Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

611.62/7–2050

Paper Prepared in the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany¹

secret

[Frankfort, undated.]

I. Context of a Program for PEPCO

1. PEPCO’s program will be concerned with the attainment of United States objectives in Germany by denial of those of the USSR. The formulation of its program requires a preliminary examination of the objectives of the two powers and the casting of a trial balance of progress made by each toward the attainment of their respective objectives.

a. soviet objectives in germany

Vis-à-vis East Germany:

2. (1) The retention of, and the consolidation of the Soviet position in, those former and present German territories now under Soviet occupation.

3. (2) The dislodgment of the Western Powers from West Berlin and the incorporation of Berlin into the GDR, to serve as the “capital of Germany”.

4. (3) The “legitimation” of the GDR and its conversion into a diplomatically recognized Government of Germany which will be a Soviet-controlled satellite and a reliable agent for the execution of Soviet objectives vis-à-vis West Germany.

5. (4) The development of East Germany’s economic viability, the reduction of its economic dependence on West Germany, and its integration with the Soviet orbit (especially Poland and Czechoslovakia).

Vis-à-vis West Germany:

6. (1) The undermining of the Western orientation of the Federal Republic and the frustrating of the United States objective of leading Western Germany into an integrated Western community.

7. (2) The development of a maximum of advantageous East-West economic and trade relationships, which will profit the Soviet bloc, tend to orient West Germany Eastwards, and permit the USSR to exert political influences on the Federal Republic.

8. (3) Following the detachment of West Germany from the West, the unification of Germany under the auspices and leadership of the GDR.

9. (4) The ultimate absorption of Germany into the Soviet bloc.

b. united states objectives

Vis-à-vis West Germany:

10. Insofar as the over-all conflict with Soviet strategic objectives is concerned, the U.S. High Commissioner’s Policy Directive² instructs him to seek to promote the development of the German people to political independence and as responsible and equal members in a free Europe, to strengthen democratic government in Germany, and to encourage “the Germans to take an increasingly active part in the political and economic organization of a free Europe.”

11. Since the unification 6f Germany cannot now foreseeably be accomplished except (a) by dislodging the Soviets through forceful means (which would provoke war) or (b) by accepting Soviet terms which would preclude the integration of Germany in a free Europe, United States objectives in Germany must be addressed, for the moment, primarily to West Germany but must continue to include the long-range objective of German unification.

12. (1) West Germany should be considered a basic component of the “situation of strength” which the United States recognizes as necessary to deter Soviet expansionism or to reach a satisfactory coexistence with the Soviet world. West Germany should, therefore, be integrated into a Western European base through the development of conditions which will insure responsible West German adherence to such a base. The Federal Republic must be fully supported and efforts should be undertaken to increase its prestige both in West and East Germany and to return it to the comity of nations as an equal and sovereign partner in the Atlantic community.

13. (2) The portion of Germany now held or controlled by the Soviets (including the Polish-administered territories) should be converted into an irredenta through the association of the Western Powers and the West Germans with the deep-seated desire of the German people to unite their country and ultimately to enjoy the perquisites of an independent power.

14. (3) The development of those conditions which will insure West German adherence to an integrated Western Europe should be accorded priority, since they permit of courses of action within the capabilities of the United States and other North Atlantic powers and can probably be accomplished short of war.

15. (4) The association of the Western Powers with the West Germans in the objective of unifying Germany remains an important coordinate objective vis-à-vis West Germany, however, because it should serve to (a) convert West Germany into the positive pole of attraction in respect of German unification, (b) enlist the psychological support of the German people against Soviet objectives, (c) convince them of the advantages of association with the West, and (d) dissuade them that integration with the West connotes a writing-off of the East.

Vis-à-vis East Germany:

16. The Policy Directive issued to the U.S. High Commissioner instructs him, within the limits set by primary concern for the development of the Federal Republic, to do what may be possible to normalize relationships between East and West Germany through quadripartite and German consultations; to join in constructive tripartite efforts toward the unification of Germany on a democratic and federal basis, assisting the Federal Republic toward this end; and to devote particular attention to political and economic developments in Eastern Germany and their impact on the Federal Republic.

17. In respect of Berlin, the U.S. High Commissioner is instructed to encourage its playing “an important role in the development of the Federal Republic of Germany” and to exercise vis-à-vis the West Sectors of Berlin “powers corresponding to (his) powers in the western zones of occupation, and in the United States zone.”

