Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

611.62/8–2350: Airgram

The Secretary of State to the United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy), at Frankfort¹

secret

Washington, August 23, 1950.

A–529. PEPCO. In considering the PEPCO program (on which comments being sent separately),² the Department has been giving thought to the subject of retaliatory action in Germany against Soviet violation of agreements. In general Western interests suffer because our retaliation is taken only after long debate and delay, is often poorly enforced and is usually too inflexible to meet Soviet pinprick tactics. Yet prompt arid effective retaliation against these pinpricks is important because without reply they create psychological and sometimes economic harm out of all proportion to the intrinsic damage done. They make us look weak and ineffective in contrast to the bold, strong and alert Soviets.

The Western Allied control apparatus in Germany, mainly because it is tripartite, is probably incapable of taking most of the direct actions called for to meet Soviet methods and will diminish in capability as the national elements become smaller in size and withdraw more and more from direct operation. Therefore it becomes increasingly important to bring the Germans into the picture and to get their active and whole-hearted cooperation. Necessary action in the trade field will be discussed in a separate communication. Such action has the difficulty that it harms important groups of West German citizens and in other ways meets political resistance. (It is nonetheless vitally important that action in the trade field be taken.) However, the Department believes that there are many fields and many ways in which the Federal Republic, Land and local governments might be willing and able to take flexible retaliatory measures by administrative action with minimum publicity, where the only persons hurt would be Communists and other Soviet stooges. It is believed that the Germans should be encouraged to do this and that a distinction can properly be made between the domestic sphere, where strict adherence to the rule of law must be maintained, and the field of relations with the Soviet orbit including the Soviet Zone, where less gentility and consistency are required. Of course great delicacy would be necessary in presenting such a distinction to the Germans.

Two specific fields occur to the Department in which this type of action would seem now to be profitable and feasible:

1. Interzonal passes. As the Department understands, the Soviets have long since ceased to honor Control Council Directive 43 of October 29, 1946, and Directive 49 of April 23, 1947, on one-trip interzonal passes, and require a permit from place to be visited as an additional prerequisite for any travel from Western Germany. Travel to the Soviet Zone by democratic West German or West Berlin leaders has of course been out of the question for years. There seems to be no further reason why Soviet Zone leaders and agents should any longer be permitted to travel freely in Western Germany on interzonal permits issued by the Soviets. Therefore the Department believes you might work out with HICOM and the appropriate German authorities an arrangement either requiring some kind of West German written approval for travel from the Soviet Zone and the Soviet Berlin Sector to Western Germany or setting up a list of persons whose entry is barred. It should be agreed that entry would be denied Soviet Zone Communist leaders and known Soviet agents.

The practical working out of either system might be difficult if the volume of traffic across the border is large. Ordinary persons traveling for family reasons or on legitimate business should of course be allowed entry. The danger is that if persons politically important to the Soviets are kept out, the Soviets will retaliate by barring the travel of innocent people both Westward and Eastward. The Department believes that this risk must be taken. However, it would be important that whatever system is adopted be in operation well before the Chrismas season, so that people can adjust to it and not blame the Western Allies for causing a stoppage of traditional Christmas visits. A list of debarred persons given to the border police would be an easier system to operate than a system of prior approval, but would have the disadvantage that entrance across the “green border” would not be a punishable offense. Possibly the prior approval system could be implemented with wide decentralization, distribution of black lists and requirement that the applicant be vouched for by a reliable local resident. You might develop a better system which would minimize these disadvantages. The Department urges that you give serious thought to this problem.

2. Interzonal mail. Apart from retaliatory action in the general trade field it would appear advisable, in the light such reports as. Berlin’s telegram 267, August 12, to Frankfort, repeated to the Department as 226,³ to take special measures against interference with the mail between Berlin and West Germany. The Department suggests the following idea for your discussion with the British, French and West Germans: Issuance of a standing secret order that whenever there is interference with the mails between Berlin and West Germany, mail from the Soviet Zone and Soviet Sector to Western Germany should be inspected and material from the SED and its front organizations or addressed to the KPD and its front organizations or leaders should be removed. Such mail should then be delayed, confiscated or lost as occasion warrants. Orders covering similar material should simultaneously go to the border police. Since the Soviet interference is now principally concerned with parcels, our retaliation should probably be initially confined to parcels also.

It is important that retaliatory action in these and other fields should be rapid, flexible, clearly noticeable as retaliation and open to a minimum number of evil consequences for innocent bystanders. These objectives can be achieved, the Department believes, if the Allies and Germans who devise and implement the measures work in harmony and all understand the basic idea behind their actions.⁴

Acheson

1. Repeated to Berlin for Morgan.
2. Regarding the PEPCO program and the Department of State reaction to it, see the Paper prepared in the of the U.S. High Commissioner, p. 643.
3. Not printed; it reported that after a week’s hiatus mail parcels were again being impounded by the Volkspalizei under supervision of Soviet officers (962.10/8–1250).
4. In telegram 2835, October 4, from Frankfort, not printed, PEPCO indicated that it had instructed the United States member of the working party on travel control to propose tripartite agreement on a variety of travel restrictions, coordination with the Federal police, and enactment of legislation in the British and French zones for the arrest and punishment for illegal border crossings. All these controls, it was stated, could have been unilaterally put into effect in the U.S. zone, but that would probably have only diverted such traffic to the less strictly controlled British zone border with the Soviet zone. (862.181/10–450) On November 30, McCloy reported that with minor amendments this program was approved by the working party for tripartite discussions with German authorities. These discussions evoked a “uniformly favorable” German reaction and the matter had been referred to the Chancellery for the formulation of the Federal Republic’s position. Telegram 4540, November 30, from Frankfort, not printed (862.181/11–3050).