226. Letter From the Chief of the Office and Research and Intelligence, U.S. Information Agency (Loomis) to the Country Public Affairs Officer at the Embassy in South Africa (Graves)1

Dear Mr. Graves:

Several weeks ago an addition to your operating manual was sent to all posts for inclusion in Part 1, Section 223.2 This addition included [Page 703] about four pages describing the organization and functions of the Office of Research and Intelligence, (IRI). While this statement described what we are supposed to do, it was, of necessity, written in formal Government language.

I thought it might be helpful if I filled you in more completely and more informally, with particular emphasis on how we hope to be of service to you.

When IIA was part of the Department of State,3 it depended on the Intelligence Area of the Department (OIR) to collect and produce the kind of intelligence needed for policy and programming. This arrangement was never completely satisfactory since OIR had insufficient resources to devote to our requirements, and of course became impossible after USIA was separated from the Department.4

About a year ago Mr. Streibert5 went to Mr. Allen Dulles and asked him to take a look at the problem of how best to supply USIA with all the information it required to function. Mr. Dulles accepted the job, and appointed a task force which studied the issue for several months in great detail both in Washington and in selected posts overseas.

Both the National Security Council’s Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) and the Agency accepted the recommendations of the task force6 and they were put into effect in September 1954.

The survey team first identified six types of information which were needed by USIA. I am enclosing an excerpt from the Report which describes these in detail.

The survey team concluded on the basis of these requirements that the intelligence needs of USIA did not differ in kind from the intelligence required to support the political, economic, and military activities of the Government, but that USIA did require such intelligence “with an emphasis, a detail and a form not normally required in intelligence produced for other purposes”. I should point out that “intelligence”, as used in this letter and with respect to USIA in general, does not mean covert or “cloak and dagger” operations. Rather, it refers to the entire process of overt collection, collation, evaluation and dissemination of information and analyses on subjects relevant to USIA activities.

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The survey concluded further that:

(a)
The total available intelligence of the types required by USIA had been inadequate in character and quantity, and should be increased;
(b)
The primary responsibility for the provision of the types of intelligence required by USIA should continue to be assigned to the Department of State and in a lesser degree to the other agencies of the Intelligence Community;
(c)
USIA should establish its own intelligence organization to tailor the output of the other intelligence agencies to the particular and peculiar applied needs of the Information Agency.

This, in a nutshell, is our primary function.

The survey group also concluded that on occasion the U.S. Information Agency, particularly its field staff, was a unique source of intelligence information. This would include information that field officers pick up about the organization and operations of foreign and communist media in a particular country. The survey group concluded that USIS should, therefore, have the responsibility of reporting this special type of information in coordination with the reporting by the other sections of the Embassy. You can use the most convenient channel for this reporting; the psychological section of the WEEKA, State Department despatches, or USIA despatches. One point was stressed—USIS field personnel should not be expected to undertake activities for the sole purpose of gathering information. Rather, their responsibility is to report information which they had gathered as a by-product to their regular activities in support of the general USIA program.

Another point stressed by the Survey group was the function of evaluation. The group concluded, and we strongly concur, that the responsibility for evaluating the program cannot be separated from the executive responsibility for running and planning the program. We believe that IRI’s job is to provide to the responsible USIA executives all the facts and figures which are available, and upon which they can base their judgment as to what actions they should take.

For example, if IRI were asked—“Is the radio program in the Union of South Africa7 any good?”—we would say that it was not our function to answer that question since it involves judgment—program judgment. We would try to work out with you the questions to which we wanted answers, such as:

“How many people listen to USIS radio programs as compared to the competition?”

“What type of people listen?”

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“Why do they listen to the programs?”

“What is their opinion of the programs?”

etc. We would then present those findings to all levels concerned; you, your radio officer, IBS, the Area Directors, etc. You all could argue as to whether or not the findings indicated that the program was good, bad or indifferent, and whether or not the program needed change. IRI will follow the same principles as the FBI, which, as you know, has always been scrupulously careful never to tell any operating unit what to do as a result of its findings. Our mission in IRI, therefore, is completely a service mission to provide both the USIS field missions, and the headquarters elements of USIA, with the information they want about foreign programs, issues and conditions. Specifically, IRI is not responsible for gathering or analyzing statistics about the output of USIS programs. That is the responsibility of each media concerned.

