220. Report by the Task Force on Intelligence Activities of the
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government1
Washington, May 1955.
PREFACE
Scope of the Study
“Intelligence”—A Definition
The fate of the nation well may rest on accurate and complete
intelligence data which may serve as a trustworthy guide for top-level
governmental decisions on policy and action in a troubled world where so
many forces and ideologies work at cross purposes.
The Congress has recognized the importance of the role of intelligence in
our national security. It has authorized the expenditure of vast
[Page 652]
sums of money by appropriate
departments and agencies to carry on this work.
Immediately after World War II, at the suggestion of the Chief Executive
of our Government, the Congress approved the creation of a new agency
unique and in many ways strange to our democratic form of government. It
is known as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
The CIA operates without the customary
legislative restraints and reins under which other departments must
function. Its work is veiled in secrecy, and it is virtually a law unto
itself.
In order to evaluate the extent and effectiveness of intelligence as
carried out under these conditions, the Task Force on Intelligence
Activities found that it was confronted at the outset with the problem
of arriving at a common understanding and agreement on the meaning of
the word “intelligence,” as applied to its own areas of work and
investigation.
The word has many definitions and is subject to varying shades of
interpretation and meaning. In a certain context it might refer to
“ability to learn”; in another context, “intellect,” or perhaps “ability
to meet a new situation”; and in yet another sense, “common sense.”
In the search for an acceptable definition as applied to our own field of
study, it was found that each department or agency surveyed had its own
definition. Many of these definitions were lengthy, and involved use of
words requiring additional interpretation or delimitation to get to
their precise application.
The task force sought a definition as simple and clear as possible and
arrived at the following:
“Intelligence deals with all the things which should be known in
advance of initiating a course of action.”
Useful for our purposes, also, as a supplemental and expanded definition
is that given in the Dictionary of United States Military Terms for
Joint Usage:
“INTELLIGENCE—The product resulting from the collection,
evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all
available information which concerns one or more aspects of
foreign nations or of areas of operations, and which is
immediately or potentially significant to planning.”
Scope of Task Force Study
Refined
Initially, this task force was instructed by the Commission on
Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, hereinafter
referred to as the Commission or the Hoover Commission, to study and make recommendations as
to the structure and administration
[Page 653]
of the Central Intelligence Agency and other
kindred intelligence activities.
Later, those instructions were changed by the Commission to embrace
studies of all intelligence activities of the
Federal Government and to submit recommendations to effect changes
considered necessary to promote economy, efficiency, and improved
service in this field.
The task force gave thorough consideration to the decision of the
Commission to broaden the scope of the task-force studies to include all
intelligence activities of the Federal Government. It developed that
there are at least twelve major departments and agencies which, in one
manner or another, are engaged in intelligence. Among these are the
Department of State, the Department of Defense (including the Army,
Navy, Air Force, and Joint Chiefs of Staff), the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of Commerce, and
the Department of Agriculture. In addition, there are ten or more minor
agencies or activities which expend public funds directly or indirectly
on behalf of the intelligence effort of the Government.
Thus, under the broad definition of its terms of reference, the task
force was confronted with the Herculean job of studying and reporting on
more than twenty major and minor departments and agencies. It readily
became apparent that any attempt to spread the efforts of the task force
over such a large area would mean either that only minor results could
be expected within the allotted time or the work period should be
extended beyond the date contemplated for dissolution of the Commission
on May 31, 1955. Therefore, it was apparent that the scope of the
task-force work had to be refined if any useful results were to be
derived from its efforts and expenditure of funds.
Positive Foreign Intelligence
Vital
The most pressing need under present conditions is for those officials in
responsible positions in Government, especially those responsible for
foreign policy, to have readily available full and factual foreign
intelligence. The word “foreign” as used here denotes the target of
information as distinct from the geographical source.
Thus, it appeared to the task force that within the given time limit the
best interests of the Government would be served if the task force
directed its attention to the departments and agencies whose entire or
primary responsibilities lie in the field of positive foreign
intelligence as it pertains to national defense and security, and in
whose care vast sums of money and unique authority have been entrusted.
