Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

105. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Bruce) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)¹

Washington, April 7, 1952.

SUBJECT

• Fourth Progress Report on NSC 26 Series, “Removal and Demolition of Oil Facilities, Equipment and Supplies in the Middle East”

NSC 26/2,² NSC 26/4 and NSC 26/5³ were approved as governmental policy on January 10, 1949, August 18, 1950 and May 3, 1951, respectively. It is requested that this fourth progress report as of March 10, 1952 be circulated to the members of the Council for their information.

Important Developments:

1. July 9, 1951, the Secretary of Defense stated that due to worsening world conditions and increased global requirements, “the earmarking of a military contingent for the specific use in connection with NSC 26/2 should not be done in advance”.⁴ He added that the JCS were of the opinion that although “under certain circumstances a force such as the Battalion of Marines now in the Mediterranean might be available for this mission”, “the sending of a force to Saudi Arabia must be decided at the time (of the emergency) in view of the overall situation confronting us”.

2. [4 paragraphs (39 lines) not declassified]

3. On August 14, 1951 it was recommended by State [less than 1 line not declassified] field representatives in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia in consultation with local US military officials that the company notify the Saudi Arabian Government in a most general way of denial and evacuation plans.⁵ On August 21, 1951 it was decided by the Departments of State and Defense in consultation [less than 1 line not declassified] that not only denial plans, but also broader national policies in the area, would be jeopardized by such disclosure to SAG officials at that time and that no indication should be given that the Western powers might abandon the area.⁶

4. On August 22, 1951 the National Security Council discussed the third progress report and noted that the Secretary of State would issue a directive [3 lines not declassified].⁷

5. On September 10, 1951 the Bahrein Petroleum Company informed the Department of State of its acceptance of the denial policy provided: (a) concurrence of the local government were obtained before the program could be put into effect, and (b) company claims for reimbursement would be “treated upon the same footing as claims of other companies elsewhere who cooperate in like measures”.⁸

6. [3 paragraphs (11 lines) not declassified]

7. [16 lines not declassified] Similar problems in Saudi Arabia have been presented to the US military for resolution. No problems have arisen that require action on the NSC level.”⁹

8. January 16–February 3, 1952, a mission of State–Defense–CIA–US oil company representatives visited Middle East oil areas of United States denial responsibility, i.e. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrein, Qatar, to review NSC 26 progress, plans, policies and problems. Conclusions and recommendations, which are now under State–Defense–CIA study, will be presented in the next progress report.

Action Now Contemplated

Further action required to implement NSC 26 includes further development of Aramco-type denial plans to Kuwait, Kuwait Neutral Zone, Bahrein and Qatar; [less than 1 line not declassified]; continual examination of the situation re protective forces; and inter-Departmental consideration of problems observed during the January field mission, i.e. implementation of the denial plans in the event of local opposition, status of company personnel engaged in denial operations, degree of denial throughout Middle East oil areas, clearer definition of the national interest in preserving oil reservoirs, notification of local authorities regarding denial plans, delegation of field responsibility for NSC 26, security of denial plans, coordination of denial plans with production plans, rehabilitation plans, personnel protection, evacuation, and counter-sabotage plans.

Policy Evaluation

Policy evaluation will be withheld pending a resolution of the problems mentioned in the above paragraph, following which recommendations will be made as to whether new Council action, including the revision of NSC 26, is desirable.

David Bruce

¹⁰

1. Source: Truman Library, Papers of Harry S. Truman, President’s Secretary’s File, Subject File. Top Secret; Special Handling.
2. Not printed. (National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, Box 51)
3. Neither printed. (Ibid., RG 273, Policy Papers of the NSC: NSC 26, Box 9)
4. Not printed. (Ibid.)
5. Not found.
6. Not found.
7. See Document 84.
8. Not found.
9. Not found.
10. Printed from a copy that indicates Bruce signed the original.