762A.5/9–2750: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany ( McCloy ) to the Secretary of State

top secret

2612. Secto 45, September 24. I am disturbed by agreement that German Laender police are authorized to have engineer and armored motorized units and to be used against East German attack. If this is done they will tend to lose their police character and to constitute nucleus for German army separate from international forces. If implemented this measure seems inconsistent with decision not to create German national military force since it eliminates distinction between external and internal security forces which we had understood Foreign Ministers agreed to maintain. Moreover, in our talks with Chancellor and Ministers-Presidents we have sharply accented the separation of external security from internal security measures. It also compromises our propaganda against the East.

I assume immediate measures for utilization of German manpower were adopted as means of inducing French later to accept US proposal and have now received your 2313.1 Until these measures can be presented to Germans as first step in agreed program looking to German integration in European defense systems, some of them are likely to undermine much of favorable impression created in Germany by NY decisions and delay achievement of US objective of obtaining German contribution to NATO.

If they stand alone they might be interpreted as implying Western intention to exploit German manpower and to delay German participation in wider defense scheme. Chancellor has several times in last two days expressed considerable concern over continuing reports in French press that US had accepted French thesis that German rearmament should be postponed, and implying that American position in New York had now gone into complete reversal. To approach Chancellor [Page 727] now with these suggestions except as initial step in an overall agreed program that included German participation in European army would serve to confirm his previously expressed fear that Germany is only to be given second or third-class accommodations. In my judgment we are compromising on dangerous ground when we put forward these halfway measures which play directly into hands of those in Germany who are striving hard to avoid any definite action aligning Germany with West. This group is very large—Heinemann, Noack, Niemoller are not isolated figures by any means. I repeat the real objective is not so much the number of German divisions which may be incorporated into European army but to help Germany from drifting to neutrality or worse.

I therefore urge that Allied planning under C proceed but further approach to Germans be postponed until question of German participation in European defense settled in principle.

Department pass New York priority, sent Department 2612, repeated info USUN New York 3, London 192, Paris 213.

  1. Not printed; it reported the tactical details that went into the drafting of the tripartite agreement on immediate measures to be taken in Germany. (740.5/9–2350)