18. Translated into terms of the possible, United States objectives vis-à-vis Berlin and East Germany should be:

19. (1) As a minimum, the maintenance of the Western positions and rights in Berlin and the improvement and consolidation thereof through the solution of West Berlin’s present economic and social problems.

20. (2) The development of United States policy vis-à-vis East Germany in a manner which will

(a) stimulate a maximum of passive resistance to Communist ideology, Soviet propaganda, and the consolidation of totalitarian rule;

(b) encourage the belief of the East Germans in the values of Western civilization and political institutions;

(c) assist them in overcoming a feeling of defeatism and of the inevitability of a Soviet triumph in Germany;

(d) hold up to all Germans the pattern of Soviet encroachments on the liberties and resources of the East Germans;

(e) contribute to the deterioration of the Soviet and Communist position in East Germany or, at a minimum, retard the Sovietization of East Germany, and

(f) convert East Germany and the Polish-administered territories into the German irredenta and thus foil the present Soviet/National Front strategy of attempting to convert West Germany into an irredenta.

21. (3) Maintenance of a policy of non-recognition of the GDR, except among members of the Soviet bloc, and the frustration of Soviet moves to “legitimate” the GDR vis-à-vis the German people and world opinion.

22. (4) Maintenance of the political and psychological initiative in respect of the unification of Germany, of Berlin and of a peace settlement with Germany.

23. (5) The normalization of relations between East and West Germany toward the ends of maintaining trade and of effecting the unification of Germany on bases acceptable to the Western Powers and to the Federal Republic.

24. (6) The enlisting of the support of the Federal Republic and of West German opinion to United States objectives vis-à-vis East Germany.

25. (7) The anticipation and frustration of moves intended to consolidate the Soviet position in East Germany and to convert the East Germans into agents who will serve Soviet purposes vis-à-vis West Germany.

c. soviet tactics (1950)

General Considerations:

26. In pursuance of their German objectives, the Soviets are confronted with a contradiction: In respect of the Sovietization of East Germany, they must not time and execute the process in a manner which will alienate the West Germans and yet they must as promptly as possible achieve a reliable regime which may be entrusted to advance the Soviet campaign against West Germany.

27. In respect of West Germany, the Soviets are unquestionably interested primarily in its dislodgement from Western Europe and, secondarily, in its Sovietization. The general Soviet tactic will be one of utilizing the East Germans as agents to accomplish Soviet purposes in West Germany and of employing all available means to convince the Germans that German-USSR rapprochement offers more unique possibilities than the integration of Germany with the free world. Hence, Soviet tactics are now less concerned with the development of Communism in West Germany than with the dissemination of nationalist and geopolitical appeals calculated to orient Eastwards all classes of Germans, to weaken the present political dominance in West Germany of the centrist parties, and to disillusion the Germans with the Western Powers.

28. Similarly, Soviet tactics will be designed to avoid the impression or charge that Germany is an object of Russian expansionism and the East Germans, rather than the Soviets, will thus bear the tactical brunt of executing Soviet maneuvers. In the development of its German policy, it would be a mistake to assume that the Kremlin will not be willing to offer concessions, or some special status, to Germany in an effort to dislodge it from the West, or that the Soviet techniques employed will not reveal a tactical versatility intended to exploit all doubts and differences which internal difficulties and a long period of occupation are developing between the Germans and the Western Powers.^*

29. The Soviet campaign to drive a wedge between the West Germans and the West has been intensified since the fall of Nationalist China. The importance of the campaign has been attested to by the references to Germany and to German unification contained in the recent election speeches made by Molotov and other members of the Soviet Politburo.

Definite Tactics:

30. (1) Continuance of present tactical approach to “legitimation” of GDR through unity-list plebiscite on “National Front” program. Following this event, Soviets will be in stronger position both politically and psychologically to invest GDE with trusteeship powers for the whole of Germany, to press for wider recognition of the GDE as an all-German government, and to seek to compel the Western Powers and the Federal Republic to deal directly with it. A collateral tactic will be the granting of an increasing measure of “sovereignty” to the GDR, in order to discredit the Occupation Statute and to prepare the way for a separate USSR–GDR peace treaty.

31. (2) Continued remilitarization of the East Germans (including the formation of military units from the Alert Police and youth). Such serves the strategic ends of (a) creating East German forces sufficiently reliable to permit a withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces, and (b) forming cadres for future German armed forces capable of intimidating the West Germans, contributing to their feeling of insecurity, and possibly conquering them through civil war.