These are the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the
Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (to the extent that it deals in security
intelligence), and the intelligence activities of the Atomic Energy
Commission.
[Page 654]
Directive to the Task Force
Accordingly, a proposal to delimit the scope of the task-force studies
was made to and approved by the Commission, as follows:
- 1.
- Survey the work of the Central Intelligence
Agency. Cover all activities of CIA, wherever located, including but not limited to
collection, evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence,
obligation and expenditure of funds, examination of auditing of
funds, security, personnel, projects carried out through other
agencies, relationship and coordination with other governmental
intelligence agencies, communications, supply and storage; a
determination of the responsibilities of the agency, as
prescribed by legislative enactment or administrative action,
and a study as to whether the responsibilities have been
adequately defined and are being implemented.
- 2.
- Survey the intelligence activities of the
Department of Defense. Cover all intelligence
activities, wherever located, of the Department of Defense,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Security Agency, Army, Navy, and
Air Force, including, but not limited to, collection,
evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence, obligation and
expenditure of funds, security, personnel, projects carried out
through other agencies, communications, relationship and
coordination with other governmental intelligence agencies,
supply and storage; a determination of the responsibilities of
the Department and all its elements for intelligence, as
prescribed by legislative enactment or administrative action,
and a study as to whether the responsibilities have been
adequately defined and are being implemented. No survey will be
made of the organization or organizational structure of tactical
units in the Army, Navy, and Air Force engaged primarily in
producing tactical or combat intelligence.
- 3.
- Survey the intelligence activities of the
Department of State. Cover all intelligence activities
related to national defense, wherever located, of the Department
of State, including but not limited to, collection, evaluation,
and dissemination of intelligence, obligation and expenditure of
funds, security, personnel, projects carried out through other
agencies, communications, relationship and coordination with
other governmental intelligence agencies, and supply; a
determination of the responsibilities of the Department for
intelligence, as prescribed by legislative enactment or
administrative action, and a study as to whether the
responsibilities have been adequately defined and are being
implemented.
- 4.
- Survey the intelligence activities of the
National Security Council. Include a study of the
history, legislation, development, organization, and operations
of the National Security Council as they affect intelligence
activities. Include study of the Operations Coordinating Board,
the Intelligence Advisory Committee, and related
activities.
- 5.
- Survey limited segments of the intelligence
activities of other agencies. The segments to be
studied would be developed as the task force gathers
information.
- 6.
- General Considerations. Determine which
of the intelligence services, activities, and functions
performed by any of the agencies surveyed are (a) essential; (b)
not necessary; (c) of similar nature, and what consolidations
are in the public interest; (d) non-essential, and which are
competitive with private enterprise; and, (e) duplicate or
overlap those of other agencies.
[Page 655]
This requires a determination in the basic surveys outlined in paragraphs
1 to 5 as to what services, activities, and functions are being
performed by each agency studied. Upon completion of the basic surveys,
a functional survey of the work done by the agencies would be undertaken
from the data developed. With such a scope, the task force would cover,
among other things:
- (1)
- The intelligence function of the National Security
Council.
- (2)
- The value and effectiveness of the information supplied by the
operating agencies.
- (3)
- The effectiveness of the coordination of intelligence
agencies.
- (4)
- The organization, procedures, methods, and performance of the
several Government agencies in the field of overt and covert
intelligence.
- (5)
- An examination of the operation and physical plant of the
agencies as to economy, adequacy, effect on efficiency, and
utilization.
- (6)
- The various programs of the several agencies in such fields as
training, research and development, stockpiling, reference
material, and security.
- (7)
- The personnel policies and manpower utilization.
- (8)
- All programs and procedures for the collection, development,
and dissemination of information to include collection apparatus
and dissemination media.
- (9)
- The interrelationship between the several areas thus assigned
and actual areas of coverage, mutual support of one
another.
In the execution of this extensive undertaking, the task force, in
certain areas, had to employ the “sampling” method, particularly in the
case of the study of those activities of the agencies overseas.
