Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

133. Report by the Psychological Strategy Board¹

PSB D–34

Washington, October 30, 1952.

NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT FOR THE PERIOD JULY 1, 1952 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 1952

[Omitted here are a title page, a copy of the November 3 transmittal memorandum from Director Alan G. Kirk to NSC Executive Secretary Lay, and a Table of Contents.]

I. Significant Psychological Activities During the Period Under Review

1. The Board presents below a brief evaluative summary of psychological activities during the reporting period on the part of the departments and agencies responsible for psychological operations.

Capabilities by Area

2. Some progress toward our psychological goals has been achieved in certain areas. Wide geographical gaps remain, however, in our capabilities for making an immediately effective psychological contribution to the reduction and retraction of Soviet power and influence. These gaps include the USSR itself, Communist China and most of the European satellites. In other areas there has been progress, especially in building capabilities for future development.

3. Radio broadcasting currently is the major active element being employed in the psychological field against the USSR. The Russian “jamming” continues to be a serious obstacle, and poses a problem in the whole field of communications. Insofar as Communist China is concerned, the situation is about the same but probably with less receptivity due to shortages of receiving facilities among the masses.

Anti-American Attitudes

4. In the free world and especially in Western Europe, specific grievances and generalized discontents continue to find expression in anti-American sentiments and resentments of overt United States propaganda and pressure. During the reporting period a substantial increase was made in the volume of guidance and support material for indirect and non-attributable propaganda. However, the above trend makes clear the importance of still further increasing our efforts to develop indirect and non-attributable information activities.

Western Europe

5. The benefactor-beneficiary relationship in this area continues to cause difficulty for our psychological efforts to develop attitudes favorable to the position-of-strength strategy. European enthusiasm continues to lag for institutions looked on as specifically military, i.e., NATO and EDC. However, U.S. psychological action has contributed to an increasing awareness of the communist danger in some countries, notably France and Sweden; to the development of pro-integration attitudes in Western Germany; and to progress toward European functional and political unity. All these gains, taken together with the growth of military strength in Europe, contributed to counteracting the spread of neutralist sentiments.

Middle East

6. The political crisis in Iran has materially reduced U.S. capabilities to influence the present trend of events in that country, though some limited results of non-attributable activities are reported. The danger of further deterioration in Iran emphasizes the importance of rapid preparation of psychological activities in neighboring countries, where repercussions of such deterioration would be felt. In Egypt, the political crisis similarly reduced current capabilities, but the present situation contains both favorable and unfavorable elements that make the future uncertain. In the area as a whole, little progress in the psychological field can be reported for the quarter toward the achievement of national policy objectives. A notable contribution to the national psychological effort in the area, however, was the airlift by the United States Air Force of some 3,800 Moslem pilgrims from Beirut to Jidda.

Far East

7. In Southeast Asia, awareness of United States aid was increased appreciably during the reporting period by the psychological impact of TCA and MSA agricultural, public health, and other aid programs. Psychological capabilities in Southeast Asia have been expanded, especially in the non-attributable field, but little increase in current effectiveness is reported. The tendency in the area to identify the United States with European colonial powers, and with indigenous leadership groups which are opposed by revolutionary nationalist movements, continues to present a psychological obstacle. In Japan, certain non-attributable activities in the labor field continue to make progress.

Korea

8. Aside from direct psychological warfare in support of hostilities, the psychological effort in Korea has exerted pressure on the communists for an armistice and has stressed the principle of voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war. This principle has gained widespread acceptance in the non-communist world.

“Hate America” Propaganda

9. All the reporting departments and agencies have been concerned with combatting the Soviet-Communist “Hate America” propaganda campaign. A large volume of guidance and support material on this subject was provided for both overt and non-attributable propaganda channels. Emphasis was placed on the absurdity and evil purpose of the hate campaign. Special steps were taken to coordinate the release by the Department of Defense and its components of information on biological and chemical warfare. The effectiveness of these activities cannot be gauged in isolation from other United States operations.

Military Assets for the “Cold War”

10. A number of actions and programs of the Department of Defense and the military services during the reporting period, particularly in Western Europe and the Middle East, illustrate the type of contribution these services can make to the national psychological effort. However, it is noted that there remains an unexploited potential for the use of military psychological warfare assets in support of approved national peacetime programs; but that considerable difficulty is encountered in exploiting this potential in the absence of specific authority and missions upon which military psychological activities in peacetime may be based. The feasibility of making such a delineation is under study.

[Omitted here are Part II, “The Work of the PSB;” Part III, “Summaries of Reports”: A. Department of State, B. Department of Defense, C. Central Intelligence Agency, and D. Field Representatives of Mutual Security Agency; and Annexes A and B.]

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 333, PSB D–34. Top Secret; Security Information; Eyes Only.