762A.5/9–2750: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfort
2459. Personal for McCloy. Fully appreciate concern expressed in your 2612 regarding intermediate measures to be taken in Germany.
Believe it important that you understand motives involved in the presentation and adoption of these intermediate measures:
As Gen Marshall, after taking office,1 only had few hours in which to prepare for a meeting in N.Y. and the only proposal on this subj he had before him was the ultimate objective of German divisions and possibly Army Corps, he asked the Chiefs of Staff to provide him most informally with some suggestions for initial measures leading up to ultimate objective above referred to. The Chiefs hurriedly considered the matter and reached him in NY the next morning immediately prior to opening of the conference with these suggestions. After complete stalemate with regard to German armament foil an all day conference, Gen Marshall met with Shinwell and Moch,2 explained frankly the basis for these suggestions and got their immediate agreement. Mr. Schuman then was apprised of the matter by Moch and at re-opening of discussion late in the day, these intermediate measures [Page 728] were adopted. Later they were cut by French Drafting Comite and the foil morning most of the cuts were removed and a basis was found for an agreement in principle pending the necessary arming of German units.3
It was not intended that these were measures to be undertaken in the next week, we might say, but they were considered initial measures and presented as a means of breaking the stalemate.
In carrying out provisions of this agreement you are authorized, pending the time when question of German participation in the integrated force is publicly settled, to confine your activities to planning on those provisions on which you consider approach to the Germans wld [not?] prejudice our objective of obtaining whole-hearted German support for participation of German army units in the integrated force. We are prepared take this matter up on governmental level if you desire but believe in view of discussions in NY that you will have little difficulty in persuading your colleagues to follow a similar course. As you know from previous messages, we are proceeding on assumption that agreement in principle on the larger question will be obtained from Fr Govt prior to meeting of DefMins on Oct. 28.4 It is most important that we receive your recommendations well prior to that meeting on the practical measures which shld be taken in Germany towards the creation of German army units in light of the progress you have been able to make on establishment of Garde Mobile, the progress that has been made on implementation of Agreement in Secto 45, and the general political conditions prevailing in Germany at that time.
The first point you mention, that is the use of the German police in event of East German para-military attack, was discussed in tripartite drafting session. Our explanation of last sentence of Para A in Agreement was to effect that we were not attempting to build up Laender police so that they cld be employed in a direct military manner to meet attack. It was rather our intention by this sentence that the police wld have previously assigned missions in event of an attack. This cld include such matters as preparation for demolition, protection of line of communication activities, handling of refugees, etc. behind the lines.5
- George C. Marshall had been sworn in as Secretary of Defense on September 21.↩
- Emanuel Shinwell, British Minister of Defence; Jules Moch, French Minister of National Defense.↩
- Attached to the source text was a memorandum by Byroade, dated September 29, not printed, which indicated that the first three paragraphs had been drafted by Secretary Marshall, who had cleared the whole cable.↩
- For documentation on the NATO Defense Ministers meeting on October 28, see vol. iii, pp. 1 ff.↩
- In telegram 2807, October 4, from Frankfort, not printed, McCloy advised that this telegram gave him “sufficient leeway for immediate future, but feel certain that in order to obtain our objectives we must keep clear distinction between internal and external security measures for many cogent reasons.” (762A.5/10–450)↩