Sensitive Portions of Agencies
Surveyed
In giving its approval of the foregoing proposal, the Commission directed
that a first paragraph be added as follows:
“1. The study and survey of the sensitive portions of the
agencies will be undertaken by General Clark with a minimum staff on a
‘need-to-know’ basis.”
Pursuant to the foregoing directive, arrangements were made orally
between Mr. Allen Dulles,
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and General Mark W. Clark, chairman of the
Task Force on Intelligence Activities, initially for General Clark and Colonel
Herman O. Lane, a member of the task-force
staff, to have access to CIA activities,
both overt and covert. Shortly after this arrangement was implemented,
it developed that a requirement existed for at least one additional
member of the task force to have access to covert activities of the
agency. Accordingly, Admiral Richard L.
Connolly’s name was added to the list.
This arrangement continued until a decision was made that certain members
of the task force and staff should inspect intelligence activities in
the European and Far East areas. Since General Clark was
[Page 656]
unable to take part in one of these inspection
trips, the problem confronting the task forces, as a result of the
existing restrictions on the clearance of the task force to sensitive
material of the agency, was presented to the Director of Central
Intelligence. The following quoted letter was received from the
director:
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington 25,
D.C.
Office of the Director
27 January 1955
General J.G. Christiansen
Staff Director
Task Force on Intelligence Activities
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of
the Government
Washington D.C.
Dear General Christiansen:
With further reference to your letter of 20 January 1955,2 and our telephone conversations
of yesterday evening and today, I have arranged clearance for Mr.
Henry Kearns and for you to have access to
CIA activities, both overt and
covert, in connection with your trip to the Pacific area. It is also
understood that all members of the Task Force and you, yourself, will be
cleared to consider the report with respect to both overt and covert
activities of the CIA which may be
submitted by those members of your staff who have been cleared for
on-the-spot investigation of those activities. I quite appreciate that
this is necessary in connection with the preparation of the Task Force
report.
This procedure has been cleared with Governor Adams.
Faithfully yours,
Cost of the Intelligence Effort
Precise figures on the cost in money and manpower engaged in
intelligence activities in the interest of national defense and
security are not a matter of record. Any attempt to compile such
data accurately would require the expenditure of money out of all
proportion to the value of the findings. The task force estimates,
however, that the annual expenditure is in the order of $800
million.
[Page 657]
Organization of the Task Force
Security Impact on Selection of
Personnel
The Task Force on Intelligence Activities was the last to be
authorized by the Hoover
Commission. The director and deputy of the staff assumed their
duties on October 1, 1954. The limited pool of available personnel
in the United States with prior experience in the intelligence field
influenced to some extent the structure of the staff and its methods
of operation.
Personnel of the Intelligence Task Force and of the staff had to be
screened carefully for background security and possible prejudicial
interest arising from prior association with departments and
agencies under investigation.
Before a member of the task force or staff could have access to any
material, a security background investigation was conducted and the
individual declared by proper authority to be eligible for access to
“Top Secret” information. In each case where the inquiry involved
access to atomic energy data, a special clearance was obtained.
It was found that each department and agency had evolved its
criteria, practices, and standards for clearance. The task force
adopted a policy in conformity with the policies and requirements of
the department or agency involved in each specific
investigation.
In the interest of security and economy, the task force also decided
to keep its staff as compact as possible. Sensitive material was
studied generally on the premises of the agencies.
Staff Organization
After careful consideration by the task force of the possible methods
of organizing the staff and its work, it was decided that the most
practical course would be to assign some teams composed of one or
two staff members to study specific agencies, and to delegate to
other teams specific across-the-board survey functions. Individual
task force members were assigned across-the-board responsibilities
paralleling the work of designated staff teams. Thus, all members
would be in a position to interject their influence and guidance in
the staff activities and at the same time obtain valuable first-hand
knowledge of the overall problem.
Initially, five staff study groups were organized. Some were assigned
responsibility for study of a single department; others, where
feasible, covered two or more agencies.
