Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

PPS Files: Lot 64 D 563: Germany¹

Memorandum by the Secretary of the Army (Pace), Referred to the National Security Council by the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)²

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Washington , April 28, 1950.

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense

Subject: May Day and Whitsuntide Youth Rallies in Berlin

1. Our intelligence and Communist press in Berlin have definitely indicated that there will be large scale Communist youth demonstrations in Berlin during the month of May. Soviet plans envisage the employment of as many as 500,000 persons in the demonstration scheduled for Whitsuntide (26–28 May) and a possible mass invasion of the Western Sectors of the city. It is believed that the May 1st demonstration will be on a much smaller scale and will not include an attempted entry into the Western Sectors.

2. The Berlin Youth Rally as planned by German Communists can have important military as well as political implications. Militarily, the intervention of Soviet troops to restore order could result in clashes with Allied Forces which might possibly lead to war. Politically, the failure of Allied troops to apply military force to the extent necessary to restore order might well result in the overthrow of the West Berlin Government and our eventual ejection from Berlin.

3. Since it is improbable that Soviet troops will be employed, the threat posed by the demonstrations is primarily a political one and is, therefore, under Executive Order No. 10062, a responsibility of the High Commissioner as the supreme United States authority in Germany. The Commander-in-Chief, European Command, will in accordance with his directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS 1259/27³), employ such military force as is requested by the High Commissioner to maintain law and order and support United States policy.

4. The following information has been received from the Commander-in-Chief, European Command, with reference to Allied plans for countering the threat of the Soviet sponsored youth demonstrations planned for May Day and Whitsuntide:

a. The West Berlin Police Force has been augmented to a strength of 12,000.

b. It has been publicly announced by British, French, and U.S. Commanders in Berlin that allied troops will support the West Berlin Police to the extent necessary to suppress any disorder. Available troops are as follows:

	In Berlin	Alerted for Air Movement	Alerted for Surface Movement
U.S.	1 Infantry Bn (922)	2 Infantry Bns.	1 Reconnaissance Company
	1 Constabulary Bn (887)
	1 MP Battalion (635)
	2 MP Companies (188)
	1 MP Platoon (42)
British	1 Armored Car Squadron (500 men)	1 Inf Battalion
	3 Infantry Battalions (500 men)
	300 Military Police (150 est. yet to arrive)
French	1 Infantry Bn (700 men only 50% effective)	2 Infantry Companies (in U.S. planes)	5 Companies of Gendarmes
	3 Squadrons Military Police
	100 Gendarmes
	2 Squadrons Armored Cars
	6 Squadrons Military Police (enroute)

c. Special measures have been taken to insure that Berlin units are maintained at full strength, that adequate communications are provided, that all necessary supplies are on hand, and that medical units are alerted to move to Berlin if required.

d. Command Post Exercises and Communication tests have been held both within the U.S. Command and with the British and French to insure the adequacy of planned measures.

e. Emphasis has been placed upon the primary responsibility of the West Berlin Germans to control hostile elements and allied forces will not intervene unless the maintenance of order is beyond the capabilities of the German Police. If intervention becomes necessary, Allied forces will progressively:

(1) Demonstrate their intent to halt entry of rioters.

(2) Employ riot control measures such as night sticks, bayonets and non-toxic chemicals.

(3) Use individual and crew served weapons only when necessary to protect weapons or life or upon the order of the senior officer present when all other means have failed or to return fire.

5. Although the measures envisaged may result in the application of military force with concomitant bloodshed, this force will be applied only after German authorities, who are basically responsible for law and order, have failed to contain the demonstration. It is important that our informational output reflect this primary responsibility of Germans for their own affairs and emphasize that, while allied troops will be employed to the extent necessary, they will be used only when the maintenance of law and order is beyond the capabilities of German civil police. Publicity to date has emphasized the employment of force by the allies to the neglect of the primary role which the German civil authorities will play. It appears appropriate that a vigorous informational program be instituted both in the United States and abroad to report this matter in its true light.

6. I recommend that you refer this entire matter to the National Security Council outlining the situation in Berlin and the projected course of action there, pointing up the possibilities of international difficulties that might result from this action, seeking approval of the progressive application of military measures as planned, and recommending that the Secretary of State undertake a vigorous informational program along the above lines.

Frank Pace, Jr.

1. Lot 64 D 563 is the master file of documents, drafts, records of meetings, memoranda, and related correspondence for the years 1947–1953 of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State.
2. Attached to the source text was a memorandum, not printed, by James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, submitting this report to the Council for discussion on May 4.
3. Not found In Department of State files.