Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

137. Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency (Amory) to Director of Central Intelligence Smith ¹

Washington, November 25, 1952.

SUBJECT

• Senior Staff Action on the Summary Evaluation

1. The Senior Staff approved paragraphs a. and b. of Enclosure A as its recommendation for action at tomorrow’s meeting of the NSC.

2. In paragraph a., the reference to specific limitations of the summary evaluation as noted in your transmittal memorandum² was deleted. Various individual members of the Senior Staff felt that there are still other defects in the summary evaluation.

3. In paragraph b., your proposal for the preparation of terms of reference was adopted, and it was further recommended that the NSC instruct you to report on the needs for improved machinery for preparing a more adequate evaluation of the USSR’s net capability to inflict direct injury on the United States.

4. The main point of controversy was your recommendation c., as clarified in paragraph c. of the attached Enclosure. On this point the Senior Staff decided to take no action at this time, on the understanding that you might feel free to put the proposal before the NSC yourself.

5. The opposition to a Senior Staff recommendation at this time came primarily from the military. JCS has just submitted to the Secretary of Defense a lengthy memorandum on the subject,³ which it was felt could not be adequately considered prior to the NSC meeting. It was evident from Admiral Wooldridge’s oral paraphrase that the JCS view is that no additional machinery is needed to produce “Commander’s Estimates,” the JCS being the agency responsible for and capable of producing such estimates.

Robert Amory, Jr.

Enclosure A⁴

SENIOR STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NSC ACTION

The National Security Council:

5. a.⁵ Receives the summary evaluation, Net Capability of the USSR to Injure the Continental U.S., as an initial effort in response to the NSC Directive issued by NSC Action No. 543,⁶ and notes that it is characterized by a number of limitations and inadequacies, including the fact that developments since the evaluation was prepared have rendered it, in part, out of date.

5. b. Instructs the Director of Central Intelligence, in collaboration with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security and Officials of other governmental bodies as required, to prepare for early submission to the NSC, terms of reference for a more adequate evaluation of the USSR’s net capability to inflict direct injury on the United States, and recommendations concerning the machinery necessary to produce for the NSC such a coordinated evaluation.

DCI RECOMMENDATION (No Senior Staff Action)

5. c. Instructs the Director of Central Intelligence, in collaboration with Officials of other governmental bodies as required, to examine the adequacies of the present machinery, and to make recommendations to the NSC concerning the character of any new machinery that may be required in order to produce for the NSC coordinated evaluations, in the nature of “Commander’s Estimates,” of the Soviet Bloc’s net capabilities and probable courses of action vis à vis the United States’ security interests. Such evaluations require the integration of national intelligence with adequate military, political, and economic operational information on the United States’ capabilities and contemplated courses of action.⁷

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Job 80–R01440R, Box 3, Folder 10. Top Secret. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates it was prepared in the Office of National Estimates. A stamped notation indicates that Smith saw the memorandum on November 26.
2. Not found, but presumably it transmitted to the NSC a revised version of Smith’s paper attached to Document 131.
3. Not found.
4. Top Secret.
5. The number “5” is handwritten in front of paragraphs a, b, and c.
6. Document 86.
7. For the discussion and the decision taken at the November 26 NSC meeting, see Document 138. Additional documentation on this initiative, which led to the creation of the Special Evaluation Subcommittee of the National Security Council (NSC 140), approved by President Truman on January 19, 1953, is in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, volume II., Part 1, pp. 205–208.