893.01/9–1649: Telegram
The Consul at Hanoi (Gibson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 5:21 p. m.]
102. Deptel 42, September 7,52 Depcirtel August 19, 5 a. m., received while I absent leave Hong Kong. Anderson53 accordingly referred telegram Abbott54 who informed him he would answer for both posts.55 Although I have not seen Abbott’s reply, we discussed question in past and am sure our impressions agree.
[Page 87]Re specifically Hanoi Vietnamese political circles so concerned own problems with. French their immediate interests Chinese affairs surprisingly lacking. Their reaction Department’s White Paper for instance was almost complete disinterest. They follow local developments southern Chinese provinces especially Yunnan insofar as fragmentary news allows with more interest than elsewhere for they have inherent fear local war lords and bandits and do not believe Chinese Communists will be any more successful dominating bordering provinces than their predecessors. They consider Chinese threat as military rather than political and as emanating for the moment from these groups rather than from any organized Communist army.
I think consensus opinion among Vietnamese [in] Hanoi, who have any, is pending military developments and other factors recognition by Western Powers will be withheld immediate future but if Communists succeed overcoming all military opposition and establishing effective reasonably stable government these same powers will in reasonable time grant such recognition jointly if only assure continuance classic Sino-Western trade.
I do not think local opinion considers any policy recognition will be anything but joint one. Surely US and UK expected act jointly especially in view present high level Washington talks while French not considered to be in position either pioneer or fail follow in any policy adopted by their allies.
Tonkinese sentiments re Western recognition extremely difficult define. They obviously would favor indefinite non-recognition if such step might prove impediment to what they regard age-old Chinese covetousness of Vietnam. Yet threat China invasion also provided excuse presence increased number French troops and cure to them almost worse than illness. Thus they are torn by conflicting emotions complexity of which such, they cannot reconcile them into clear policy their own minds. Consequently while looking to desired end result without considering means they are apt do less address themselves and seek refuge in attitude defeatism. If Vietnamese thus affected has any hope left it is directed to Anglo-Saxon’s [garbled group] looks both to oblige French grant him full independence and same time somehow forestall domination Vietnam by China as they did with Japanese.
In sum any US step re recognition will probably not actively influence opinion here one way or another providing it is not taken too hastily and is taken jointly with UK and French. Any independent action would doubtless lead to further confusion and misunderstandings.
[Page 88]French opinion here is simply question will be decided in present Washington talks, that no policy will be set or action taken without French and in any case it will have little effect their immediate and considerable problems Vietnam.
Considering all this it is strange no one locally at least has appeared to consider possibility Western recognition Chinese Communists might alter military picture and threat Indochina border.