Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

112. Letter From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Intelligence and Research (Armstrong) to Director of Central Intelligence Smith ¹

Washington, June 3, 1952.

Dear General Smith:

As you know, National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 10² places upon the Department of State primary responsibility for the collection abroad, by overt means, of information in the basic sciences. The Department, under this directive, has additional secondary responsibilities for collection in other scientific and technical fields.

On a limited scale, the Department has, during the past two years, endeavored to meet these responsibilities. The experience gained during this period of time has confirmed the importance of several factors in the collection of scientific information:

a. Except in the case of the USSR and its satellites (including China), the traditional and normal channels of intercommunication between US and foreign scientists are capable of furnishing a large portion of the information required for intelligence purposes. The normal channels comprise interchange of published works and scientific periodicals, reciprocal visits and attendance at international meetings and conferences.

b. In the case of the USSR and satellites, the limited information available through normal channels can be effectively supplemented only by carefully planned covert activities.

c. In the case of non-Soviet areas, the information which is needed to supplement that received through the normal and traditional channels mentioned above principally relates either to a specific field of scientific effort and to research which has not yet reached the publication stage, or to an overall evaluation of scientific potential in one or more broad fields.

d. The types of information mentioned in (c) above can be acquired most efficiently and economically through overt means, provided the following factors are kept in mind:

1. The use of relatively young or scientifically unknown individuals will, in most cases, not only be ineffective, but may tend to dry up even the normal channels of intercommunication. Profitable contact with foreign scientists can usually be expected only where there is a reasonable quid pro quo, that is, when the US scientist is a qualified leader in a given field, and when the basis of the contact is a legitimate exchange of scientific ideas and experiences. Relatively unknown individuals who only ask questions quickly arouse resentment and reluctance, since it is obvious that their principal purpose is to extract information, giving nothing in return.

2. Every effort must be made to keep the collection of basic scientific information removed from the taint of intelligence. Infraction of this principle may not only hinder the overt operation, but may jeopardize contacts and sources essential to the success of covert operations.

3. The degree to which a US scientist can be successful in collecting information on a specific or general scientific field depends upon his own ability and competence in that field rather than upon any detailed briefing by intelligence.

The Department is keenly aware of the importance of carrying out its responsibilities under NSCID–10, and desires to expand its current activities in this respect. The following steps should be taken in this direction, some of which can be accomplished within the Department’s present resources; others will require additional support.

a. The Department can collect the bulk of basic scientific material available in published form which CIA requires.

b. The existing scientific attachés can undertake to collect specific additional information which CIA may require within their individual fields of competence.

c. With appropriate financial assistance, known and competent specialists can be selected and sent overseas for limited periods of two to three months to cover specific fields of science on a strictly overt basis. These consulants would function in the same manner as normal science attachés, and would make their reports to the office of the Science Advisor, Department of State. They would have no direct connection with CIA in any way.

d. The office of the Science Advisor, with additional staffing assistance, could undertake a more extensive program of debriefing scientists and engineers who have visited foreign areas under private sponsorship. The use of this office, which while it has no apparent connection with intelligence, is directly and openly concerned with science, will in many cases be more fruitful than debriefing by the intelligence agencies themselves.

e. With adequate financial assistance the Department can increase the competence and scope of coverage of US representation to international scientific conferences and congresses abroad. It is believed that such meetings are extremely profitable occasions for the interchange of scientific information and ideas, particularly in acquiring prepublication knowledge of work in progress.

In accordance with paragraphs 1,d and 1,f of NSCID–10, the above views and suggestions are submitted to the Central Intelligence Agency for consideration, both as to their validity, and as a basis for further discussion as to the degree of support to the overt scientific collection activities of the Department which might be appropriate and justifiable.

Sincerely yours,

W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

³

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, INR Files: Lot 58 D 776, Atomic Energy. Secret; Security Information. Drafted by Theodore M. Nordbeck on May 29.
2. For NSCID No. 10, see Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 429.
3. Printed from a copy that indicates Armstrong signed the original.