32. (3) The organization of threats to the position of the Western Powers in West Berlin and the use of economic and financial measures intended to gain ascendancy over West Berlin by a process of attrition. The political and psychological advantages of the Soviets’ dislodging the Western Powers from Berlin are evident. The “creeping blockade” forms a part of this tactic and events such as the Deutschlandtreffen are a tactical preview of Soviet plans to capture West Berlin and West Germany through the use of Germans, rather than Russians.³

33. (4) Utilization of the “National Front” and associated fronts and mass organizations to divert attention from Soviet-SED methods in East Germany, to appeal to German nationalism, to enlist German political and economic support for the professed policies of the USSR, and to exploit difficulties between the West Germans and the Western Occupation Powers. The “National Front” appears now to be the Kremlin’s principal politico-economic instrument in use vis-à-vis West Germany and efforts will be made to extend its organization and appeal throughout West Germany. A “National Front” Congress may be held in West Germany in support of this tactic.

34. (5) The infiltration of Soviet agents into West Germany and the manipulation of the KPD as a hard-core activist GHQ for the execution of subversive activities and incitements to mass violence, Part of this tactic will be continued liaison with nationalist and industrial groups who are more attracted to the East than to the West and who serve Soviet ends by creating doubts of whether the West Germans should break with the Soviet world.

35. (6) Efforts to increase the volume of inter-zonal and East-West trade, to the net strategic advantage of the Soviet bloc.

36. (7) Attempt to maintain the initiative on the matter of German unification and a peace settlement with Germany.

Possible tactics:

37. (1) Conclusion of separate peace treaty with the GDR. In the consideration of this tactic, the Kremlin must weigh psychological and propagandistic advantages against the disadvantages of (a) closing the door tighter against a quadripartite solution on the German problem and thus sacrificing a measure of flexibility of foreign policy, (b) finalizing the Oder-Neisse boundary through bilateral action, and (c) entering into a probable commitment to withdraw occupation troops.

38. (2) The withdrawal of Soviet occupation troops. Such would probably be related to the conclusion of a separate peace treaty and, as provided in the Warsaw Declaration of 1948,⁴ would most probably occur after finalization of the treaty. The timing of the withdrawal will depend on the Kremlin’s assessment of the reliability of the GDR and of remilitarized East German forces. It is, nevertheless possible that the Soviets may offer to withdraw their forces, or actually withdraw them, in order to attain a propaganda coup in connection with a counter-proposal to hold free all-German elections if all occupation forces in Germany are withdrawn as a condition thereto.

39. (3) Conclusion of a pact of mutual assistance and cooperation with the GDR, along the lines of similar pacts now in force between the USSR and its Eastern European satellites. Such would have the effect of welding the GDR to the Soviet bloc and of accentuating the partition of Germany: its disadvantages would seem to be that it might accelerate the integration of West Germany in the Western bloc and, possibly, the NAT community.

40. (4) Proposal of all-Berlin elections on the condition that all occupation troops be withdrawn. Such would be tantamount to surrendering Berlin to the Soviets and could not be accepted by the Western Powers.^†

41. (5) Proposal of an all-German plebiscite on the “National Front” platform (repeal of the Occupation, Ruhr and Military Security Statutes; abrogation of the Petersburg Protocol; plebiscite in the Saar; removal of restrictions on interzonal and East-West trade and on West Germany economy; unification of Germany and conclusion of a peace settlement). If made, such proposal might, for greater propaganda effect, be linked with a Soviet offer to withdraw occupation forces.

42. (6) Imposition of a blockade of Berlin by the GDR, following the East German elections scheduled for October, with the East Germans, rather than the Soviets, enforcing the blockade. Among others, such would raise the problem of the Western Powers’ negotiating directly with the GDR and the corollary of de jure recognition of the GDR.

43. (7) Proposal for discussion of the German problem in the CFM or some other quadripartite forum. If the West succeeds in wresting the initiative in Germany from the Soviets, such a tactical maneuver would afford the Soviets a propaganda forum and an opportunity to buy time and to test the unity and resolution of the Western Powers vis-à-vis Germany.

