213. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to the National Security Council1

SUBJECT

  • The Foreign Information Program and Psychological Warfare Planning

REFERENCES

  • A. NSC 59/12
  • B. NSC 127/13
  • C. NSC Action. Nos. 11974 and 11985
  • D. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 8, 19556
1.
The attached NSC Staff memorandum sets forth a brief review of measures which have been periodically considered or adopted within the Executive Branch to provide organizational arrangements and principles for coordination and planning in the field of psychological operations. It illustrates the difficulties and divergences of opinion hitherto encountered in attempting to provide adequate direction and coordination for psychological operations at a high governmental [Page 626] level. It also affords a historical record to those presently concerned with the desirability of providing further policy and organizational arrangements in this area.
2.
NSC 59/1 (“The Foreign Information Program and Psychological Warfare Planning”, March 9, 1950) and NSC 127/1 (“Plan for Conducting Psychological Operations During General Hostilities”, July 25, 1952) have clearly become obsolete in many of their provisions due to major change in Executive branch organization during the past few years. Therefore, they should be rescinded, revised, or otherwise dealt with.
3.
The current status of action on these policies has developed in the following manner.
a.
A special memorandum from the President to the NSC, dated September 3, 1953,7 transferred the functions of the POCC (established pursuant to NSC 59/1) to the OCB. The OCB continued only the POCC Subcommittee, the “X-Day Working Group”, charged with developing plans for psychological operations in support of hostilities.
b.
The “X-Day Working Group” was authorized by OCB in the latter part of 1953 to propose revisions in NSC 127/1 deemed necessary in the light of the numerous Executive Branch organizational changes brought about since the adoption of the policy in question.
c.
In carrying out their task, the X-Day Committee found itself unable to make agreed recommendations on several major issues due to departmental conflict of views.
d.
As a result, the OCB in its report to the NSC dated July 23, 1954,8 recommended recision of NSC 59/1` and NSC 127/1, “without prejudice to the principles of operation and the responsibilities of departments and agencies to engage in psychological warfare and psychological warfare planning enunciated therein or elsewhere”.
4.
On August 3, 1954, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted recommendations to the NSC opposing recision of NSC 59/1 and NSC 127/1, pointing out that these policies, although obsolete in some respects, contained “essential formal statements of national policy on psychological warfare matters”.9
5.
The NSC on August 5, 1954, deferred further action with respect to NSC 59/1 and NSC 127/1, pending receipt of a study from the Bureau of the Budget which was to include “the placing of responsibility within the Executive Branch for coordinating economic [Page 627] warfare, psychological warfare and foreign information activities”.10 However, the study in question does not deal specifically with the problems posed by NSC 59/1 and NSC 127/1.
6.
In a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense dated January 11, 1955, subsequently circulated to the NSC on February 8, 1955 with a supporting memorandum from the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed their views of August 3, 1954 and additionally set forth certain provisions which should be contained in any revised policy.11
7.
As suggested by the attached historical summary, a number of major issues are identifiable, which must be dealt with in any attempt to provide for organizational arrangements in this area:
a.
Departmental Responsibility. State’s primary prerogative for giving in this area in peacetime policy guidance, with related responsibilities, has been generally recognized. Military prerogatives in wartime have been likewise generally recognized. However, the organizational expression of carrying out these responsibilities has varied considerably (ICS, IFIO, NPSB, PSB, OCB).
b.
The Necessity of Continuity. This concept has been approached in various ways, including:
(1)
The organization for coordination of planning in this area should be the same in peace and war;
(2)
Peacetime arrangements should generally prevail on a temporary basis during the first stages of general war—to be modified or replaced later by a permanent organization whose nature and authority would subsequently by determined;
(3)
A special interim organization should be provided for in peacetime to be activated during the initial stages of general hostilities (or limited war);
(4)
A permanent organization should be provided for in peacetime for the period of general war, or some variant of this concept with (3);
(5)
No binding decision should be made at this time on the nature of the permanent organization for coordination and planning during general hostilities.
c.
The Governmental Level of Responsibility.
(1)
Should the organization be at the Assistant Secretary level or higher?
(2)
Should the organization have the authority to make psychological warfare policy and to issue directives, operational and other, or should it be more exclusively coordinating in nature?
(3)
To what extent should the organization have an independent staff?
(4)
What provision should be made for access to the top policy-making levels in the Government and to the President?
(5)
To what extent should the directing officer of such an organization be independent from the departments and have direct access to the President?
(6)
To what extent does the changed nature of general war as presently envisaged bear on the necessity and importance of establishing in peacetime an organization for the conduct of psychological operations in the initial stages of general war?
(7)
To what extent is it necessary in peacetime to provide, in the psychological warfare area, trained personnel and stockpiled resources for use in wartime?
8.
In view of the past history in this field and the nature of the issues identified in the preceding paragraph, it is believed that a high level review of the existing arrangements in the light of NSC 59/1 and NSC 127/1 should be undertaken with a view to preparing appropriate recommendations for consideration by the National Security Council. Such a review should be undertaken with a full understanding of the existing arrangements and current plans and programs in this field, as well as the status of planning for the possibility of limited or general war.
9.
Mr. Cutler therefore recommends that the responsibility for making such a review and recommendations be assigned to Mr. Nelson Rockefeller as Special Assistant to the President “to provide leadership in the development of increased understanding and cooperation among all peoples and in reviewing and developing methods and programs by which the various departments and agencies of the Government may effectively contribute to such cooperation and understanding”. In this assignment Mr. Rockefeller should be provided with such advice and assistance as he requires from the Bureau of the Budget, the Office of Defense Mobilization and the Operations Coordinating Board as well as the responsible operating departments and agencies.
10.
Mr. Rockefeller and the NSC Planning Board concur in the above recommendation.
James S. Lay, Jr.
12
[Page 629]

