Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

663.00/1–1950: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy for Austria at the Council of Foreign Ministers (Reber)¹

secret
priority
niact

Washington, January 21, 1950—1 p. m.

289. Audel 230. Moscow’s 186 and 197 Jan 19² Although Moscow démarche may have negative results for this immediate phase negots, we consider it to have served useful purpose in crystallizing public opinion on Aust question. Gen reaction places blame squarely on Sovs for delaying Treaty. NY Times editorial highlights contrast Sov attitude with their Peace Campaign, but stresses necessity avoiding any partition Aust.

Our view is that completion Aust Treaty in order secure withdrawal Sov forces shld remain major objective. Consequently no break shld occur in continuity of negots. If it becomes clear Treaty cannot be concluded, we shall consider possible alternative courses of action to supplement our aims in Aust pending opportunity reach final settlement. Announcement these steps will depend on clarification Sov position and developments in Aust in following months.

In view these considerations Dept hesitates to endorse your third proposal in Delau 403, Jan 19. Adjourning discussions without a fixed date for resumption might leave us in less favorable position than we are at present in negots by providing Sovs opportunity to insist on further concessions on Arts 16 and 27 as price for conclusion of Treaty. It is therefore recommended that alternative two be accepted and that negots be resumed after appropriate interval at fixed date on same basis as they now proceed. Such proposal for adjournment to any date not later than Feb 15 shld be accepted with a statement that interlude will provide Sovs time to conclude Vienna negots and to proceed on previously agreed basis. All possible use shld be made of Gromyko’s statements in this regard. No intimation shld be given at Tues mtg that our action constitutes in any way a break in negots, and maximum onus for necessity of delay shld be placed on Sovs.

If at any time while impasse over 48 bis continues Zarubin raises Arts 16 or 27 you shld agree discuss them but limit your discussion to making clear that our position on them stands and that we are unwilling to consider further concessions in view of previous Sov assurances that no difficulties wld be encountered on other arts if their position was met on German assets. This is a negotiating position on which we might reconsider our stand on Arts 16 and 27 in event agreement reached on econ arts. Naturally no hint of this shld be given in present phase. We assume Brit and Fr wld be prepared take similar firm position.³

Besides consideration further action that may be taken in event no further progress with Treaty, we are preparing record of negots, Audel 225, and will inform you when ready for publication.

If no further mtgs are held until Feb 15 subsequent instrs will be sent re Del.

Acheson

1. Repeated to Moscow as 58, Paris as 277, and Vienna as 114.
2. Not printed, but see footnote 4, p. 437.
3. In telegram 107, January 20, not printed, Legation Vienna expressed its opinion that the first alternative was the best since it maintained the pressure on the Soviet Union better than the other two choices (663.001/1–2050). This view was supported by Embassy Moscow in telegram 210, January 21, not printed (663.001/1–2150).