44. (8) Alteration of Oder-Neisse border in favor of the GDR. Such seems unlikely at this juncture and constitutes a trump card which the Soviets can use only once and will perhaps play only when it is thought that it will prove decisive to the Kremlin’s over-all objectives in Germany. Meanwhile, the veiled suggestion that rapprochement between the USSR and Germany may lead to a fifth partition of Poland serves to entice those Germans who feel German interests will be served best by reaching a settlement with the USSR.

d. a trial balance

45. The basic objectives of the USSR and of the United States vis-à-vis Germany are mutually exclusive and there are no indications that they can be reconciled or that the Soviets feel confronted with such a situation of fact as to require an equitable quadripartite solution of the German problem. Basically, the Soviets intend to integrate East Germany in the orbit and thereafter to utilize it as a base for maneuvers against West Germany designed to effect German unification on Russian terms. The United States is basically engaged in a similar strategy vis-à-vis East Germany but suffers the fundamental handicap of not being able to exert a full measure of influence on the East Germans because of the nature of the technique of Sovietization and the Soviets’ employment of naked power to attain and consolidate their objectives. In seeking to cast a trial balance at this time, perhaps the most pertinent observation possible is that the ultimate tipping of the scales will depend on the deployment of power in sharper focus than either antagonist has thus far brought to bear on the German scene. For the Soviets, despite the advantages deriving from their employment of totalitarian techniques, have not won the battle for the German mind. The United States has made progress, the German remains predominantly anti-Communist, and the development of Soviet policy in recent months has unquestionably tended to disenchant the East Germans further and to narrow the points of friction between the West Germans and the Western Powers.

46. Nevertheless, if the situation is assessed in the light of the present power factors at play, it must perhaps be admitted that the Soviets are in a more advantageous position to influence developments, and to frustrate our objectives in West Germany, than we are in relation to East Germany. The Soviets have made our retention of Berlin expensive and awkward; they have made some psychological inroads on the West German mind and have implanted therein some doubt and uncertainty in respect of Germany’s future as a Western buffer to the Soviet world; they retain the initiative in respect of inter-zonal trade, of Berlin, and of Germany’s geopolitical destiny, each of which exerts a strong attraction to the German mind; they are perhaps concentrating more effectively on indoctrination of the youth; they are making some progress in overcoming the Russophobia of the adult Germans because, in contrast to the West, they are developing an impression of strength, resoluteness of purpose, political sophistication and inevitability of victory; and they enjoy large advantages in proceeding with the remilitarization of the East Germans and in being able with relative impunity to engage in subversive activities in West Germany. Developments in Korea, unless favorable to the United States, will certainly redound to the disadvantage of the Western Powers in Germany. Meanwhile, the inability to date of the Federal Republic and of the Western Powers to master those West German problems which permit the Soviets opportunities for exploitation tend to discourage the Germans from committing themselves psychologically, economically and politically to the West in the unequivocal manner contemplated in United States policy.

47. The situation must be judged to be serious when viewed in the light of (a) the Soviet timetable, which may be accellerated by developments in Korea, (b) the point of diminishing returns which will soon be reached through continuation of a strict occupation, and (c) the inadvisability, if not impossibility, of a form of occupation intended to remake the Germans in our own image.

e. the context of a program for PEPCO

48. The attainment of United States objectives in Germany, by denying those of the Soviet Union, requires the attainment of our objectives in West Germany and the planning and institution of counter-measures designed to (a) contain the Soviets more firmly in their own zone, (b) safeguard the Western position in Berlin, (c) retard the Sovietization of East Germany, and (d) anticipate and frustrate Soviet moves directed at West Germany. The two activities are interrelated and must be closely coordinated for maximum effectiveness. PEPCO’s program is primarily concerned with the latter activity but cannot be disassociated from the former, which forms the context in which its program must be developed.

49. It would seem that in the development of the initiative in Germany, the assumptions underlying our policy and operations should include these:^‡

50. (1) The present state of affairs is unsatisfactory. We appear to be on the defensive and the Germans are becoming restive, uncertain of the future, and apprehensive of the determination and ability of the Western Powers to contain the Soviet Union. The situation will not be corrected as long as we remain on the defensive.

51. (2) We, the Soviets, and the West Germans recognize that West Germany is now the vital factor in the European balance of power.

52. (3) The West Germans cannot, in the interests of our national security, remain sole arbiters of their destiny. They must, therefore, be integrated in a Western community or an Atlantic community. The only other alternative is to abandon West Germany to the USSR.