Attachment13

SUMMARY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE ARRANGEMENTS WITHIN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SINCE WORLD WAR II (with particular respect to the problems posed by NSC 59/1 and 127/1)

World War II

1. Approximately six months after U.S. entry into World War II, the OWI (Office of War Information) was established by Executive Order in June 1942.14 The OWI was responsible for domestic and overt foreign information programs and answered directly to the President. Policy guidance was provided by the Committee on War Information, chaired by the Director of OWI, with representation which included the departments of State, War, and Navy.

2. Subsequently, in 1943, the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) was established and made responsible, among other functions, for the conduct of covert information and propaganda activities abroad, answering to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. There was no psychological warfare organization for the services as a whole, although there was created within SHAEF a special psychological warfare staff division on a level with G–2. In theaters of military operations, each commander set up his own psychological warfare organization and coordinated psychological warfare with his combat operations.

Post-World War II

4. Following the end of the war, the OSS was dissolved and certain overt activities of the OWI, including the VOA facilities, were transferred to the Department of State. At the same time the CIA took over the intelligence and covert psychological warfare activities of the OSS. The military services retained their psychological warfare units on a greatly reduced scale, though they conducted significant activities in this area through the reorientation program necessitated by the occupation of Germany and Japan. This was the status of organization within the Government in early 1947 when the exigencies of the current cold war posed increased challenges and demands on U.S. activities in this field.

[Page 630]

5. At the end of 1947, by interdepartmental agreement, the State Department was charged with the responsibility for current peacetime propaganda activities (NSC 4 Dec. 9, 1947).15 To provide for closer policy coordination and integration of facilities and programs, an Interdepartmental Coordinating Staff (ICS) was established under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. Representatives of State, Army, Navy, Air Force and CIA participated on this joint staff. The organization was to develop psychological objectives for cold war programs and to coordinate the activities of the operating agencies.

6. This agreement accordingly placed responsibility upon the Secretary of State for peacetime psychological operations during the cold war; the question of wartime conduct of psychological warfare was not covered by this early agreement but was left for further study. Early in 1949, interdepartmental agreement was reached on the establishment in the State Department of a planning organization to develop plans for interim arrangements for foreign and domestic information programs and overt psychological operations abroad during the initial stages of war (NSC 43, March 9, 1949).16 The director of this planning staff was appointed by the Secretary of State in consultation with directly interested agencies. The staff was composed of State and military personnel, with liaison representatives from CIA and NSRB. Policy consultants to the director of the staff were designated by the Secretary of State and Defense, the Director of CIA and the Chairman of the NSRB. The functions and personnel of this staff overlapped to a considerable degree with the Interdepartmental Coordinating Staff (ICS). This condition and subsequent experience led to a review of existing arrangements (see NSC 43/1, Aug. 2, 1949).17

NSC 59/1

7. As a result, in March 1950 revised basic principles for handling psychological warfare planning and operations were adopted and put into effect. (NSC 59/1, March 9, 1950). The principle that propaganda in both peace and war is a continuing mechanism of national policy directed toward the achievement of national aims was reaffirmed. Under NSC 59/1, the Secretary of State was charged with responsibility for: [Page 631]

a.
The formulation of policy and plans for the National Foreign Information program during peacetime.
b.
The formulation of national psychological warfare policy in time of national emergency or threat of war and during the initial stages of war.
c.
The coordination of policy and plans for these activities with other appropriate agencies. The policy and planning for periods of emergency and the initial stages of war were to be coordinated with the joint war plans of the Department of Defense, and where such plans had a direct impact on war plans, they were to be subject to JCS concurrence.

