253. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 141

EXPLOITATION OF DEFECTORS AND OTHER ALIENS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Pursuant to the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947,2 as amended, and Section 4 of NSC 50,3 the National Security Council, [Page 793] with the concurrence of the Attorney General of the United States, hereby authorizes and directs that:

1.
Exploitation of aliens within the U.S. for internal security purposes shall be the responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Exploitation of aliens as sources of foreign intelligence information or for other foreign intelligence purposes shall be the responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency. This allocation to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to the Central Intelligence Agency of separate areas of alien exploitation responsibility does not preclude joint exploitation, which must be encouraged whenever feasible. It further carries with it the obligation for each agency to give to the other, without delay and directly, all information pertinent to the activities and responsibilities of that other agency, such as the FBI notifying CIA promptly of aliens of potential foreign intelligence interest who may come to its attention and CIA notifying FBI of information it obtains relating to internal security problems.
2.
Exploitation of aliens by the Central Intelligence Agency or by the other member agencies of the Intelligence Advisory Committee shall be conducted for the following purposes:
a.
To obtain foreign intelligence information required in the interests of national security or by the member agencies of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.
b.
To obtain internal security information or other data required by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the discharge of its domestic responsibilities.
c.
For such other purposes as the National Security Council shall deem to be in the interests of national security.
3.
In the case of any official, employee, or other individual officially attached to a foreign government or one of its agencies, an official of a political party officially recognized by its government, or an official of an international organization, in an overt or covert capacity, who defects within the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall:
a.
Immediately notify CIA, as well as the other IAC members and other interested agencies, of the actual or potential defection.
b.
Determine insofar as is possible the legitimacy of such reported potential or actual defection within the United States, and whether the individual’s determination to defect or his defection is or is not known to his government.
c.
Immediately notify the Attorney General and the Department of State of the identity of the individual concerned and his official connection with a foreign government, as well as his status as a defector. Comments and observations will be solicited from the Attorney General and the State Department.
d.
Be initially responsible for exploitation of all such actual or potential defectors, and maintain sole jurisdiction over them until completion of its internal security exploitation, unless it is jointly determined that the foreign intelligence interest shall be paramount in the particular case.
e.
Determine whether such potential defector can be utilized in a clandestine capacity and when so utilized provide through CIA, or the other interested agency, for satisfaction of foreign intelligence requirements. Appropriate security restrictions will be agreed upon in individual cases. If, for operational reasons, it is not possible for the FBI to immediately fulfill foreign intelligence requirements of the other agency, such notice will be provided to CIA and the other agency.
f.
Make immediately available to CIA with copies to interested IAC members all foreign intelligence information resulting from the initial exploitation of such a defector, and provide, through established channels, for his interview by other member agencies of the IAC upon their request, prior to the full exhaustion of internal security requirements if feasible.
g.
On request by CIA, arrange for the transfer of such a defector to the jurisdiction of the CIA upon completion of its internal security exploitation, unless it is jointly determined that the foreign intelligence interest is paramount prior to that time. The CIA will assume responsibility for necessary maintenance and custody during the period of its exploitation and shall be responsible for the final disposal and rehabilitation of all such defectors. Internal security problems will remain the responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The final disposition of the alien and reimbursement of maintenance expenses will be determined by mutual agreement in advance among the CIA and interested agencies in each case, based upon future operational considerations.
h.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102(e) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, upon the written request of the Director of Central Intelligence, provide all available information and pertinent observations with respect to the internal security factors involved in the exploitation of each defector for foreign intelligence information.
4.
In the case of aliens within the U.S., other than those covered in paragraph 3 above, CIA shall:
a.
Be responsible for their exploitation for foreign intelligence under the provisions of NSCID No. 7.4
b.
In order that the statutory responsibilities and domestic intelligence jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may be adequately handled and in order to prevent confusion in internal security matters, the CIA or any other authorized intelligence agency will, prior to exploiting an alien within the United States, advise the FBI in advance of the exploitation. The FBI will then provide information it has which may be of assistance in the exploitation by the other agency and will make such observations as are pertinent, including notice that exploitation by the other agency would interfere with matters involved in internal security or execution of the statutory obligations of the FBI.
c.
After determining priorities, arrange for exploitation of the alien for foreign intelligence purposes by any other IAC agency or agencies which may request independent exploitation of the alien. The CIA will assume responsibility for necessary maintenance and custody during the period of exploitation. During the period of such maintenance, internal security problems will remain the responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, except as is provided below. Reimbursement of maintenance expenses will be determined by mutual agreement in advance among the CIA and interested agencies in each case.
d.
Notify the FBI immediately of information obtained through its own facilities or from other IAC agencies that an alien within the U.S. has defected or may defect. To accomplish this end, the other IAC agencies will transmit without delay all such pertinent information to the CIA and the FBI.
5.
If it appears to be in the national interest to bring a defector to the United States for intelligence purposes or operational use under the provisions of this Directive, CIA shall be responsible for coordinating with the other interested departments and agencies for policy approval and for making necessary arrangements in advance for entry. CIA shall also be responsible for handling and disposal of the defector in agreement with the interested departments or agencies, and until such disposal will make adequate provisions to insure that the defector does not endanger the internal security of the United States. In each case, notice and full available biographic and background information will be given to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in advance. No commitments for entry for intelligence purposes or operational use will be made by any United States official without coordination and notice as set forth in this paragraph.
6.
Any overt publicity and propaganda exploitation of a defector shall be coordinated with the Department of State.

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSCIDs. Top Secret. NSCID No. 14 received NSC approval by memorandum action on March 3. (Ibid., Records of Action by the National Security Council)
  2. 61 Stat. 495–510.
  3. See Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 384.
  4. Ibid., Document 427.