Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

740.00/4–1250: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany ( McCloy ) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfort ¹

secret
priority

Bonn , April 12, 1950—6 p. m.

164. Blankenhorn² stated today no general agreement had been reached between Adenauer and Schumacher in their conversation last week. However, he said they did agree that if the Federal Government were to enter the Council of Europe³ it would, in effect, mean a definitive separation of East and West Germany and that Adenauer would have to take the responsibility therefor. Such a decision would greatly increase Adenauer’s responsibility toward the German people as a whole and particularly the Eastern Germans. It would likewise involve the Federal Government directly in the East-West struggle, especially in questions involving Berlin. Consequently, according to Blankenhorn, Adenauer and Schumacher agreed that entrance of the Federal Republic into the Council of Europe should be accompanied by increased participation being granted to the Federal Republic in European affairs. Blankenhorn said that unless Federal Republic were taken into confidence of the western governments Adenauer could not assume the responsibilities implicit in his decision to enter the Council of Europe. With this he intimated Schumacher was in agreement. Blankenhorn said, for example, that he had told Bérard⁴ last night that it was his personal opinion that Adenauer should be invited to the Foreign Ministers’ Conference in London to report on the German situation. (Blankenhorn had made it clear that Adenauer was not associated with this suggestion.) Pointing out to Blankenhorn that increased participation by Federal Republic in east-west matters entailed increased responsibility vis-à-vis German people for Germany’s security in the east-west conflict, I asked Blankenhorn exactly what he meant by added participation which should be given to Adenauer. Blankenhorn replied that so far as the German people were concerned only Adenauer could be held responsible for German security. Not only should Adenauer be heard, but his advice should, at least to a limited extent, be followed with regard to the Berlin question and other east-west problems.

In conversation with Bérard immediately following my talk with Blankenhorn, Bérard stated he had it from “unimpeachable, absolutely reliable” sources that Schumacher in conversation with Adenauer had stated that Federal Republic could not enter the Council of Europe without taking sides in the east-west struggle. Schumacher, according Bérard, argued that Federal Republic should not take sides in the east-west struggle but should provide meeting ground for the solution of the east-west conflict. Bérard stated that while Schumacher, according to his sources, did not use word “neutrality” nevertheless he had argued with force and with some success with Adenauer that Federal Republic should not definitely align itself with the west.

I told Bérard of my recent conversations with Schumacher and other SPD leaders, including Carlo Schmid, and expressed skepticism at the accuracy of his report. Bérard nevertheless insisted that his sources were absolutely reliable and accurate. Bérard indicated that he had originally considered Schumacher’s argumentation as a tactical move but he was inclined to believe it was a basic strategic shift in SPD policy. That being the case, we both agreed it was a matter of major concern which might involve a complete shift in Allied policy towards Germany. Bérard did say, however, he felt the great majority of German people definitely identified themselves with the west and would oppose the “middle ground” position Schumacher suggested.

Comment: Based on my conversation with both opposition and government leaders in the past few weeks, I am inclined to the view that Schumacher, who is no statesman, is possibly attempting a double blackmail against Adenauer and the Allies. He had, apparently with some success, as reported in my cable Bonn to Frankfort 161,⁵ written prior to my conversation with Bérard, played upon Adenauer’s feeling of frustration in the problem of German territorial security. He has at the same time given Adenauer a weapon which he may possibly use against the Allies to wring concessions for entrance into the European Council. In this connection, it is significant that Blankenhorn did not employ this weapon in his conversation with me this morning, whereas I do not doubt he did so in his conversation with Bérard last night. It is entirely possible that Adenauer is reserving this threat for use on McCloy this evening.⁶ If Schumacher is serious in suggested shift in SPD policy toward a middle ground between Soviet Union and America, it may be well to mention there is no evidence thus far among SPD members of Bundestag of support for such a shift. Possibility should not be overlooked that Bérard, who invited me today for first time, is trying to build a fire behind us to push the Federal Government into immediate entrance into European Council by means of a possibly questionable rumor.

Sent Frankfort 164; repeated Department 149; Berlin 63.

McCloy

1. The source text was sent as 149 to the Department of State.
2. Herbert Blankenhorn, personal secretary to Chancellor Adenauer.
3. On April 1 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe had invited the Federal Republic of Germany to become an Associate Member of the Council.
4. Armand Bérard, Political Adviser to the French High Commissioner for Germany.
5. This cable was not repeated to Washington and was not found in the Frankfort Post Files.
6. Regarding McCloy’s conversation with Adenauer on the evening of April 12, see telegram 162, April 14, p. 627.