8. In accordance with NSC 59/1, a revised central planning and coordinating mechanism based on the consolidation of the former Staffs was established to deal with these responsibilities. The ICS became the Interdepartmental Foreign Information Staff (IFIS). The director was appointed by the Secretary of State and was in fact the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. The group of consultants was retained. This combined mechanism became the Interdepartmental Foreign Information Organization (IFIO).18

9. Again there was avoided coming fully to grips with the issue of jurisdictional responsibility for psychological warfare policy and direction during war, because of the fundamental differences between State and the military services on the question. Agreement had been reached only for planning through the initial stages of war, but even this concept was left without precise definition. This arrangement proved unsatisfactory and the cause of friction from many aspects.

10. The IFIS joint staff was charged with planning for emergency and wartime psychological operations and completed a study shortly after the outbreak of war in Korea on the assignment of psychological warfare responsibilities for the initial stages of war (defined as D plus 90) and for the subsequent stages of war. This study was transmitted to the departments for adoption in July 1950.19 It provided that:

a.
During the initial stages of war, the Secretary of State would:
(1)
Formulate psychological warfare policy and issue policy guidance directives to operating agencies.
(2)
Coordinate these functions with agencies executing psychological warfare functions.
(3)
Prepare detailed plans and programs for implementation of policies.
(4)
In areas other than theaters of military operations, execute overt psychological warfare programs, provide for coordination with covert psychological warfare and coordinate U.S. psychological warfare policies and operations with our allies.
b.
To handle psychological warfare during the subsequent stages of war, there should be established an independent agency:
(1)
Authorized to issue directives to operating agencies.
(2)
Providing for representation of the operating agencies.
(3)
Authorized to provide coordination with our allies.
(4)
Having direct access to the President, but recognizing the authority of the State Department in areas other than theaters of military operations, the Department of Defense having authority in such theaters.

11. Furthermore, for the initial stages of war, an interdepartmental board was to be established within the State Department to act as the “executive agent” of the Secretary of State in formulating policy plans for, and coordination of, the world-wide conduct of psychological warfare.

12. The transition from the peacetime organization to the initial stages of war organization was to take place on D-Day, or earlier at the discretion of the President. The IFIO would be designated the Interim Psychological Warfare Board and strengthened; as executive agent for the Secretary of State, it would issue directives.

13. These recommendations led to further controversy. In the fall of 1950 Secretary of Defense Johnson advocated the immediate establishment of the Interim Psychological Warfare Board in the Executive Office of the President and immediate consideration of the question of composition and urgency of a National Psychological Warfare Board. He proposed that the latter Board would be independent of existing departments and have full-time public members in the majority. On the other hand, the Department of State was not willing to accept establishment of the Interim Board as an executive agent for the Secretary of State at that time. The issue was posed as to whether or not such an interim board would impair the Secretary of State’s responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs. Accordingly, an impasse developed.

14. Meanwhile, in August 1950, in the light of the Korean developments, State strengthened the IFIO organization. The interdepartmental consultants group was expanded and renamed the National Psychological Strategy Board. It was headed by the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and was composed of representatives of the Secretary of Defense, the JCS, the Director of CIA and the Army as Executive Agent of the JCS for the conduct of psychological warfare in Korea.

[Page 633]

15. Attempting to break the organizational deadlock, State proposed in December 1950 a new concept, emphasizing continuing psychological effort, (rather than phased operations) for both peace and war. The conclusion was that the same organization should be responsible for formulation of policy and programs in both peace and war. It was proposed to place responsibility for all phases in the Secretary of State with an interdepartmental coordinating agent to advise the Secretary on policy and to coordinate planning operations. This proposal was rejected by Defense.