The survey team found that the following four separate units, dealing with various phases of research and intelligence, existed within USIA: the Evaluation Staff (IEV) (which, among other things, contracted for research studies with universities and private research firms); the Coordinator of Psychological Intelligence (CPI) (which was a group of some 35 people assigned to the State Department, but paid by USIA); the Research and Library Section of IBS; and the IPS Library. Upon approval of the Report, these units were abolished and a new central organization was established called the Office of Research and Intelligence (IRI).

After the usual delays caused by the merging of functions and organizations and the slow recruitment and appointment of qualified personnel, IRI is now getting to the point where it can begin to carry out its responsibilities.

As a manual outlines, IRI is composed of four divisions: Collection and Liaison, Library, Production, and External Research. The first of these, the Collection and Liaison Division, is primarily responsible for collecting the raw and finished intelligence from other intelligence agencies, both within this Government and from foreign governments; falling within the six categories spelled out in the IAC Survey. In addition, this division has the job of trying to convince other agencies to produce finished intelligence for us. To the extent that it succeeds, the work of the Production Division is simplified.

The Collection Division also disseminates the raw and finished intelligence which it collects to all elements of USIA. They distribute to USIS in the field, and to other Government agencies, the finished production turned out by IRI. They are the people responsible for getting scripts declassified which have utilized paraphrases of some classified material in their preparation.

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Another major responsibility of the Collection and Liaison Division is to formulate intelligence requirements. Normally, people come to us with a vague desire for “all the facts” on a given subject. We then must get them to refine and sharpen their requirements until we know exactly what they want, and how they plan to use the information. We then list the minimum information which must be collected.

The Division lays requirements on the other intelligence agencies (State, Defense, CIA) to do production for us when they are better equipped. It will lay requirements on the field to collect information when you are the best source. As I mentioned above, this will primarily be where we are anxious to learn about the Communist and indigenous activities in the various media. In other words, this Division is the middleman between the user of intelligence and those who collect and produce it.

The Collection and Liaison Division is headed by Ed Carroll, who had a lot of wartime service with OSS in Europe, and was with the Intelligence Collection group in the Department of State for the past nine years.

The second Division is the Library Division. The nucleus of the collection and personnel of this Division is the old IBS and IPS libraries. The Division is headed by Roth Newpher, who headed the IBS Library and Research Staffs for 12 years. The Library has four rather distinct collections.

The first section is the book and periodical collection. We have some 25,000 volumes and 260 periodicals and newspapers. The collection is heavily weighted with Russian and Communist materials, but does cover the waterfront. Also, of course, we have excellent relationships with all other libraries, both Government and private, so that the Library can obtain almost any book on very short notice.

The second section is the unclassified morgue, which has more than 5 million items, classified under 80,000 headings. This is a unique facility in Government. Nowhere else is there such a large amount of unclassified intelligence material.

The third section is the classified file. This resembles the unclassified, except that all documents in it are classified. This is a new section for the Agency, and is rapidly expanding. We have excellent relationships with the CIA Library so that if we do not have a classified document ourselves, we can get it shortly from CIA.

The fourth section is the propaganda collection, which is unique among collections in or out of the intelligence community. It represents an extensive collection of the published propaganda of foreign countries, and contains some 30,000 items organized by country of distribution. It is extensively cross-indexed. We must rely heavily on you to send us examples from your area. Many have already contributed significantly. [Page 707] This material is constantly used by the Director and other headquarters personnel because it is particularly effective in demonstrating the opposition.

The Library Division is prepared to give you very rapid service. The Library provides reference service for Agency personnel in Washington. It can do so by telegram or despatch for you.

The third IRI division is the Production Division, headed by Lou Olom, who for three years was Chief of the CPI unit located in the State Department, and who has been in intelligence for the last 15 years.

The Production Division has the responsibility of answering questions from any part of USIS or USIA. Sometimes these questions can be answered on the telephone very speedily. Sometimes they require considerable work and result in a memorandum of some length.

The Production Division does not always answer these questions itself. If a large and comprehensive study is required, we will lay the requirement on other appropriate intelligence organizations—State, CIA, Defense as well as non-IAC agencies such as Labor, Agriculture and Commerce Departments. The Production Division will make every effort to meet any deadline which you establish. We are a “quick and dirty” shop completely geared to the operational needs of the Agency. We will give you whatever information we are able to obtain within your time limit—an hour, a day, or a week. We believe you, the user, rather than we, should establish the deadline, since you know how and when you expect to use the information. Obviously, the shorter the deadline, the more superficial the answer.

