762A.00/9–150: Telegram

The Acting United States High Commissioner for Germany (Hays) to the Secretary of State 1

top secret

1864. High Commission met yesterday with Adenauer in executive session2 and asked him to clarify his memo in regard to security measures. Adenauer stated that he was fearful of possibilities after October election3 that Eastern Germany would be set up as satellite country with fictitious independent powers, that Volkspolizei would be developed into an important combat force and that East German Government would thereafter attack West Germany with the object of unifying all Germany under East German regime. He asked whether High Commission was able to give him positive assurances that in such a situation Allied forces would oppose the Volkspolizei. He was informed that the Governments had already declared that their forces in Germany would resist attack from whatever source, including attack by Volkspolizei. (It might be helpful in this connection if Ministers at forthcoming meeting could reiterate clear statement of this position to avoid any misunderstanding among Germans.)

Adenauer then stressed importance of psychological effect upon Volkspolizei if they were opposed by not only Allied forces but also by Western German forces and stated that if adequate German forces were established to counter Volkspolizei he believed danger of an attack from a satellite Eastern German Government might be averted. This was the major basis of his demand for a Federal police force. He also stressed the need for a Federal police force to combat Communism including FDJ and Communist inspired strikes. In his opinion, latter will increase. He cited Frankfort building strike as first example and alleged that Frankfort police are not affording adequate protection to workers who wish to remain on the job.

Discussion developed that Adenauer desires Federal police force with sufficient strength and type of equipment. He considered external security consisted of defense against Soviet aggression but that internal security included protection against any German threat, including that from East Zone. Consequently he was unwilling to separate his police needs for internal security and his need for force to oppose an attack from the Volkspolizei.

We inquired re political support for amendment to the constitution to permit the establishment of the type and kind of Federal police [Page 715] force which he envisaged. The Chancellor claimed that he had the support of three coalition parties and the SPD. He hoped to gain support of other smaller parties later. He admitted that minister presidents of the Laender were opposed at present to this concept but he hoped to be able to convince them that such amendment was necessary and gain their support.4 When informed by High Commission that it would be reluctant to use its reserve power under paragraph 3 of occupation statute for purpose of authorizing establishment of a Federal police force prior to the amendment to the constitution, Chancellor then agreed that under his present authorization of 10,000 Laender police, contingent measures should now be envisaged to set up schools, establish central direction and start recruitment. These measures could now be agreed without prejudice whether or not the force so recruited would ultimately be transferred into a Federal force or remain as Laender contingents available for Federal use in emergencies. In this discussion, Francois Poncet indicated that he would be prepared to authorize a major increase in the Laender force over the 10,000 now authorized.

In support of his request for a Federal police force as a counterforce to the Volkspolizei and to offset any propaganda that this was first step on the part of Federal Republic to establish national army, Chancellor stated that he was prepared to accept any necessary Allied controls over this force even to the appointment of Allied officers to positions within this force.

In concluding this phase of the discussion, the High Commissioners agreed to forward to respective governments Chancellor’s security memo, copies of which were taken to Washington by Mr. McCloy.5

Discussion then turned to Chancellor’s memo on revision of the occupation statute6 and Adenauer was asked whether the first two of the declarations envisaged for NY in paragraph III of memo should precede the third which provides for progressive regulation of relations between occupying powers and Federal Republic by agreements. He said this was desire of Federal Republic since progressive regulations of these relations would take some time and require considerable negotiations. He explained that it would be extremely [Page 716] difficult to impose additional burdens on German people such as would be required for defense or participation in European army if they had no assurance that Germany was being received as equal partner by the western nations. He, therefore, urged that a decision of the Foreign Ministers in September and an announcement which could be understood clearly by the people were essential. As an example of this frame of mind, he said he was horrified to learn from the Ruhr that people were saying there that war between the US and USSR was inevitable but that they should have no part in it.

Kirkpatrick made considerable point of our rights to remain in Berlin which should not be prejudiced if state of war between Allied powers and Germany is to be terminated, pointing out our rights in Berlin grew out of the act of surrender. He considered that this however could be handled by some formula which would have practical effect of terminating war.

High Commission likewise agreed to forward occupation memo to respective governments (Mr. McCloy also has copies).

Chancellor was obviously impressed by article in Die Welt which purports to give Soviets’ plans for peace with Eastern Germany (substance of article being sent separate telegram7) and asked Allies to pay particular attention to this program.

Adenauer seemed even more discouraged than at last meeting. This may be due to his concern over Communist-inspired strikes, continued reports of police ineffectiveness, his difficulties with Laender, his fear of what will happen in October and possible utilization by Soviets thereafter of satellite status of East Germany to precipitate civil conflict leading inevitably to third world war.

  1. McCloy was in Washington for consultations on Germany.
  2. The executive session followed the 38th meeting of the Council of the Allied High Commission for Germany at Bonn-Petersberg on August 31, the minutes of which are in Bonn Embassy Files, McCloy Project: Lot 311: Box 358: D(50) 2086b.
  3. For documentation on the October 15 elections in the Soviet Zone, see pp. 942 ff.
  4. Initial planning by the Germans for the police force had begun on August 4 at a meeting attended by representatives of the Western occupation powers. At this meeting a general proposal was made and subsequently discussed with the Laender Interior Ministers, who raised various objections and the necessity to amend Article 91 of the Basic Law. By September 1 agreement had been reached only that the Laender police must be reorganized to strengthen the powers of the Interior Ministers and to eliminate unreliable elements. Reports from Bonn on these developments are in files 862A.501 and 862A.511.
  5. Regarding Adenauer’s security memorandum, see footnote 3, p. 711.
  6. For the full text of Adenauer’s memorandum on the revision of the occupation statute, see Konrad Adenauer, Memoirs, 1945–1953 (Chicago, Henry Regnery Company, 1966), pp. 280–281; for a summary, see the first editorial note, p. 765.
  7. Telegram 1909, September 5, from Frankfort, not printed.