16. A new memorandum of agreement and disagreement was then worked out interdepartmentally. It set forth the issue somewhat as follows. Agreement was reached on the following points:

a.
The peace-to-war phasing was eliminated and the need for organizational and policy continuity recognized. The responsibility of the JCS in theaters of military operations and of State in other areas was reaffirmed.
b.
A single official, designated by the President:
(1)
Should be responsible for formulation of psychological policy within the framework of approved national policy and coordination and evaluation of the psychological effort; and
(2)
Should be authorized to issue policy guidance to the operating agencies.
c.
Representatives at the policy levels, also agencies executing major portions of the psychological effort, should advise this official and coordinate operations.

17. There was disagreement as to whether or not the single official designated by the President should be the Secretary of State or an independent official responsible to the President. Arguments were put forth for both propositions, and the matter was referred to the President for decision in January 1951.

Establishment of the Psychological Strategy Board.

18. The problem was worked on by the BOB, the NSC Staff, and a final agreement was negotiated by the agencies concerned. This resulted in the directive of the President on June 20, 1951, establishing the Psychological Strategy Board.20 The principle of psychological operations was recognized. However the designation of a single official as the focus of responsibility was replaced by the concept of a Board composed of the Undersecretary of State, the Undersecretary of Defense, and the Director of CIA. A director appointed by the President served under the Board, and was placed in a position to take initiative [Page 634] in, and give direction to, government-wide psychological operations. The Board was directed particularly to:

a.
provide more effective plans of psychological operations within the framework of approved national policies;
b.
coordinate psychological operations of all departments and agencies of government, and
c.
evaluate the effectiveness of the national psychological effort.

19. In the meantime the IFIO have been continuing to struggle with the formulation of a “national psychological warfare plan” for general war, to include principles of operation, delineation of responsibilites and organizational principles, etc. Since the PSB now had been given authority for such planning, the IFIO plan along with alternate departmental versions was, accordingly, referred for further study and action to the PSB.

NSC 127/1

20. The PSB in due course resubmitted the plan for conducting psychological operations during general hostilities to the NSC for approval, (NSC 127/1). It provided, among other things:

a.
A statement of national objectives which will maintain in a condition of general hostilities (based on NSC 20/4).21
b.
Basic principles of operations.
c.
Delineation of responsibilities, including:
(1)
PSB responsibility for formulation and promulgation as guidance of over-all national psychological objectives, policies and programs, and for the coordination and evaluation of the national psychological effort (para. 7, NSC 127/1).
(2)
The JCS to be responsible, in conformity with national policy and PSB guidance, for planning and execution of U.S. psychological operations in military theaters of operations (para. 8, NSC 127/1).
(3)
State in conformity with national policy and PSB guidance responsible for the planning and execution of U.S. overt psychological operations in areas other than military theaters of operations (para. 9, NSC 127/1).
(4)
“In situations in which a military theater of operations embraces territory of a government which exercises civil authority and to which a U.S. diplomatic mission is accredited … the Department of State shall be responsible for the U.S. information program directed toward the nations of the country concerned”. (para. 10, NSC 127/1).
(5)
“The Psychological Strategy Board shall insure through the government agency or agencies appropriate … any necessary coordination of national psychological operations, policies, or plans with the appropriate agencies of other governments” (para. 14, NSC 127/1).

[Page 635]

21. NSC 127/1 further provides that plans for the transfer of facilities and personnel from State and other overt agencies to military control in military theaters of operations should be coordinated through the organization established pursuant to NSC 59/1 (the POCC). Originally the PSB draft of 127/1 had provided for such coordination by the PSB, but this was changed subsequent to a recommendation by the Bureau of the Budget. In approving NSC 127/1 the President made clear that this policy was to serve as a basis for emergency planning relating to sudden general hostilities and “directed that the subsidiary plans and measures authorized provide maximum flexibility whenever the President deems it desirable to determine the ultimate organization appropriate to protracted full-scale general hostilities” (NSC 127/1, Note by the Executive Secretary, July 25, 1952).

Establishment of the Operations Coordinating Board

22. The effort of the Psychological Strategy Board to carry out its variegated mission was not a happy one. In reviewing its activities the Jackson Committee22 found that:

“there is no ‘strategic concept for psychological operations’ separate and distinct from a strategic concept for gaining national aims without war. When PSB has developed, for example, a ‘regional psychological plan’, it has really formulated a plan for the achievement of national aims involving the use of propaganda, diplomacy, economic pressure and military strength in various combinations. It is this fact which has caused so much controversy between PSB and the established planning agencies within the State Department”.

