Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment

352. Memorandum From the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination (Wisner) to Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter⁰

Washington, September 13, 1948.

SUBJECT

• Appearance Before Eberstadt Subcommittee of the Hoover Committee

1. Pursuant to the clearance which I obtained in advance from General Wright and Admiral Souers, I appeared before the Eberstadt Subcommittee of the Hoover Committee in response to the request communicated to me by Mr. Eberstadt via Admiral Souers. I was called at 5:00 p.m., 10 September 1948, and was questioned extensively by various members of the committee for approximately 40 minutes.

2. It was evident from Mr. Eberstadt’s introductory remarks that he and various members of his committee were already quite familiar with the establishment of my new activity. Mr. Eberstadt cautioned the members of his committee concerning the highly classified character by statements but beyond that he did nothing to restrict the course of the inquiry. However, I was able to adhere very closely to the pattern of presentation which had been rehearsed in advance in conversations with Admiral Souers and General Wright. That is, I concentrated upon the fact that the members of the National Security Council regarded the new activity as being of the greatest importance and urgency, and that various of the most prominent members of that body had personally assured me of the importance which they attached to the activity and of their intention to give it their full support. In regard to the character of my activities, I stressed the planned aspects and refrained from indicating that we are now engaged in or presently contemplating actual operations.

3. The most inquisitive members of the subcommittee were Mr. Eberstadt himself, Mr. John McCloy and Mr. Hanson Baldwin. They were particularly curious to know how the new activity ties in with the structure of government; whether it might not better be placed under the National Military Establishment; whether, in the event of war, it would be necessary to create a new “OSS type” organization for sabotage and guerrilla activities, etc. To this line of questioning, I replied generally that I had not as yet devoted sufficient consideration to these problems to have a definitive view and that I was operating pursuant to a directive which had been carefully considered by the National Security Council in accordance with which my activity has been placed within the framework of the CIA organization.

4. Notwithstanding the fact, as indicated above, that I managed to adhere very closely to the predetermined pattern of presentation, I should like to register for the record my concern about the security aspects of this appearance before the committee. It may well be that most if not all of the members of the committee have some form of security clearance, and I am duly aware of the fact that a substantial proportion of the committee members are important and responsible individuals who well understand and will respect Mr. Eberstadt’s admonitions on the score of security. The fact remains, however, that as a result of this appearance, some 15 individuals who are not directly connected with the intelligence organization of this government are now aware of the existence and much of the significance of the Office of Policy Coordination. I consider it unlikely that all of these people have been fully indoctrinated in the principles of security and it is, therefore, reasonable to assume that some disclosure of the activity of this office may result from this appearance. Should a leak occur, it would be my recommendation that we continue to maintain the position that our activity is one of “planning and coordinating policy.”

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Records, Job 86–B00269R, Box 2, Folder 3. Top Secret.