218. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts 1

SUBJECT

  • The Watch Committee and the National Indications Center

CA–7918

The purpose of this instruction is to review the responsibility of the Watch Committee of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) of the National Security Council, and to provide notice of the establishment of the National Indications Center (NIC), which has been set up to increase the Watch Committee’s capability to discharge its mission. The instruction is being circulated to Foreign Service posts to provide information on how posts should cooperate in carrying out the responsibility the Department bears to the Watch Committee and the NIC.

The Watch Committee is chaired by the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, at present Lt. Gen. Cabell, and his senior representatives from each of the following: State, Army, Navy, Air Force, JIG, CIA, AEC, and the FBI. Its mission is: “To provide earliest possible warning to the United States Government of hostile action of the USSR, or its allies, which endangers the security of the United States.” (“Hostile action” is defined as aggressive action by armed forces or organizations or individuals in support of military strategy.)

The Watch Committee has the following functions:

1.
To analyze and evaluate information and intelligence, both current and cumulative furnished by IAC agencies relating to the imminence of hostilities, and to develop therefrom conclusions as to indications of:
a.
Soviet/Communist intentions to initiate hostilities against the continental US, US possessions, or US forces abroad; US Allies or their forces; areas peripheral to the Soviet Orbit.
b.
Any other development, actual or potential, susceptible of direct exploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action which would jeopardize the security of the U.S.
2.
To report promptly their conclusions to the principals of the IAC and to other appropriate recipients. If immediate action or decision on the part of the President or the National Security Council seems [Page 649] to be required a meeting of the IAC will be convened by the Director of Central Intelligence.

The Watch Committee is always on call for emergency sessions and meets regularly on Wednesday of each week.

The National Indications Center has been established to provide a central staff devoting full time to the problems faced by the Watch Committee. It is charged, among other responsibilities with:

1.
Developing and operating the Watch Committee Intelligence plan for world wide collection of information pertinent to the Watch Committee mission;
2.
Arranging for exploitation of all sources of information bearing on the mission;
3.
Arranging with IAC agencies for systematic screening of all information and intelligence received by them for the purpose of forwarding to the Indications Center all items which contain indications of Soviet/Communist intentions.

In support of the Watch Committee and NIC, the President on 30 November 1954 approved NSC 5438,2 directing all appropriate departments and agencies of the Government:

  • “1. To make fully available to the IAC Watch Committee all information and intelligence of reasonable credibility pertinent to its mission and functions without restriction because of source, policy or operational sensitivity.
  • “2. To keep the IAC Watch Committee informed concerning significant diplomatic, political, military, or other courses of action by the U.S., approved for immediate implementation or in process of execution, which might bring about military reaction or early hostile action by the USSR, or its allies, thus endangering the security of the U.S. This information is for the explicit and express use of the Watch Committee and those members of the National Indications Center who need to know of it in order to perform their functions.”

The Department of State’s responsibility to the Watch Committee and the National Indications Center covers evaluation of political and economic indications which might bear on Soviet/Communist intent to initiate hostilities. Within the Department, the Office of the Special Assistant, Intelligence (R) bears the responsibility for the discharge of the Department’s commitments. However, the responsibility to be checking constantly for such indications is shared by the other areas of the Department and by Foreign Service posts. Information on any [Page 650] such indications should be brought immediately to the attention of the Department by telegram when appropriate, and should be followed up when necessary by dispatch containing available further information, including information on the source and reliability of the report.3

At posts where Service Attachés or CAS are present, the information should also be passed to those officers.

Directly bearing on the question of Soviet/Communist intent to initiate hostilities, of course, would be information on attempts to smuggle fissionable material or other types of unconventional warfare weapons or sabotage devices into the country. Any information of this type should be reported immediately by telegram and followed by dispatch providing full details as to the source and reliability of the information, the origin and destination of the material and the alleged use to be made of it. At posts having CAS or Legal Attachés, all available information should also be passed to them.

This instruction neither supersedes nor modifies any other extant instruction concerning the requirements of other government agencies for specialized information having to do with threats to the security of the United States (e.g. Secret Circular Instruction, June 17, 1952 concerning the smuggling into the U.S. of radiological, biological, chemical, and other weapons, or sabotage devices.)4

Hoover
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1955–60, 101. 2/5–1455. Secret. Drafted by McAfee on May 3, cleared in 10 bureaus, and approved by Furnas.
  2. Regarding NSC 5438, see Document 187 and footnote 4 thereto.
  3. McAfee elaborated on the watch functions of the Department of State in an August 19 memorandum to Robert G. Barnes, Director of the Executive Secretariat, for distribution throughout the Department. According to McAfee, the Department was charged with evaluating diplomatic indications of Soviet/Chinese intent to initiate hostilities and for reporting to the Watch Committee significant Soviet/Communist hostile reactions to certain U.S. diplomatic negotiations and economic measures. In particular, Department officials were asked to look for such indications when reviewing memoranda of conversation and observing Soviet reactions to U.S. negotiations for base rights, military assistance pacts, or transit rights with states adjacent to the Soviet orbit, and to such steps as preclusive purchasing, embargoes, blockade, and interference with Soviet/Communist marine or air transport. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1955–60, 101.2/8–1955)
  4. Not found.