The restrictions imposed on the staff in its survey of the Central
Intelligence Agency necessitated that the work be broken down into
two classifications, with one group studying the covert aspects of
CIA, and the other surveying the
overt operations of the Agency. These two teams carefully
coordinated and correlated their studies, except where
[Page 658]
information on the more
sensitive areas of the Agency’s work was restricted to designated
individuals. This arrangement proved very cumbersome, was
time-consuming, and seriously interfered with the conduct of the
survey.
As each task group completed the study of a particular department or
agency, it was assigned to studies of specific functions common to
two or more agencies.
Procedures for Gathering
Data
The task force scrupulously avoided the use of questionnaires. The
statistical matter which appears throughout this report was
extracted from documentary files maintained by the departments and
agencies.
The task force and staff had the benefit of detailed briefings by
each agency studied. These briefings were characterized by
informality. Oral questions and answers were the rule rather than
the exception. No verbatim transcriptions of the conversations and
comments of witnesses were deemed necessary. In some instances,
however, copies of the prepared briefings were furnished to the
staff for ready reference.
Discussions were had with all echelons of personnel in each
department and agency, from the clerk at the working level to and
including the Secretary of State, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary
of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence.
The task force also had the benefit of expert advice from many
individuals who are not in Government employ but who previously
occupied positions of prime responsibility in the development of our
present intelligence operations and organization. Their help and
advice were of inestimable value.
Some of these witnesses appeared before the task force at no expense
to the Government and at considerable personal sacrifice. The task
force wishes to express its unqualified appreciation to these
public-spirited individuals in private life who gave freely of their
time, and who by their objective approach to the problem materially
enlightened the task force.
Teams Make First-Hand Studies
Abroad
In order to obtain a clearer picture of intelligence operations, two
teams, each composed of a member or members of the task force and
members of the staff, were sent abroad for on-the-spot
investigations. One team visited the European sector and the other
went to the Far East.
These staff groups had discussions with the senior United States
representatives, senior military commanders, and representatives of
the Central Intelligence Agency in the countries visited. The visits
and discussions afforded the task force first-hand information which
could be obtained in no other fashion.
[Page 659]
The conclusions reached and the recommendations contained in this
report reflect the benefits of those personal tours of
inspection.
Results of the Recommendations Made in 1948 by the
First Hoover Commission As
They Related to Intelligence
The first Hoover
Commission3 directed
its attention primarily to the functional responsibilities and
relationships of the heads of the various departments and agencies
established under the National Security Act. The principal
recommendation relating directly to intelligence was incorporated in
the following general recommendation:
“That more adequate and effective relations be developed at
working level among the appropriate committees of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff on one hand, and the National Security
Council, Central Intelligence Agency, Research and
Development Board, Munitions Board, and the National
Security Resources Board on the other hand. That vigorous
steps be taken to improve the Central Intelligence Agency
and its work.”
Results
The Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 19534 transferred the
functions of the National Security Resources Board and Munitions
Board to the Office of Defense Mobilization. The functions of the
Research and Development Board were transferred to the Secretary of
Defense by Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953,5
where they are incorporated in the functions of the Assistant
Secretary of Research and Development. There are apparently no
relationships on working levels in the intelligence field between
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of Defense Mobilization,
except through the representation of the Secretary of Defense in the
National Security Council. As far as the intelligence relations
between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence
Agency on working levels are concerned, they are implicit in the
representation of the joint intelligence group of the Joint Staff,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the Intelligence Advisory Committee. The
degree of coordination effected through these relationships will be
discussed more fully in this report in the section devoted to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. The steps taken subsequent to the publication
of the report of the first Hoover Commission to improve the Central
Intelligence Agency are
[Page 660]
discussed in the following paragraphs relating to the
recommendations of the task force of the first Hoover Commission.
Observations, Recommendations, and
Results of the Task Force on Intelligence Activities within the
National Defense Organization
The task force of the first Hoover Commission confined its observations and
recommendations to the Central Intelligence Agency, its internal
problems, and its relationships with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
State Department, the National Security Council, and the
intelligence agencies of the three military services.
