Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

177. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Continental Defense Committee (Bull) to Director of Central Intelligence Dulles¹

Washington, May 5, 1954.

SUBJECT

• Net Evaluation Procedures

1. In addition to the point that we have been making that the DCI has a legal responsibility to advise the Commander (and his NSC) on his intelligence estimates of both gross and net capabilities, probable intentions and probable courses of action, there are much more potent arguments in favor of joint intelligence operational consideration as follows:

a. Admiral Radford and others infer that all they need is the normal estimate of gross capabilities which they in the Defense Department can then use in working out the net capabilities. This view is not only an oversimplification of the problem but it puts the Director in the position of abdicating his responsibilities for estimating for “The Commander” the Bloc’s probable intentions and probable courses of action. This the Director cannot do in a satisfactory and useful manner in a vacuum, excluded from knowledge of our own deployments and our own capabilities. If the Director’s estimates are done in this manner he is asked to estimate the thinking of the Kremlin leaders which is based on their intelligence of our capabilities which they most certainly know in great detail, whereas the Director in his estimate is permitted to have no such comparable knowledge. The Director’s knowledge of US and allied capabilities and dispositions must be at least comparable to the intelligence possessed by the Kremlin leadership. To think, as I believe Admiral Radford and the military in general do, that the Commander’s estimate is made by G–3 after receiving a G–2 contribution overlooks the sound procedures which govern all good staff operations in the G–2/G–3 field.

b. No G–2 makes his estimates of enemy capabilities, probable courses of action, or probable intentions or advises his Commander in an operational vacuum. By the closest hour by hour contact and joint daily or more frequent briefings, he is always able to make his estimate of probable hostile courses of action based on not only the enemy new capabilities in manpower, weapons, organization, training, leadership, dispositions, etc. but also from his estimate of what the enemy probably knows concerning our own strengths, dispositions and intentions.

c. The Director as our National G–2 should have the same rights and duties as any G–2 in the lower echelons has. Otherwise he cannot fulfill his legal responsibilities.

2. Although I recognize that a case can be made that the “national level” presents different problems with a justified restriction on revelation of war plans, certain planned courses of action, certain dispositions, weapons development, etc. should be made available to DCI and IAC on a very strict “need-to-know” basis, I believe a clear definition of intelligence requirements in the operational field could be worked out jointly and I doubt that a knowledge of detailed war plans would be necessary. In general, DCI should get only operational information which it is reasonable to expect the enemy to have in whole or in part.

We have no present mechanism to meet our minimum needs. We are blocked by self imposed departmental restrictions or ground rules which severely limit our intelligence investigation of our own force—a handicap not imposed on our enemies.

3. I want to point out also from my experience a real stumbling block in getting Defense to accept our proposal. That is, the broadening of the responsible group to include other agencies such as IIC and ICIS who have a similar justification for full responsibility in their more limited field—hostile attack on the Continental US by Soviet agents. Their exclusion from overall responsibility can be justified on practical grounds only but I think it must be done to make the joint effort work. I think it might be acceptable to insure them the right and duty to be heard at appropriate times and to comment on the final report or at least segments thereof that bear in any way on their responsible interests. I believe you should support the probable Defense Department desire to exclude them but to do so on a practical basis related to their total lack of responsibility in the fields of foreign intelligence and foreign deployments and war plans which quite rightly should be kept on a strict “need-to-know”. They will resist as we have but I believe the exclusion can be justified on grounds acceptable to the NSC.

H.R. Bull

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Job 80–R0440R, Box 3. Secret. The typed words “Condensed by Robert Amory, Jr.” (with Amory’s handwritten initials) appear below Bull’s signature at the end of the memorandum.