Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

660E.0021/7–2050

Memorandum by the Minister to Finland (Cabot)¹

secret

[Washington,] July 19, 1950.

In the event of a general war in Europe, the question would arise as to what, if anything, we should do in Finland.

My understanding is that the US would, in that event, hope to see Finland remain neutral. In any event I expect that the Finnish Government would desperately try to remain neutral regardless of our attitude. The Finns are bound to the Russians by a Friendship Pact which in effect requires Finland to resist aggression and to consult with the Soviet Union in the event that Finland, or the Soviet Union across the territory of Finland, should become the object of military aggression on the part of Germany or a state allied with her. I would expect the Finns to try to prevent the Russians from sending troops into Finland despite the Pact; i.e., they do not expect an attack on them to get at Russia, and would not voluntarily side militarily with Russia under other circumstances.

If it is the desire of the American Government that Finland should remain neutral, I feel that we should consider the following course of action:

When war had broken out or was obviously imminent (and only then), I might go to see the Finnish Foreign Minister and say that I assumed Finland wished to remain neutral, that I could privately inform him that the US hoped that Finland would remain neutral, find that if Finland requested formal assurances of the US to that effect I was certain that they would be forthcoming. I might add that I hoped that the Finns would request similar assurances of the Russians. They might even in due course be advised to say to the Russians that they would be prepared to implement their Friendship Pact with the Russians in the event of an armed attack across Finnish territory against Russia but that in the absence of such armed attack (which the Finns frankly did not expect in view of the assurances which we have given them) the Finns expected the Russians to permit them to insure the neutrality of Finnish territory through their own military efforts.

My purpose in making this suggestion is to make it perfectly clear in the event that the Russians tried to seize Finland that they alone were responsible and that no possible allegation could reasonably be made that Finland was an American “military stooge”. Should the Russians, despite the naked character of any aggression against Finland under those circumstances, nevertheless decide to occupy Finland, it would be wholly apparent to the Finnish people that they had no choice other than to fight or to submit to the loss of their independence. Neither the Government nor the people of Finland could be under any illusions as to what the score was. I feel that this would be important in view of the fact that the present Government of Finland is inclined toward appeasement of the Soviets and that 20 per cent of the Finnish people are pro-Communist in domestic politics. It is generally felt that a very substantial portion of even these 20 per cent would be patriotic Finns in the event of an unprovoked attack by Russia against Finland.

I think it would be important to take such action in order that Finland might not drift either into the Russian camp, or on the other hand into armed conflict with Russia through any mistake or misunderstanding. I also feel that it would be important for me to understand the governmental thinking in Washington regarding this situation now, since it might be impossible to request and get instructions in the very short time which might be available to carry out effectively the course of action which I have outlined.

The questions which should be decided in this connection would seem to me to be:

1. Do we desire Finland to remain neutral in a general war, at least at the start?

2. Do we plan any military action (for example, flights over Finnish territory) which would make it inadvisable to give Finland the assurances envisaged above?

3. If the answer to 1. is yes, and to 2. is no, is the course of action I suggest the best suited to achieve our purposes?

John M. Cabot

1. Minister Cabot returned to Washington in early July for medical examination and for consultation. The source text is an attachment to the following memorandum of July 20 from Benjamin M. Hulley, Officer in Charge of Northern European Affairs, to Assistant Secretary of State George W. Perkins and to Henry R. Labouisse, Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern, European Affairs:

   “The principal merit in the attached proposal of Mr. Cabot regarding Finnish neutrality seems to lie in its public relations value, as it will clearly fix the responsibility for aggression, which probably could not be deterred by any action in Finland. Whether we can safely give an undertaking that we will respect Finnish neutrality in the event of a general war is a point which should be cleared up with the Pentagon before reaching a decision on the proposal.” (660E.0021/7–2050)

   In a memorandum of July 21 to Labouisse, G. Frederick Reinhardt, Deputy Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs, indicated that his office would favor the course of action suggested by Minister Cabot:

   “Basically, of course, Finnish neutrality is at the mercy of the Soviets who may choose to disregard or observe any Finnish declaration of neutrality. Soviet forces already possess bases on Finnish territory in accordance with the terms of the Peace Treaty. It appears probable that in the event of a major war and a declaration of Finnish neutrality, the Soviets would at least seize the occasion to press the Finns for further military privileges on Finnish territory.

   “By making publicly clear our intention to respect Finnish neutrality, it would be easier to place on the Soviets the onus for the beginning of any hostilities in the Scandinavian peninsula.” (660E.0021/7–2150)