The present task force has been unable to determine the degree to
which these observations and recommendations were published and
disseminated, except as they are reflected in the recommendation of
the Commission discussed previously. However, as they influenced to
some degree the direction of the efforts of this task force, a brief
discussion of the observations of this task force in the same areas
is believed to be pertinent.
Observations of the Task Force of
First Hoover Commission
and Comments of this Task Force Thereon
- 1.
- “Judgment as to the effectiveness of the CIA must be tempered by
considerations of its apparent youth, its lack of tradition and
established, time-tried procedures, and of continuity of
personnel.” The soundness of that observation is self-evident
and is supported by the observations of this task force as set
forth in its report.
- 2.
- “There seems to be an excess of administrative personnel, and
there is undue interference with operating agencies. Reduction
of administrative overhead is possible and desirable, and
interference with operating agencies should be eliminated.”
There still exists some excess of administrative personnel
because of considerations relating to compartmentalization for
security reasons, and because of the fact that the agency is now
scattered among thirty-four buildings. This administrative
overhead is a matter of constant concern and study to the
agency. Plans for new construction have been initiated and funds
will be requested.
- 3.
- “The CIA is scattered among
twenty-two buildings, causing many administrative difficulties,
although some scattering may be desirable for security reasons.”
The number of buildings now occupied by the agency has been
increased to thirty-four, thus magnifying the administrative
difficulties.
- 4.
- “The CIA has fallen short of
its objectives as a source of national intelligence, especially
in the fields of scientific intelligence, including medical.
This information should be evaluated centrally.” This
observation will be commented upon in the discussion following
recommendation 3 below.
- 5.
- “The CIA’s main problem is one
of securing and retaining qualified personnel. This is also true
of other intelligence agencies.” The securing and retaining of
qualified personnel has been largely solved by the agency as it
has had sufficient funds to attract the best qualified people,
sometimes, unfortunately, at the expense of the intelligence
agencies of the three services. This situation will be discussed
more fully in the section covering the Central Intelligence
Agency and the military services.
- 6.
- “The services must rid their intelligence estimates of service
bias.” Attempts on the part of service intelligence agencies to
present honest intelligence estimates particular to that agency
are sometimes “slanted” by the command echelons of the services
in support of budgetary requests. This tendency should not be
charged to intelligence agencies, which on the whole, are doing
an honest job as far as this task force has been able to
observe.
- 7.
- [1 paragraph (7 lines) not
declassified]
- 8.
- “Thought should be given to desirability of splitting CIA in time of war, and
transferring operational services, such as open and covert
collection, to the Department of Defense. Changes should be made
in peacetime organization to facilitate this split.” Much
thought has been given by the officials of the CIA and the military services
concerning the proper relationships in time of war between the
CIA and the military
services. Present plans of the CIA do not contemplate the transfer of any of
CIA’s current functions and
responsibilities to the Department of Defense in time of war.
However, current plans (approved by the Secretary of Defense and
the DCI) envisage the transfer
of operational control over CIA’s component forces in active theaters of war where
American Forces are engaged to the military commander thereof,
who will exercise such control in the same manner as control is
exercised by him over components of the Army, Navy, and Air
Force assigned to the same command (see Appendix II). The task
force believes that the seriousness of this ever-present problem
warrants continued study to arrive, if possible, at the most
suitable solution prior to the outbreak of war.
- 9.
- “The military services, including Joint Chiefs of Staff, tend
to withhold details of operational information and military
plans on the grounds of security.” This situation has not been
solved to the complete satisfaction of all interested
parties.
- 10.
- “The ties binding the JCS,
among others, to the CIA are too
tenuous.” This observation resulted in recommendation 3 of the
task force and will be commented on in the discussion following
that recommendation.
- 11.
