Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

249. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower ¹

Washington, December 27, 1955.

OTHERS PRESENT

• Secretary Dulles
• Assistant Secretary Gardner (Air Force)
• General Twining
• General Cabell
• Colonel Randall
• Colonel Goodpaster

The President said that the background regarding project “Grayback”² was very hazy in his mind. He did not know how it had gotten started, although he did recall that it had been mentioned by Dr. Land in his office at the time of the Killian Report.³ He now understood that it represents about a $75 million investment, and that it is ready for initiation very soon. General Twining said that Admiral Radford had stated that he had presented the matter to the President for consideration, and he also said that Mr. Quarles had also stated that the matter had been presented to the President. He said that there is nothing in the records about this. Secretary Dulles recalled that just prior to the Geneva meeting he had raised with the President the question whether it should be held in abeyance.⁴

The President then said that regardless of how the matter progressed, it is timely to consider what should be done now. He understood that a plane that is being developed is coming along very well.⁵ It also appeared that if the balloons were discovered, as they will be, certain questions become important—such as what will public reaction be in the UK and Japan, how many of them are likely to be shot down, whether their release will spur the development of higher altitude radar, etc. General Twining said it is practically impossible to pick these up by radar. It is also practically impossible to intercept them—our Air Force has made extensive attempts to do so and has never succeeded.

Replying to a question by the President, Mr. Gardner said there are approximately 2500 of these balloons. It is expected that 500 to 600 would pass through to the Western coast of the Pacific. One-half would travel at about 40,000 feet and the other half could be sent much higher. The project is manned with 4400 people in the United States and 1400 overseas. The President asked whether the project should not be presented as meteorological, with pictures taken to show ground speed, etc. Secretary Dulles said a further question is whether to do it at all. Mr. Gardner said that by late April or May four alternative items, with trained crews, should be available and capable of operating at approximately 80,000 feet.⁶ General Cabell viewed the present project as a supplement, and thought if the balloons were kept below 50,000 feet they would not stimulate a “crash” radar program. There was discussion whether possible political reaction might tend to prevent use of the alternative when it is ready—in that case it might be well to consider delaying the whole project a year. The President said that there is a natural tendency toward reluctance for a bold program. If the results seem necessary, he would do it, but that is the question. He thought that an effort involving 2500 in a few months might cause alarm, where a dozen or so a week would not have a “crash” significance (Secretary Dulles asked what would be lost if the action were delayed for a year—Mr. Gardner said that the force will have to be largely disbanded and material would crack and disintegrate).

Mr. Gardner said that low altitude winds are satisfactory throughout the year except in July and August, and that if the lower altitudes were used—which seem desirable—the release could be phased out. The President thought they should be released at a number of points throughout the world. Mr. Dulles felt an agreed news release will be extremely important, and the President said it must tell a good story. General Cabell suggested that other countries be approached to ask them to return the equipment gondolas when they come down. Mr. Dulles agreed that it made a great difference if they were released a few at a time and in many places all over the world. The President thought that the announcement should be on the basis that when the winds are right, we will get off a number from all stations. He thought that if this is presented as a meteorological operation, it would be all right; he did not feel it could be done just in January and February, i.e., it should not be a “crash” program. Mr. Dulles suggested the following as points on which to agree: Launchings should be spread over time; medium altitudes should be used—50 to 55 thousand feet; some should be released from Japan, Honolulu and Alaska; notice should be given to other countries and to the world at large. The President indicated agreement and suggested that this notice bring out that we would like to have the items returned; that if any country wanted to develop the prints, they should take care not to destroy the negatives; that all languages should be used on the request for return, including Russian; that State Department should review the cover plan (Secretary Dulles to get a little group together to look at this); that the long-term aspect of the thing should be emphasized, bringing out that efforts in the past have been too intermittent and relating it to the “jet stream” shift responsible for the recent floods in California. To a question by Secretary Dulles as to how the photographing operation is to be explained, it was indicated that operations are well advanced to inform the authorities of the International Geophysical Year⁷ of this activity as a means of mapping cloud formations (which is, in fact, all that most photographs will show.)⁸

AJG

Colonel, CE, US Army

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Records of White House Staff Secretary, Intelligence Matters. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on December 28.
2. Previously known as Project Genetrix. See Documents 229, 240, and 242.
3. Headed by James R. Killian, President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee prepared a study, issued on February 14, requested by the President on U.S. technological capability to reduce the threat of surprise attack. See Document 223.
4. See Document 229.
5. The U–2, a joint CIA–U.S. Air Force reconnaissance aircraft.
6. Gardner apparently is alluding to the U–2.
7. The International Geophysical Year was scheduled to begin July 1, 1957, with worldwide scientific observations of earth and astronomical phenomena. It would continue for one and a half years.
8. President Eisenhower was given a technical briefing on December 27. On the next day Secretary Dulles told Fisher Howe that those attending the briefing included Secretary Dulles, General Twining, Trevor Gardner, and an aide to Secretary of Defense Wilson. The Secretary indicated at the briefing that the British had given their go ahead on December 25, and the President approved the operation subject to “certain modifications,” which included slowing down the rate of launching, extending the time period of the operation, and resubmission of the program to Secretary Dulles to whom the President “delegated authority for the final decision and triggering of the operation.” (Memorandum by Fisher Howe, December 28; National Archives, RG 59, INR Files: Lot 61 D 67, Genetrix) Another account of this December 27 briefing is in a telegram from Bergquist to General LeMay, December 28. (Ibid.)