Requests from the field for information can be sent either directly to IRI or to IPS, depending on the type of product desired. Both IPS and IRI often work on the same requests. We in IRI do the research, and try to obtain all the facts bearing on the subject and place them in some logical order, irrespective of whether they help or hinder our cause. IPS utilizes these facts, as appropriate in its output. There is, therefore, no reason for you to change whatever system you are now using. However, if you only wish a fact or an intelligence analysis rather than a story, it might be a little quicker if you made that request to IRI.

The Production Division has seven branches—the five regular areas, the USA Branch, and the Functional Branch.

The Functional Branch is responsible for following international Communism, front organizations as well as local and national party propaganda methods and activities. They also follow media activities worldwide, so that we can detect and analyze changes in emphasis or procedures in Communist radio, Communist movies, etc. Paul Phillips is Acting Chief.

The USA Branch is headed by Dick Fitzpatrick, and is responsible for providing background information on the United States, which you [Page 708] and other elements of this Agency request. Again, if you want an article about some facet of the United States, or American life, we often provide the material to IPS and they, of course, do the final writing.

The Soviet-Satellite Branch is responsible for obtaining the facts and figures about the Soviet and European Satellites, and for following their activities, particularly their current propaganda lines and operations. The Division is headed by Mike Fodor, who has lived in the area for many years, and most recently was the editor of the Neue Zeitung.

Your Branch, the Near East Branch, does not yet have a Branch Chief, although Joe Dees is acting in that capacity. Joe was at one time in the operational intelligence division of the Voice, but came to us from Radio Liberation.

The fourth Division is the External Research Division, which has the mission of supplementing classical intelligence, using the unique techniques of social science. The most obvious area not touched by traditional intelligence seems to be public opinion surveys. We believe that suveys of public opinion are a unique and important addition to other sources of information, such as newspaper comment, editorial comment, and estimates of the situation by qualified observers.

We are now using the survey technique to get two different types of information. The first is opinion on political matters, particularly as they concern our global themes—such matters as:

What is your opinion of the United States?—of Russia?

In your opinion, how are the relations between your country and the United States at the present time?

Do you think the local Communist party is an independent party or is it controlled by the Soviet Union?

If Western Europe were attacked with atomic or hydrogen bombs, would you approve or disapprove of the use of such bombs on enemy cities?

Survey techniques also provide unique information on specific USIS activities, such as exhibits, radio programs, etc. In these surveys we ask such questions as:

What radio programs did you listen to last night?

How often do you listen to ____________ program?

What is your opinion of the program?

Which do you think gives you more reliable reports of the news—radio or newspaper?

What is your opinion of the exhibit you have just seen?

What part did yo like the best?

Which the least? Why?

etc.

Through the science of sampling and questionnaire research, the opinions of small, carefully selected groups can be used to estimate the attitudes of larger groups with a high degree of accuracy (3–5% with [Page 709] the sample-size generally employed). This tool can be used to study the opinions of the entire adult population, or just of certain groups—the youth, the educated, the city dweller, or whatever particular segment you are interested in.

We are now conducting political surveys every four months in four countries of Western Europe, which we are calling Barometer Reports. We began survey operations in Western Europe, in part because public opinion in the American sense of the word is more meaningful there, and in part because the local research concerns were further developed. We believe that one of the chief values of these surveys is that it allows both us and you to chart trends in opinion with more accuracy than any other method. We plan to extend these surveys to the other major countries of the world as rapidly as possible. We have just finished an exploratory survey in four countries of Latin America, and hope to put them also on a regular basis.

The External Research Division is very small—only five professionals—since the work is essentially a field function. The Agency has thus far established a TO of twelve research officers overseas, seven are already assigned as follows: England, France, Germany, Austria, Italy, Brazil and Mexico. We hope to establish research offices soon in India, Thailand, Japan, Egypt and Iran. These officers will be regular members of the PAO’s staff, reporting to him, spending his GOE, in order to provide the PAO with the facts and figures he needs, through individual research, local contractors, or any other means available.