- “Any proposals for the revision of laws so as to permit
conviction, regardless of intent, in
cases of dangerous disclosures by indiscreet
[Page 662]
and irresponsible persons, should
be examined most carefully by Congress in the light of our
concepts of freedom.” As far as this task force has been able to
determine, no statutory authority exists or is contemplated
which covers the situation of former employees who may,
negligently or otherwise, without intent,
make unauthorized disclosures.
- 12.
- “The National Security Organization, as established by the
National Security Act of 1947, is soundly conceived. In order to
improve operations, the NSC
should give more thought and attention to the relationships of
CIA with other agencies, and
by working through the Secretaries of State and Defense, should
encourage the improvement of other intelligence agencies.” This
observation is incorporated in recommendation 1 of the task
force below.
- 13.
- “Such of the reforms as suggested by this committee, as well
as those of the Dulles
Committee,6 should be made promptly, but when
action has been taken, the agencies affected should be permitted
a period of internal development free from examination and its
attendant publicity.” Any comment on this sound observation
would be redundant.
Recommendations of the Task Force
of the First Hoover
Commission
- 1.
- “That more adequate and effective relations be established at
the working levels between appropriate committees of the JCS and the Joint Staff and their
countermembers in (1) the National Security Council, (2) the
Central Intelligence Agency, (3) the Research and Development
Board, (4) the Munitions Board, and (5) the National Security
Resources Board, to the end that in their strategic planning the
JCS will weigh adequately
and on a systematic, reciprocal basis, considerations of foreign
policy, intelligence, scientific research and development, and
economic capabilities.” This recommendation is substantially the
same as the recommendation of the commission, and the results
will be discussed in the sections of this report devoted to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- 2.
- “That the Secretary of Defense be the sole representative of
the national military establishment on the National Security
Council. The Committee suggests, however, in order that the
JCS may be fully and
currently posted on our national policy, that they be invited,
as a general rule, to attend meetings of the NSC, but without membership
thereon. The civilian departmental secretaries, although not
members, should also be invited to attend council meetings in
appropriate circumstances.” The National Security Act of 1947,
as amended, now provides that the Secretary of Defense is the
sole National Defense Establishment member. However, secretaries
and under secretaries of the military departments may serve as
members at the pleasure of the President.
[Page 663]
The law also provides that the
Joint Chiefs of Staff will be the principal military advisers to
the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary
of Defense. It has been observed by this task force that the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff habitually attends the
meetings of the National Security Council and the other members
attend for those items in which the Joint Chiefs are concerned.
When departmental matters are before the Council which are of
concern to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, or Air Force, the
secretary concerned will be invited and may bring his military
chief as an adviser, in which case that military chief will not
be attending in his role as a member of the JCS.
- 3.
- “That vigorous efforts be made to improve the internal
structure of the CIA and the
quality of its product, especially in the fields of scientific
and medical intelligence; that there be established within the
agency at the top echelon an evaluation board or section
composed of competent and experienced personnel who would have
no administrative responsibility and whose duties would be
confined solely to intelligence evaluation; and that positive
efforts be made to foster relations of mutual confidence between
the CIA and the several
departments and agencies it serves.” This task force has
observed that positive efforts have been made to improve the
quality of scientific and medical intelligence. The Office of
Scientific Intelligence is adequately staffed to include medical
personnel. In the quality of its products, this agency is
definitely handicapped by the inability of the intelligence
community as a whole to collect information from the Soviet
bloc. The Office of National Estimates is a top-echelon
evaluation board, composed of competent and experienced
personnel with no administrative responsibilities and whose
duties are confined solely to intelligence evaluation, the
product of which appears in the form of national estimates.
Specific recommendations with regard to deficiencies in the
relations of the Central Intelligence Agency with the services
will be found in those sections devoted to CIA and the Department of
Defense.
- 4.
- “That the Research and Development Board and the CIA, as a joint undertaking,
establish immediately within one or the other agency an
efficient and capable unit to collect, collate, and evaluate
scientific and medical intelligence, in order that our present
glaring deficiencies in this field be promptly eliminated.” The
Research and Development Board has been dissolved and its
functions transferred to the Secretary of Defense. Progress made
by the Central Intelligence Agency in the field of scientific
and medical intelligence is fully discussed in the section of
this report devoted to that agency.
