893.01/9–1049: Telegram
The Ambassador in Burma (Huddle) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 10—9:22 a. m.]
378. GOB was pleased at inclusion mutual consultations friendly powers re China before individual action taken and desires to continue arrangement as long as practicable. (Deptcirtel August 19, 5 a. m.) On question recognition Communist China government, Foreign Minister is noncommital. He would like, I believe, to follow American and British lead but realizes difference approach between USA and UK, with joint action therefore unlikely. In absence similarity US–UK approach, Burma would, if possible, be more likely follow British lead and would, I think, be relieved if British accorded early recognition.
This problem crucial for GOB and it could scarcely be expected now to make binding commitment. Burma’s action on recognition may be expected to be opportunistic, in all likelihood if CP considered, and issue may be so doubtful when it eventually arises that GOB leaders might, as has been done in past, resort to religious soothsayers for advice and counsel. This last suggestion made in all seriousness.
Public opinion in Burma on recognition question is undecided and will follow government lead. Ba Swe Socialists undoubtedly favor prompt recognition. More conservative circles clamor for policy of friendly Burmese neutrality between countries representing Communist and Western democratic ideologies, demanding policy which will always result best interests of Burma.
While Burma would, if able, probably follow British lead, GOB nevertheless might be forced by sudden impact Chinese Communism in borderland areas to take early independent action in favor Chinese Communist government. Burma could expect little or nothing by way of material aid from UK or India or any other sources in an extremity and could not successfully resist by its own unaided effort an aggressive Chinese Communist movement against it.
If Chinese Communists make no gesture toward Burma as is rather to be expected at least for a considerable period of time, Chinese Communist advance to the Burma border would nevertheless probably result in strengthening pro-Chinese elements and weak Communistic movements this country, which also would imperil government’s position in attempting a non-recognition policy. (Foreign Minister told me he expects General Lu Han,39 who reportedly just returned to Kunming after seeing Chiang Kai-shek, to attempt to make deal with [Page 80] Communists. If this occurs, it might relieve Burma temporarily at least from immediate Chinese Communist menace and permit Burmese delay in squarely meeting recognition issue).
In substance, I expect Burma to follow a British lead in this question to the extent that the GOB finds it practicable to do so, but developments might force GOB take independent action favorable Chinese Communists. Burma would gravely consider American policy non-recognition but would not be decisively influenced by it.
- Governor of Yunnan.↩