If some headquarters’ element in Washington, or some other Agency, such as the National Security Council, desires local survey information, we will lay that requirement on the Public Affairs Officer. Under this system, the Research Officer becomes really familiar with his country and can produce rapid, efficient, and meaningful research studies. This is particularly true of research dealing with the impact of the USIS programs. During the initial stages, we are supplementing the post’s GOE with additional funds, earmarked for research, but this is only an interim measure until the Public Affairs Officer can include research in his regular budget. However, whenever IRI places an additional requirement on any post, which is over and above its normal concern, we will provide the Public Affairs Officer with additional funds so that these special requirements will not be a financial burden.

The function of the External Research Division is to provide technical backstopping services to these research officers. Also, the Division prepares the detailed requirements, such as questions to be asked in order to satisfy headquarters’ needs. In the case of those countries which do not have a research officer, the External Research Division will provide as much help as possible to the Public Affairs Officer. If the PAO has some particularly pressing problem, IRI is prepared to [Page 710] send one of its Washington staff on TDY for as long as necessary to obtain the information required by the PAO.

The Division is headed by Leo Crespi, who was Research Officer in Germany for six years. This Division will no longer emphasize long-range basic studies. It, like the Production Division, is now a service shop trying to provide information as quickly as possible, so that it can be of practical use to all elements of USIS and USIA.

I am afraid this letter has become a little long, but I wanted to describe in some detail our assets, and our mission, so that you could understand it better, and therefore use it. Our sole mission is to be of service, and we will change our methods and procedures as required to give you what you want.

I will be very glad to get your comments on our service, both good and bad, particularly any recommendations which you may have for improvement.

Sincerely,

Henry Loomis
8

Enclosure9

IDENTIFICATION OF INTELLIGENCE NEEDS

USIA has essential needs for the following types of intelligence and intelligence information:

1.
Selected segments of societies: selected classes, groups, organizations (public and private), and their leadership, present and potential
a)
Size, composition, ideologies and attitudes, predispositions, and reactions to: (1) the United States, the USSR and other countries of greatest significance and their basic policies, (2) critical foreign and internal problems.
b)
The patterns of influence among groups, organizations, and leaders, (including the government); specifically, who is influential, on whom, how, and how much
2.
Media Research and Analysis:
a)
Communication habits and types of media in the country (press, publications, radio, motion pictures, TV).
b)
Organizational aspects of each medium, including location, key personnel, finance, distribution and exhibition outlets, and a description of the facilities of the media.
c)
The political orientation of the media.
d)
The content of the communications output by the media.
e)
Location, size and type of audience receiving the output of the media.
f)
The reactions of the audience to the media, and why.
3.
Foreign Propaganda, both friendly and unfriendly, including exchange of persons or cultural exchange
a)
Facilities and personnel.
b)
Program content and plans.
c)
Estimate of probable courses of foreign propaganda.
d)
Analyses of foreign propaganda vulnerabilities.
4.
Impact of factors affecting public opinion and attitudes and the net impact of such factors on people of a country. Such factors would include historical attitudes of people, and the influence of current domestic and foreign official and unofficial activities.
5.
Descriptive Detail, that is, unclassified or declassified intelligence information to supplement the content of USIA media with items of local interest in order to make the output appear more interesting and more authoritative, particularly in denied areas.
6.
International Communism:
a)
International organizations, personalities, programs, fiscal support, methods and success or failure of operations.
b)
Local applications, including counterespionage information, with emphasis on communications facilities.

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 306: USIA Files Lot 63 A 190, B. 172, IRI Memoranda (IAN), 1954–56. Confidential; Official–Informal. A cover letter from Clary Thompson, Deputy Assistant Director, Near East, South Asia and Africa, U.S. Information Agency, to Dear ______, June 22, 1955, suggests that the letter was intended to be sent to multiple U.S. posts abroad.
  2. Not further identified.
  3. For documentation on the establishment and responsibilities of the International Information Administration (IIA) on January 16, 1953, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 2, pp. 1591 ff.
  4. For documentation on the creation of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) later in 1953, see ibid., pp. 17091711.
  5. Theodore E. Streibert, Director of the U.S. Information Agency.
  6. The task force and its recommendations have not been further identified, but many features of the report are summarized below and quoted in the enclosure.
  7. The words “Southern Rhodesia” are crossed out and “the Union of South Africa” has been inserted by hand.
  8. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
  9. Confidential.