INTRODUCTION
The machinery for accomplishing our intelligence objectives,
hereinafter called the intelligence community when referred to as a
whole, includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the National
Security Council,
[Page 664]
the
National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and
the intelligence sections of the Department of State, of the Army,
the Navy, and the Air Force, and of the Atomic Energy Commission.
Some of these agencies approach or exceed the operations of the
CIA in functions and in
expenditures. However, since CIA is
charged with the overall responsibility for coordinating the output
of all intelligence forces, the task force gave special attention to
the work of that Agency.
Our investigations showed that the sensitive and vital work of the
intelligence community is being led by a group which is sincere, and
dedicated to the service of the nation. We discovered no valid
ground for the suspicion that the CIA or any other element of the intelligence family was
being effectively contaminated by any organized subversive or
Communistic clique. Charges were made by some individuals alleging a
few members of the intelligence community to be poor security risks.
All such cases, except those obviously without merit, were
investigated by proper authority, or investigations are in the
process of being made.
On the basis of its comprehensive studies, the task force feels that
the American people can and should give their full confidence and
support to the intelligence program, and contribute in every
possible way to the vital work in which these agencies are engaged.
We found the Director of Central Intelligence to be industrious,
objective, selfless, enthusiastic, and imaginative. We are
convinced, however, that in his enthusiasm he has taken upon himself
too many burdensome duties and responsibilities on the operational
side of CIA’s activities. The task
force feels that certain administrative flaws have developed in the
CIA, which must be corrected to
give proper emphasis and direction to its basic responsibilities
The major aim would be greater concentration on the collection of
intelligence information from our primary target—Russia and her
satellites, and Communist China.
The task force is deeply concerned over the lack of adequate
intelligence data from behind the Iron Curtain. The information we
need on the political plans, scientific progress, and military
potential of the Communists is there to be had, and we must exert
every conceivable and practicable effort to get it. Proper
directional emphasis, aggressive leadership, boldness and
persistence are essential to achieve the desired results.
The glamor and excitement of some angles of our intelligence effort
must not be permitted to overshadow other vital phases of the work
or cause neglect of primary functions. A majority of the task force
is convinced that an internal reorganization of the CIA is necessary to give assurance that
each of these functions receives adequate attention without
diversionary interest.
[Page 665]
The task force further is concerned over the absence of satisfactory
machinery for surveillance of the stewardship of the Central
Intelligence Agency. It is making recommendations which it believes
will provide the proper type of “watch-dog” commission as a means of
reestablishing that relationship between the CIA and the Congress so essential to and characteristic
of our democratic form of government, but which was abrogated by the
enactment of Public Law 1107 and other statutes relating to the Agency. It
would include representatives of both Houses of Congress and of the
Chief Executive. Its duties would embrace a review of the operations
and effectiveness not only of the CIA, but also of all other intelligence agencies.
One of the aims in the creation of a compact commission of this type
would be to keep the public assured of the essential and trustworthy
accomplishments of our intelligence forces, and to enlist public
support and participation in the intelligence effort.
Action of this sort is needed to promote a general awareness and
appreciation among the people of the significance and objectives of
the intelligence program. There is a corollary demand for
clarification of misunderstandings which have arisen in the public
mind, largely as a result of the misapplication of secrecy. However,
it must be recognized that intelligence operations require a large
element of secrecy as an essential to success.
The task force further is greatly concerned about the inadequate
guidance being given to NSA by the
United States Communication Intelligence Board, and about certain
aspects of communications. Recommendations to improve the current
status are made in Appendix I, Parts 1 and 2.
The intelligence community should draw more widely on the available
pool of retired citizens with wide previous business experience in
the foreign field, and among retired military personnel who have
specialized over a long period in the intelligence field. It should
develop a more attractive program of career incentives for its
officials, and of benefits for its overseas employees.
Recommendations to achieve these desirable results are being offered
by the task force.
[Omitted here are the body of the report and the Appendices.]
