Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East: China, Volume IX

893.01/9–1749

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

[Washington,] September 17, 1949.

Participants:	Mr. Bevin
	Mr. Barclay56
	Mr. Dening
	Mr. Schuman
	Ambassador Bonnet57
	Mr. Clappier58
	Mr. Acheson
	Mr. MacArthur
	Mr. Merchant
	Mr. Butterworth
	Mr. Satterthwaite
	Mr. O’Sullivan59

Bevin opened the conversion by saying that he had discussed policy on China with me. The main difficulty was to reconcile our policies. The British are trying to keep a foot in the door and see what happens. They intend to keep their consuls in China and as much of their business as possible. On matter of recognition of the Communist regime, the British will proceed with the greatest caution. If the British are victims of overt action, they will take their case to the Security Council and the “Big Five”. To sum up, Bevin said while the United States is withdrawing, the British are holding on as long as they can.

Bevin then said that he had had a message since his previous talk with me that two American ships, Flying Independence and Flying Clipper, were attempting to run the blockade.⁶⁰ Does this change the situation? Butterworth said one of these ships had requested naval support to go to Shanghai but we had advised it that it can expect no assistance from our Navy. We are trying to get the General Gordon into Shanghai on September 23, primarily to take out Americans who want to leave, but this will not be a regular freight and passenger trip. Bevin inquired whether the ships were going to run the blockade. Butterworth said the ships were depending on “free enterprise” and hoping to get through. I said that we had not forbidden them to make the attempt. Butterworth remarked that while we have advised the Nationalist Government of China that the form of their announcement of the blockade was not traditional and correct, we have not advised our ships to ignore it. I said we are not eager to force a test of the legality of the blockade. Schuman said the French took the same position—that the announcement of the blockade was not in proper form and they do not recognize it. Bevin inquired whether the French were sending in a relief ship and Schuman said this was not probable. There are some French students and missionaries in China. Bevin asked whether they were going to be left there and Bonnet said they were free to do as they liked. Bevin then asked how would he get the French Ambassador out, and Schuman replied on a ship, he has a reservation. I said I understood the General Gordon will bring out about 1,200 passengers.⁶¹ Butterworth said of these more than 375 would probably be Americans. Bevin said he did not like the idea of the British Ambassador returning to London and it was suggested to him that he go as far as Hong Kong but no further. Were he to go completely out, the implication would be that the British were getting out of China. Butterworth interposed that we will leave our Consuls in China except where we can’t supply them. There are probably about 800 Americans who will not leave China, who regard it as their home and settled residence.

Bevin said the Chinese Ambassador in Washington had told him the day before that Chiang Kai-shek was doing better and he was still anxious for United States support. The Chinese Ambassador said the Communists were behind their timetable, but Bevin said he thought they were ahead of the predictions made by the British Intelligence. Butterworth said that a representative of Marshal Li⁶² said he had received so little money from Chiang that the Nationalist Government on the mainland was in serious financial straits. Bevin said that Chiang can’t decide whether to save his reserve or his country. Bevin said he could not make up his mind whether or not China was gone. He repeated that we should consult constantly to see how things were going. The British do not intend to “skedaddle” out of there.

Butterworth said the Communists may invite recognition of their government on October 10. Bevin said in that case we will have to make up our minds. I said that we should move slowly and in any case we should not go to them, that we could not win by going to the Communist Government, that would be doing just what they wanted us to do. I said we should consult and where possible coordinate our action. The Communists must recognize their foreign obligations and actually control the country before they are entitled to recognition. I repeated what I had told Bevin previously, that it was a matter of greatest importance to us that we do not recognize the Communist Government unless it is perfectly clear that they do control all of China. We do not want to recognize them and thus acknowledge that they have won the war. We want events to dictate this. I again emphasized that constant consultation is required. Schuman said the French had an additional reason for not recognizing the Communist Government prematurely, the fact that the Nationalist territories are close to Indo-China. I said we were studying the possibilities of preventing the Communists from controlling that part of China.

Bevin said that the Portuguese Foreign Minister had come to see him about Macao. Bevin said that he could not help him. Butterworth remarked that he understood the Government of Macao does not want additional Portuguese troops there, that there may not be any trouble, and the troops are a liability. Portugal is confident that by some undisclosed method it can hold on to Macao. Bevin believed that the Portuguese feel lonely in Macao and cannot defend it. In view of the British treaty with the Portuguese, he wondered whether Britain should do something if Macao is attacked. Bevin said that in Hong Kong if anyone starts shooting, the British will shoot back and then go to the UN. The situation in Macao, however, is different. I said the Portuguese Foreign Minister had told me that the troops in Macao are very few and he did not feel there would be an attack. He had asked me about our military liaison officers in Hong Kong, and whether we were going to fight with the British in Hong Kong. In reply I had said that he was slightly confused about our military liaison officers in Hong Kong, that these are military attaches, with diplomatic status, who have had to move there from China, and that they are getting new titles. I said that we had not been asked to help the British in Hong Kong; that we would do what we are obliged to do under the UN charter.

Bevin said he had talked with the Dutch on Indonesia. The situation there was not too bad. The Dutch were also interested in the Nationalist movement in Indo-China and Burma and thought there was some danger that the Communists might make a raid on the whole area. He said that the British were doing what they could to support the local governments; that Malaya did not want full independence yet.

[Here follows section on Indochina.]

Schuman inquired what would happen in the Security Council if the Nationalist Government of China disappears. I said we believe absence of a permanent member from the Security Council does not prevent action. It was agreed that this legal question should be discussed between the United States, Britain and France on a technical level.

Bevin said he thought Nationalist resistance in China might go on for another year, and asked what Schuman thought. Schuman said he hoped so, to which Bevin replied that he was not speaking from hope, but from belief. I said we thought the Nationalists in China could be troublesome for some time.

[Here follows section on the proposed peace treaty with Japan.]

56. Roderick E. Barclay, former Acting First Secretary of the British Embassy, Head of the Personnel Department of the British Foreign Office.
57. Henri Bonnet, French Ambassador.
58. Bernard Clappier, Directeur du Cabinet of the French Foreign Office.
59. James L. O’Sullivan, former Vice Consul at Hanoi, on detail in the Department.
60. For correspondence regarding the blockade of Communist-controlled areas by the Chinese National Government, see pp. 1098 ff.
61. For correspondence on the General Gordon evacuation, see pp. 1261 ff.
62. Acting President Li Tsung-jen.