Accordingly, the Jackson Committee recommended abolishment of the PSB and the establishment of the OCB as a coordinating body which would:

a.
Aid in coordinating the implementation of detailed operational plans prepared by responsible departments and agencies to carry out approved NSC policies.
b.
Assure the timely and coordinated carrying out of such plans.
c.
Initiate new proposals for action within the framework of national security policies in response to opportunity and other changes in the situation.
d.
Assure that each project or action was so executed as to make its full contribution to the particular “climate of opinion” which the United States is seeking to achieve in the war.

[Page 636]

Subsequent Arrangements for X-Day Planning

23. The Jackson Committee noted that the POCC, which had existed as a mechanism through which the State Department could coordinate the Foreign Information Program, was responsive to a necessary function, but recommended that the POCC be abolished and its function made a responsibility of the OCB and the OCB staff.

24. As a result, in a special memorandum to the NSC by the President, dated September 3, 1953 the functions of the POCC were transferred to the OCB. The OCB did not immediately abolish the POCC, but after the lapse of a little time discontinued it as a separate coordinating arrangement. However, the OCB continued an ad hoc committee on X-Day planning to carry on the work of developing plans for conducting psychological operations in support of hostilities, which had been the function of the “X-Day Committee” of the now defunct POCC.

25. In the fall of 1953 the ad hoc Committee on X-Day planning reported to the OCB that due to reorganization measures within the Government subsequent to NSC 127/1, revision of this policy was necessary in order that the X-Day Committee could go ahead with their tasks. Reorganization Plan No. 8 had established the USIA.23 Executive Order No. 10483 had established the OCB, and the functions of the POCC had been transferred to the former. The X-Day working group felt that 127/1 could be revised easily in order to take into account these changes within the Government structure. Accordingly, it was authorized to present proposals for such revisions to the OCB for transmittal to the NSC. These proposals did not long remain “non-controversial” as was originally hoped. On March 22 the X-Day Working Committee presented proposals to the OCB for the revision of NSC 127/1, which in effect reopened many of the old arguments between the agencies concerning jurisdiction and the conduct of psychological operations during wartime. The matter was further complicated by trying to propose revisions to cover all types of hostilities, in order that “support planning should anticipate as far as possible every such situation from limited combat, as in Korea, to general war”. There was no agreement within the Committee on the following major issues:

a.
DOD, USIA and CIA representatives supported the position that in time of hostilities the Operations Coordinating Board should be responsible for “the formulation of national psychological objectives” and “the coordination of psychological operations and programs”.
b.
The State representative supported the position that the OCB should be responsible for “assuring the formulation and coordination of guidance” and “the coordination of programs” for psychological operations in time of hostilities. (This would leave to the OCB to determine where the organization to provide guidance should be established, within the OCB or outside, etc.).
c.
On the military enclave situation (NSC 127/1, para. 10), Defense, CIA and USIA supported the position that the military commander should have the responsibility of coordinating over-all psychological operations, with the USIA operations “insofar as practicable” being placed under his direction as an entity in charge of a designee of the USIA when the former deems it necessary for support of the military operations.
d.
State supported the position that in this situation USIA should operate under the direction of the State Department Chief of Mission. The area of disagreement was possibly even broader, however, for the State Department representative with the X-Day Working Group reserved State’s rights throughout to reconsider further at a higher level.

26. The OCB considered this problem, (primarily at the Board Assistants’ level) for some time and in its report to the NSC on the subject, dated July 21, 1954, generally came to the conclusion that the jurisdictional issues raised concerning final authority over psychological operations during general war were (a) difficult of resolution at the present time, and (b) did not perhaps need to be resolved at the present time.

27. The OCB recommended:

a.
That the NSC rescind NSC 59/1 and NSC 127/1 “without prejudice to the principles of operation and the responsibilities of departments and agencies to engage in psychological warfare and psychological warfare planning enunciated therein or elsewhere.”
b.
“That the NSC note that the OCB serves as the body for dealing with requirements for interdepartmental coordination concerning overseas information and psychological warfare activities in carrying out NSC assignments or upon specific request by participating departments and agencies.”
c.
“That the NSC note that the OCB developed, on an urgent basis, a detailed contingency plan for information and psychological warfare activities in Indochina and that the OCB will not develop any further detailed subsidiary plans of this type for designated areas unless so directed by the NSC.” (the implication being that if and when limited, rather than general, war should occur the OCB could develop plans and coordinating arrangements for Psywar operations which would be appropriate in the circumstances).

