Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

663.001/1–1950: Telegram

The United States Deputy for Austria at the Council of Foreign Ministers (Reber) to the Secretary of State

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London, January 19, 1950—2 p. m.

301. Delau 403. From Reber. Mallet gave Berthelot and myself copies of Kelly’s¹ report of last night’s conversation with Gromyko, which states that identic telegrams have been sent by Kirk and Chataigneau² to Washington and Paris.

We then discussed future action and agreed to recommend to our governments that whatever procedure is adopted, it is essential in some way to keep Austrian treaty negotiations alive. It seems to us there are three possible courses of action:

1. To continue present meetings in London. Gromyko’s negative reply gives further evidence of the futility of this course of action. It will accomplish no results, will expose us to continued Soviet countercharges that we refused to discuss articles 16 and 27 and become ridiculous within a short time. This will, however, be procedure advocated by Zarubin.

2. To fix date for resumption of the deputies’ meetings at a time which will give Soviets opportunity to finish Vienna negotiations but not be so remote as to discourage public opinion. This course would mark continuity and is what Austrian Government has repeatedly urged. (Buresch³ again today presented further appeal from Gruber to set an unconditional date for resumption.) On the other hand, if we should meet say on February 15 or March 1 merely to be informed again that the negotiations in Vienna have not been concluded and that therefore article 48 bis cannot be settled, our efforts would appear more futile and result would be more discouraging.

3. To request Soviet Government to inform us in writing by an agreed date say February 15 or March 1, whether Soviet Government would then be in a position to settle all matters connected with article 48 bis and thus enable a prompt meeting to be held. This is suggestion contained in Delau 397.⁴ Although at first sight, this procedure might not so clearly mark our intention to resume and therefore be more discouraging to Austria at this time, it nevertheless places responsibility more clearly on Soviets than alternative (2) and avoids another fruitless meeting. If Zarubin accepts this formula he may also ask for assurance regarding discussions of articles 16 and 27 which can be given as soon as obstacle created by article 48 bis is removed. All three of us agreed to submit these alternatives for consideration of our governments but to recommend rejection of course (1). Although both (2) and (3) each have objectionable features, it seems to me that (3) is preferable for reasons set forth above. Mallet, on the other hand, prefers (2) as this gives greater appearance of continuity but would not object to (3). Berthelot insists that, whatever course is followed, point of continuity be emphasized.

Inasmuch as the February meeting may well prove last of current session and as Berthelot and I are not in possession of our government’s views, we agreed to postpone tomorrow’s meeting until Monday p. m. The explanation to be given to the press is that this delay is occasioned by the necessity for obtaining instructions from our governments in the light of negative Soviet response to Moscow representation. Tripartite meeting will be held tomorrow afternoon to discuss any instructions we may have then received and other treaty questions.⁵ I should welcome earliest possible indication of Department’s views and further instructions.

Sent Department 301, repeated Paris 89, Moscow 24, Vienna 21.

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Reber

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1. Sir David V. Kelly, British Ambassador in the Soviet Union.
2. Yves Chataigneau, French Ambassador in the Soviet Union.
3. Eugen Buresch, First Secretary of the Austrian Legation in the United Kingdom and Liaison between the Austrian Government and the Deputies for Austria at the Council of Foreign Ministers.
4. Not printed.
5. At the tripartite meeting on January 20, Mallet informed the other two Western Deputies that he could accept either alternative 2 or 3; Reber and Berthelot were without instructions. (Telegram 340 (Delau 405), January 20, from London, 663.001/1–2050)