53. (4) The rate of progress toward integrating West Germany and Western Europe is too slow in view of (a) Russian pressures and (b) the necessity of correcting the present situation while we remain in Germany as an effective occupation power. The task is harder by reason of the security psychosis engendered by the specter of a revitalized Germany, the lack of a sense of urgency and unity of purpose among the Western Powers, and the fact that the approach to European integration has been primarily economic, rather than political (including politico-military). Failure to correct the situation encourages the Germans to exploit the differences between the Allies and to play off East against West.

54. (5) The frustration of Soviet objectives vis-à-vis West Germany depends on the development of our policy in a manner which will persuade the Germans that integration with the West will afford them ample outlets for their energies, ambitions, and production, as well as protection from Soviet encroachments. This will require our obtaining a wider acceptance among Germans of the values and benefits of their breaking with the East. Such can only be achieved through mutual interest and confidence.

55. (6) The required reorientation probably cannot be accomplished unless, under the leadership of the United States, the West Germans are convinced of the West’s ability and determination (a) to defend them against the Russians, (b) to see them through their economic and social problems, (c) to assist them in the reunification of their country, and (d) to treat them as responsible equals.

56. (7) The frustration of Soviet objectives vis-à-vis East Germany will perhaps best be accomplished through the creation of a situation of fact which confronts the Soviets with a politically and economically viable Federal Republic, Western-oriented, and capable of exerting stronger attractions to the East Germans than the GDR is capable of exerting contrary-wise. In the attainment of this situation of fact, the United States would achieve its major objectives vis-à-vis West Germany and the elimination of those conditions in West Germany, principally economic and social, which offer opportunities for Soviet exploitation.

57. (8) The rate of progress toward creating this situation of fact has been too slow for the same reasons cited in paragraph 53, above.

58. (9) We cannot hope to retard the Sovietization of East Germany if we lose the psychological support of the West Germans.

59. (10) The institution of steps to overcome the doubts of the West Germans, and to win a greater measure of their psychological support, is necessary to lead West Germany into a Western community of nations and to frustrate over-all Soviet objectives in Germany.

60. (11) The initiation of steps intended to rectify the situation, accelerate Germany’s adherence to the West, and form the basis for frustrating Soviet objectives in East Germany must be performed on a tripartite basis and will require the assumption of substantial risks as well as considerable financial aid in addition to that now envisaged.

61. (12) Our long-range interests will best be served by now recognizing that we could not negotiate with the USSR an acceptable German peace treaty. This suggests that in attaining our objectives in Germany we should not be deterred from taking steps which may delay or preclude quadripartite consideration of the German problem.

[Here follow parts II–IV dealing with PEPCO’s terms of reference, the outline of its program, and suggested modes of implementation.]

1. The source text was sent as an enclosure to despatch 196, July 20, from Frankfort, not printed (611.62/7–2050), which indicated that it had been prepared early in April by Foreign Service Officer Henry C. Ramsey and later revised. The paper had been approved by McCloy, Taylor, all the members of PEPCO, Edward Page, the Director of the Berlin Element, and George A. Morgan, the Director of the Eastern Element of HICOG in Berlin. In airgram 561, August 25, to Frankfort, not printed, the Department of State inter alia expressed its general agreement with the statement of United States and Soviet objectives in Germany and the analysis of Soviet tactics for 1950 as outlined in Part I of the paper. (611.62/7–2050)
2. For the text of the United States High Commissioner’s policy directive, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. iii, p. 319.
3. The Foreign Ministers’ Conference at London and its announced results have, temporarily at least, inaugurated an era of good-feeling in these respects (16 May 1950). [Footnote in the source text.]
3. For documentation on the Deutschlandtreffen, see pp. 818 ff.
4. For the text of the Warsaw declaration of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia, dated June 24, 1948, see Beate Ruhm von Oppen, ed., Documents on Germany Under Occupation, 1945–1954, (London, Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 300 ff.
5. Such was actually proposed by authority of the Soviet Control Commission under date of 8 May 1950 and rejected by the West Berlin City Assembly and the Western Commandants under the dates, respectively, of 1 June and 10 June 50. [Footnote in the source text. For further documentation on all-Berlin elections, see pp. 818 ff.]
6. It would now appear that the Conference of Foreign Ministers at London laid the basis for removal of many of the fears enumerated in these assumptions, but the problems remain basic pending their solution through implementation of the London pronouncements. [Footnote in the source text.]