it would be a tactical error on our part to take any action, such as referring the matter to the UN, which would have the effect of elevating the planned demonstration of East German Communist Youth to the status of a threat to world peace and security. In this connection it has been the considered policy of the Western authorities in Germany to date to treat this event as an essentially local problem. We have taken this position for two main reasons: (1) to avoid alarming the Germans unduly by magnifying the threat and possibilities of the May demonstration, and (2) to avoid action which might leave us [Page 848] looking unduly alarmed if the demonstration develops into a harmless propaganda operation. Any communications to the Security Council would seem to play readily into the hands of Soviet proaganda which would characterize the Western powers as so weak as to be frightened by a peaceful gathering of mere children.
Furthermore, it might prove extremely difficult to formulate a communication which would convince the Council that the rally really represents a threat to the peace. The latest plans for the rally, as publicly announced, limit it to meetings, demonstrations and events in the Soviet Sector of Berlin, and Soviet propaganda could easily cite numerous statements which have been made by German Communist leaders concerning the peaceful nature of the demonstrations and the fact that they will be confined wholly to the Soviet Sector. Any warning that developments might become dangerous would have to be based on a miscellaneous assortment of reports, rumors and intelligence.
This position could and would be reconsidered, of course, and a suitable communication could be addressed to the Security Council if future developments indicate clearly that a threat to the peace is involved.
Our reaction to Mr. Lippmann’s first recommendation, i.e., that we address a communication to the Soviets, soliciting their cooperation in maintaining law and order in Berlin, is similar to that expressed in regard to the second recommendation. As matters now stand we do not consider an approach to the Soviets either necessary or tactically wise. However, we are keeping in touch with the U.S. High Commissioner in regard to this matter with a view to reconsidering our position should developments between now and May 26 so warrant.
As a result of a series of statements by the Secretary, Mr. McCloy and the Western Allied Commandants in Berlin, there can be no doubt in anyone’s mind as to our position with respect to the rally and our determination to resist vigorously all Soviet efforts to dislodge us from Berlin. Moreover, Mr. McCloy reports that there are indications that the Soviets are encountering difficulty in creating the desired enthusiasm for the rally and a Western Allied approach at this time might well serve to encourage or stimulate them to make more of the rally than they are now able to make of it. In addition, the Soviets could derive considerable propaganda advantage in replying to such a communication by characterizing the rally as a purely spontaneous, German affair with which they had no concern, thus making the Western Powers appear unduly apprehensive over a purely local celebration.
Mr. McCloy has indicated that he is not in favor of an appeal to the Soviets or notice to the Security Council.
This memorandum has been concurred in by Mr. Taylor of UNP and Mr. Reinhardt of EE.
- Attached to the source text was a note dated May 4, not printed, from William J. Sheppard, the Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat, to Geoffrey W. Lewis, the Acting Deputy Director of the Bureau of German Affairs, suggesting that he discuss the Department’s view on the rally with Senator Lucas’ administrative assistant. The note hears the handwritten notation “Communicated to Mr. Kelley of Sen. Lucas’ office 5–8.”↩
- Not printed.↩