CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 152: Briefing Book–Military Planning
Memorandum by Mr. Edgar P. Allen of the Office of Western European Affairs 1
Subject: Austria’s Internal Security
Problem:
To give tripartite consideration to certain phases of planning with respect to Austria’s internal security.
Background:
One of the major problems involved in the conclusion of the Austrian Treaty concerns the question of internal security in Austria during the period immediately following the withdrawal of the occupation forces. Article 33 of the draft Treaty provides that all occupation forces will be withdrawn within 90 days after the Treaty comes into force. Article 17 of the draft Treaty would limit Austrian armed forces to a land army, including gendarmerie, with a total strength of 53,000, and an air force of 90 aircraft with a total air force personnel strength of 5,000. From the strategic viewpoint, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated that withdrawal of the occupation troops before Austria can organize, train and equip reasonably adequate security forces would create a vacuum in Central Europe in which the Communists, following their common practice, may be [Page 484] expected to seize power and dominate the country, thus creating a Soviet salient in the East-West line.
Austria’s internal security is guaranteed at the present time by the presence of U.S., French, British and Soviet occupation forces. Austria is not now permitted to maintain any armed forces of her own. It is considered essential, both militarily and from the standpoint of U.S. foreign policy, that arrangements be made in advance of the conclusion of the Treaty for the organization and training of an Austrian army which will be adequate to assure the country’s internal security following the withdrawal of the occupation forces.
U.S. Action:
The President on November 18, 1949, approved the conclusions specified in NSC 38/4 as follows:
“6. The United States should insure, by all appropriate measures prior to the withdrawal of occupation forces, that the Austrian armed forces are reasonably adequate to maintain internal security.2
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11. In any event the United States should take the following steps immediately:
a. Continue efforts to obtain agreement by the United Kingdom and France to assume their share of the mutual responsibility for the internal security of Austria.2
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c. Program equipment for Austria under the Military Assistance Program with a sufficiently high priority to insure the availability of essential equipment for an Austrian army by coming into force of the treaty.
d. Ship equipment programmed for Austria to Austria and/or Germany for storage and retention there under U.S. Control.”
The U.S. High Commissioner for Austria has stated that the full Treaty limit army of 53,000 will be required to insure internal security. The Austrian Government considers that from one to two years would be required to organize, train and equip such an army. Realizing that a lesser force must be constituted initially, the U.S. High Commissioner has recommended an initial army of 28,000, which can be recruited as soon as the Austrian Government is given authority to do so.
The Departments of State and Defense have approved in principle the plans formulated by General Keyes for the formation of an Austrian army. These plans involve the training of an expanded gendarmerie, after signature but prior to ratification of the Treaty, and the issuance on memorandum receipt, as soon as the Treaty is signed, of the equipment necessary to implement the plans. General Keyes has been instructed to coordinate the implementation of the plans with the [Page 485] British and French elements in Vienna and to secure the agreement of the Austrian Government prior to the implementation thereof.
A program of military assistance for Austria has been approved by the FMACC; the necessary allocation of funds and contract authority has been obtained; supply action has been initiated; and stockpiling of certain equipment in the program has begun.
Tri-partite Considerations:
A constant effort has been made during the past year to obtain British and French agreement to assume their share of the mutual responsibility for Austria’s internal security in the post-Treaty period. However, the exact extent or effectiveness of British and French participation in the program remains to be determined.
It is believed by us to be preferable that particular categories of arms and equipment for the Austrian army be furnished from a single source in order to avoid difficulties in maintenance, supply and training. Tangible British and French assistance is desired, however, and it is believed that such assistance could be rendered initially by the transfer to the Austrian army of suitable types of supplies and equipment from the British and French Zones in Austria. It is essential that the exact contribution to be made by each of the three Western Powers be determined at an early date.
An official request was sent to the British and French Governments on July 22, 1949, for information on the assistance which they could give to the fulfillment of the Austrian military program. The British Government replied that it considers the equipping of the Austrian army a U.S. responsibility. Mr. Bevin informed the Secretary of State on September 15, 1949, that he would inquire into the possibility of leaving surplus British equipment for the Austrian army following the withdrawal of the occupation forces. No further information has been received on this point and no estimate as to the amount of such equipment which might be available has thus far been provided.
The British Government has indicated its willingness to equip and train an Austrian air force and has stated that the required training could take place outside of Austria. The British have further stated that they will provide the equipment and ground and supporting materiel necessary for the operation of an Austrian Air Force, adding that it has not yet been determined whether such equipment and materiel will be furnished on a grant basis or in the form of a loan. The British have assured the American Ambassador in London that the U.S., and in particular U.S. representatives in Vienna, will be furnished complete and current information concerning U.K. planning for this phase of the Austrian security problem.
The French Government has informed us that it is in full agreement with the principle of joint U.S., U.K., and French responsibility for [Page 486] the internal security of Austria after the Treaty becomes effective. The French Government stated that, while it is prepared in principle to make its contribution to equipping an Austrian army, payment or replacement must be obtained by France for any equipment turned over to the Austrians. It was added that, while it might be possible for the French occupation forces to leave certain items, particularly light weapons, when they withdraw from Austria, arrangements would have to be made to replace any items so left.
The British and French Governments have been invited to participate in conversations to take place in Washington beginning on August 3 for the purpose of discussing the foregoing matters. It is our view that these talks should be governed by the following considerations: (1) formal conversations with formal tripartite agreements are not required; (2) technical working-groups discussions are planned for the purpose of determining the logistical support to be furnished by each of the three Powers; (3) questions of supply and finance will be considered; (4) detailed planning will be worked out in Vienna after completion of the Washington talks; and (5) agreements reached will be recorded in an exchange of memoranda.
Recommendations:
It is recommended that the following principles be agreed upon to serve as guidance for U.S. representatives at the forthcoming Washington meetings:
- 1.
- This Government should provide complete information concerning U.S. planning thus far developed for the creation of an Austrian army.
- 2.
- British representatives should be requested to furnish complete information concerning British plans for the creation of an Austrian air force.
- 3.
- The principle of tri-partite planning in Vienna should be agreed upon.
- 4.
- The continued readiness of the three Governments to exchange information concerning the progress of their planning, both on a Governmental level as well as in Vienna, should be expressed in the memorandum of agreement.
- 5.
- An effort should be made to obtain from both the British and French firm commitments concerning the exact contributions which they are in a position to make toward equipping an Austrian army, including their plans for the furnishing of such equipment without cost to the United States.
- 6.
- The memorandum of agreement should specify the respective responsibilities of the three Powers, including the assumption of responsibility by the British to equip and train an Austrian air force without cost to the United States.
A proposed agenda for the meetings and a statement of the basic position of the Department of Defense are attached.
[Page 487]- The source text was an attachment to a memorandum from Williamson to Perkins, dated July 28, not printed, which indicated that it had been prepared as the basis for the United States position in the tripartite talks and had been cleared by the Department of Defense. (CFM Files, Lot M–88, Box 152, Tripartite Conversations–Austria)↩
- The following omission in the source text.↩
- The following omission in the source text.↩