Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

762.00/4–1050: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State

secret   niact

Frankfort, April 10, 1950—8 p. m.

3014. For Byroade. ReDeptel 2252, April 3.¹ In view of rapidity and volume of exchange on all-Berlin and all-German elections, feel that recapitulation of our program desirable.

1. Calling for all-Berlin elections, Department’s authorization for which is greatly appreciated, does not minimize necessity of following-up on Bonn proposals for all-German elections. The two proposals are quite separate segments of our present propaganda and political campaign intended to regain and retain initiative, discredit and disrupt Soviet election timetable, and enlist psychological support of Germans. Linking of two proposals will not give them a propagandists flavor if both have legitimate basis rooted German urge to effect unification of both Berlin and Germany. But restricting our moves to Berlin to exclusion of Germany would (a) reduce prestige of Bonn, (b) pull carpet from under our feet in midst of propaganda effort which has produced substantial results and promises much more, (c) impress Germans again, to our disadvantage, that Western Powers split on matter of German unification and thus (d) add to their uncertainty in adhering to West and integrating with Western Europe.

2. Though we see impressive advantages in three Foreign Ministers issuing statement on conditions of German unity, we feel such should not exclude our proceeding now on HICOM level with proposal to negotiate electoral law with Soviets. I note with satisfaction that Department now feels it can support concept of an all-German constituent assembly and that it is prepared to support German unity at some risk if emergent all-German Government might be spared arbitrary interference from Soviets and economic drains which would impede recovery of Western Europe. I think, therefore, that Department’s thinking and ours is very close but that Department may be confusing our suggested tactical approach with Department’s long-range thinking on terms on which peace settlement might be concluded with an all-German Government.

3. As seen from here, before all-German Government can emerge from either Bonn proposals or our offering to negotiate an electoral law with Soviets, many time-consuming steps must be completed, i.e., constituent assembly, drafting of constitution and framing of controls. Hence, because of advantages of enlisting German psychological urges and convincing them of interest of Western Allies in doing the possible in assisting them to unify their country, it would appear that considerable values will inure in our making the effort at this stage. For reasons which follow, it would appear that such efforts should precede any announcement of three Foreign Ministers on conditions under which Western Powers could support a united Germany as a candidate for a peace settlement.

4. We have envisaged our program as falling in three essential stages, which have previously been outlined to Department. First was re-seizure of initiative, which has been attained through my statement, Secretary’s comments on German unification in his Berkeley speech² and Bonn proposals. At time we entered this campaign which was forced onus through progress made by Soviet and national front lines, we pointed out that once having seized initiative we would have to recognize that unification would remain a live issue until it had been accomplished or West Germans realized that it could be accomplished by throwing their lot with Western Powers. Second state, which we have now entered, is to press our advantage, which we feel can be done with minimum risks to ourselves and maximum disadvantages to Soviets. This is important not only to enlist psychological support of Germans but to justify our present position, as defined by Secretary in Berkeley, that unification of Germany through free elections should form preliminary to peace settlement and settlement with USSR. Though we may well qualify this position in practice and eventually work toward a de facto peace settlement with West Germany, I should not think we would wish to do so until (a) we had undercut Soviets line that peace treaty and withdrawal of troops is necessary to free elections, with our own caveat, fortified by bona fide political moves, that Germany must be unified and an all-German Government established as a necessary preliminary to peace settlement and (b) convince the Germans that only the Soviets have compelled them and ourselves to modify this position. Hence, moving ahead now is not only advantageous from standpoint disrupting Soviet plans but is vital to maintenance of our controls which under Soviet propaganda barrage may grow more unpalatable to Germans. Our failure to move ahead now will not only cancel our gains but increase West German suspicions of our motives and resolution. Third stage would be enunciation of broad terms of conditions under which Germany might be unified and emerge as candidate for peace settlement. We think this should preferably be done by three Ministers at governmental level and might be more effective if made in context of our having offered negotiations on HICOM level and failed through Soviet refusal to negotiate or through making impossible counter-proposals which because of our previous efforts, would not make propaganda capital with Germans.

5. Hence, our program as outlined and which envisaged offer of limited negotiations for electoral law should not be confused with controls which four powers might wish exert vis-à-vis a hypothetical all-German Government or with conditions of the peace.

6. We do not believe that protracted negotiations of type suggested by Department would result from suggested offer to enter limited negotiations, or, in remote possibility such did eventuate, that they would deflect German energy and interest from European political and economic integration. On contrary, I feel strongly that West Germany will not become either a firm or responsible member of an integrated Western Europe unless and until it is convinced that Western Europe is interested in the unification of Germany and that integration with Western Europe does not, therefore, connote a writing-off of the East. In this connection, we must remember that Germans deeply suspect that West would willingly write off East Germany and this contributes to their dangerous tendency to play off East against West, seek to drive wedges between Allies, and manipulate their affairs in a manner not entirely conducive to European integration.

7. Our best estimate of situation impels recommendation that we cannot afford to lose initiative now or observe silence until three Ministers convene. If HICOM fails reach agreement, we would welcome Ministers taking up matter but note that they will meet for only three days and will not have opportunity examining specific programs.

8. We must be in position by, and preferably before, April 14 to submit position paper to PolAff committee of HICOM.

In light of above, could not Department accede to our proceeding to present a position paper based on previously submitted program (mytel 2605, March 28³) and accompanied by statement to effect that relinquishment of present control, pattern of control of an all-German Government, and conditions of peace therewith are in no way involved or a subject for discussion with Soviets?

Sent Department 3014; repeated Berlin 206, London 171, Paris 266, Department pass Moscow 23.

McCloy

1. Ante, p. 617.
2. For the text of Secretary Acheson’s speech at the University of California on March 16 on the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, see Department of State Bulletin, March 27, 1950, pp. 473 ff.

3. Not printed; the program McCloy suggested reads as follows:

   “That HICOM issue communiqué giving full support to Bonn proposals and including statement of willingness to negotiate with Soviet Control Commission for purposes of forming an electoral law which will govern all-German elections for constituent all-German assembly empowered to draft an all-German constitution. Proposal to negotiate with SCC would make it explicitly clear that (a) negotiations be confined to electoral law and attendant safeguards, including those enumerated in Bonn document, (b) drafting deputies to be appointed for this purpose, and (c) offer of limited negotiations proceeds from belief that agreement on modus Vivendi for formation of all-German Government should precede consideration of larger problems involved in peace settlement.” (762.00/3–2850)