Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

763.5/7–1850

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Deputy Director of Mutual Defense Assistance in the Department of State (Ohly)

top secret

[Washington,] July 20, 1950.

Subject: Program for an Austrian Security Force.

I appreciate the financial and supply problems which you face with regard to stock piling for the future Austrian army outlined in your memorandum of July 18.¹ I believe, however, that the program for stock piling and the earmarking of funds should continue as presently arranged in view of the following considerations:

1. The Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have consistently made clear both in NSC papers and in communications to the Department that U.S. troops will not be withdrawn from Austria until an Austrian army is trained, equipped and in being, and prepared to undertake the task of maintenance of internal security. The implementation of this policy, as you know, led to the agreement to proceed with stock piling for the Austrian army. I am not aware of any desire on the part of the Joint Chiefs or Defense to change this policy in the light of the supply situation in the United States or the military requirements for the NAT program.

2. The stock piling program is necessary in order that we may be prepared for any eventuality in the political field such as a Soviet move to conclude the Treaty or any other move which may be utilized to secure the withdrawal of troops in Austria in the absence of Treaty agreement. If such a move were made the U.S. could not implement the policy laid down in the NSC decisions, in absence of implementation of the current security preparations. While I agree with you that at this moment is may be unrealistic to speak of the conclusion of the Austrian Treaty, we must nevertheless be prepared for alternative developments in the European scene.

3. Instead of abandoning the stock piles in the Austrian program I suggest that it might be possible to reevaluate these programs in terms of the current situation with a view to making materiel available for such emergency use as may arise, as for example emergency requirements for Yugoslavia and Greece or for the needs arising in EUCOM and the NAT program. For that reason I agree with you that we should concentrate on small arms artillery, ammunition, and any other items which lend themselves to common use in the several areas referred to, leaving items such as uniforms, tool kits, etc., designed exclusively for use in Austria either for future procurement or for manufacture in Austria. I do not believe that emergency use of the items earmarked for Austria would require NSC action so long as the principle of a stock pile for Austria is maintained in conformity with the NSC decision and some basic supplies are retained for speedy use in Austria in the event the need for their use should arise.

4. I consider that the impending negotiations with the British and French on this subject should be pursued in order to associate the British and French with the U.S. officially in this project and to secure the maximum contribution which they can make to the Austrian program without interference to their NAT programs. It is highly important that the program for Austrian security be based on mutual agreement and that it not be the sole responsibility of the U.S. The entire question of the organization of the future Austrian army, the preliminary training program for the gendarmerie and the possibility of future equipment has been discussed with the top Austrian officials. Any move on our part now to abrogate this program or to limit it in any major fashion would give the Austrians the unfortunate impression that we have lost interest in them in a military sense. Postponement of the talks would also tend to encourage the British and, to a lesser extent, the French to reduce their security commitments in Austria and put the full burden of occupation and military security on the U.S.

5. If agreement to make emergency use of the Austrian stock piles would require a change in the location of the stock piles inconsistent with the NSC decision, it is probable that NSC reconsideration would be required. This question should be investigated and appropriate recommendations made, however, before any decision is made for referring the question to the NSC.

1. Supra.