Current Status

28. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in their views dated 3 August 1954 objected to the recision of NSC 59/1 and 121/1 on the grounds that “although obsolete in certain organizational respects, (they) contain essential formal statements of national policy on psychological warfare [Page 638] matters. Without a formal statement of responsibilities of governmental agencies concerned, there can be no valid basis for psychological warfare planning”. The JCS further recommended that NSC 59/1 and NSC 127/1 should be revised or superseded.

29. On August 5, 1954, by NSC Action No. 1198, further action with respect to NSC 59/1 and NSC 127/1 was deferred pending receipt of an expanded study by the Bureau of the Budget (NSC Action No. 1197) which was “to include the placing of responsibility within the executive branch for coordinating economic warfare, psychological warfare, political warfare, and foreign information activities”. However, the Bureau of the Budget was not specifically directed to propose a solution to the organizational and jurisdictional problems concerning psychological warfare operations during hostilities which are raised by NSC 127/1 and which have such a long history, and its projected report does not propose a solution to this matter.

30. In a letter to the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization dated February 7, 1955,24 the Executive Officer of the Operations Coordinating Board noted that the OCB is currently responsible for the coordination of the transfer of overt information facilities, personnel, etc., to the theater commander in a period of general war “and that adequate authority and procedures exist utilizing the OCB structure to carry out this responsibility in a limited conflict.” However, he further commented that in the absence of detailed plans for full mobilization in time of war, it did not appear to be feasible for the OCB to develop such plans for psychological warfare to be applicable in the event of general war.

31. In a memorandum dated January 11, 1955, subsequently circulated to the NSC on February 8, 1955, with a supporting memorandum from the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed their views of August 3, 1954, and specifically proposed that any document designed to supersede NSC 59/1 and NSC 127/1 should:

  • “a. Contain an approved definition of psychological warfare.
  • “b. Contain an approved definition of psychological operations.
  • “c. Adequately define responsibility and authority for the conduct of psychological warfare under conditions of declared war or hostilities involving the engagement of U.S. forces under conditions short of declared war.
  • “d. Delineate agency responsibility for use of facilities within a theater.
  • “e. Provide guidance for the orderly transfer of facilities at the beginning of hostilities.
  • “f. Provide for a coordinated psychological warfare effort by all agencies of government.”

  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 127/1. Top Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Director of Central Intelligence. All ellipses in the original.
  2. Document 2.
  3. Document 123.
  4. See footnote 3, Document 210.
  5. In NSC Action No. 1198, “The Foreign Information Program and Psychological Warfare Planning,” the National Security Council, on August 5, 1954, noted that NSC 59/1 and NSC 127/1 had been deemed obsolete. The Council, however, deferred further action pending completion of the Bureau of the Budget study on coordination of economic, psychological and political warfare and foreign information activities. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council, 1954)
  6. Not found; see numbered paragraph 6 below.
  7. Document 158.
  8. Not found, but for a memorandum of discussion of this paper by the National Security Council on August 5, 1954, see Document 187.
  9. Not printed, but see Document 187.
  10. This was NSC Action No. 1198; see footnote 9, Document 187.
  11. Not found but see numbered paragraph 31 in the attachment printed below.
  12. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
  13. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the paper.
  14. President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order No. 9182 on June 13, 1942. (Department of State Bulletin, June 27, 1942, p. 566)
  15. See Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Documents 252265.
  16. NSC 43, “Planning for Wartime Conduct of Overt Psychological Warfare,” is in National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 43 Series.
  17. Ibid.
  18. The IFIO became the body charged with psychological warfare policy in time of national emergency or during the initial stages of war. Following the Presidential directive of April 4, 1951, establishing the PSB, the IFIO was redesignated the POCC, Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee. The POCC created a subcommittee, the X-Day working group, to prepare the required plans. [Footnote in the original. For the April 4 directive, see Document 60.]
  19. The study cited presumably is NSC 74 of July 10, 1950, “A Plan for National Psychological Warfare,” which was sent to NSC members and the Secretary of the Treasury. The NSC did not formally approve NSC 74. A copy is in National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 74. See also Document 17.
  20. See Document 60.
  21. NSC 20/4, “U.S. Objectives With Respect to the USSR To Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security,” November 23, 1948, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. I, Part 2, pp. 662669.
  22. See Document 151.
  23. On June 1, 1953, President Eisenhower submitted Reorganization Plan No. 8 to Congress. The text and supplementary information on that plan are printed in Department of State Bulletin, June 14, 1953, pp. 849–856.
  24. Not found.