893.01/9–949
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)
| Participants: | Mr. Dening, British Foreign Office, Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in Charge of Far Eastern Matters |
| Mr. Meade, Counselor, British Embassy | |
| Mr. Ford, First Secretary, British Embassy | |
| Mr. Butterworth, FE; Mr. Merchant, FE; Mr. Freeman, CA;34 Mr. Magill, CA;35 Mr. Wright, CP36 |
With regard to the question of whether to accord recognition to any Chinese Communist government which may be established, Mr. Dening stated that there was a certain amount of internal pressure in England for recognition; that such pressure came from both the far-leftists and from certain commercial interests in London; but that the group desiring early recognition did not include Mr. Bevin. He indicated that the official U.K. position remained the same as set forth in the memorandum from the Foreign Office dated August 15, 1949, entitled [Page 77] “China”37 which subsequent to its transmission to our Embassy in London had received full ministerial approval. The important point, Mr. Dening emphasized, was that the U.K. and the U.S. should continue close and continuous consultation on the problem. He stated that, from the strictly legal aspect, the difficulties of non-recognition eventually became greater than the difficulties of recognition, but he added that this matter would seem to require a decision on a political rather than a legal basis. Mr. Dening stated that he assumed that the Soviets would recognize a Chinese Communist government as soon as one is established.
Mr. Butterworth mentioned that some months ago the Department had taken the question up with several interested foreign governments, including the U.K., on the following basis: (1) no problem of recognition had yet arisen as no central Chinese Communist government had yet been established; (2) following the establishment of such a government, the interested foreign powers should by no means be hasty in according recognition but should leave the initiative up to the new government; and (3) the interested powers should agree to consult with each other prior to taking any steps toward recognition of such a government and should bear in mind how fallacious would be an approach based on the theory that the first come would be the better served. Mr. Butterworth indicated that, of the various governments approached, only India and Australia appeared to hold divergent views.
Mr. Dening stated that, with regard to India, he felt that Ambassador Panikkar in Nanking was adopting a somewhat unrealistic view toward the question of recognition which might not necessarily be backed up by his Government. He pointed out, however, in view of India’s desire to assert itself as the principal Asiatic power, that India might take an independent stand in this matter. As to Australia, Mr. Dening stated that that Government was of the opinion that there was nothing to be gained by delaying recognition of a Chinese Communist government, but that it was nevertheless in general agreement over the desirability of consulting with other powers prior to taking any action.
Mr. Butterworth stated that the Department had recently circulated its missions in Southeast Asia on the question of probable reaction in that area to recognition of a Chinese Communist government by the Western Powers, and that the replies so far received indicated without exception that early recognition by the Western Powers would cause adverse reactions in Southeast Asia. Mr. Dening commented that, whether early or late, recognition would have adverse consequences. [Page 78] Mr. Butterworth said that in the Department’s view early recognition would carry special disadvantages for Southeast Asia.
In reply to Mr. Dening’s statement that, when the question of recognition arises, the interested powers should expect assurances with regard to their rights and interests in China, Mr. Butterworth pointed out that the Communists have already indicated publicly that they will consider certain treaties as invalid. Mr. Dening added that the U.K. would certainly not accord recognition to a government which stated in advance that it would not recognize its international commitments.
Mr. Merchant inquired whether the British Government had given full consideration to the likelihood that the Chinese Communists would demand, as a pre-condition to the establishment of relations, the withdrawal of recognition from the National Government. Mr. Dening replied that in his opinion the Communists would not accept de facto recognition and that the according of full de jure recognition would of necessity require the withdrawal of recognition from the National Government. He added, however, his opinion that when the time came to recognize the Chinese Communists the National Government would have long since ceased to be a major factor in the Chinese scene. Mr. Dening indicated that internal politics and pressures, both in the U.S. and the U.K., might have their effect on the questions of whether and when to recognize a Chinese Communist government, but that he felt there was no disagreement over the present watchful-waiting policy and the desirability of close and continuous consultation.
In adding a footnote to the conversation, Mr. Butterworth stated that he could not imagine any situation arising which would cause the U.S. to make haste in recognizing a Chinese Communist regime as that would be tantamount to acceding to blackmail. Mr. Dening replied that, for his part, he did not know whether internal pressure for recognition within the U.K. would develop to the point where the Government could no longer resist. He mentioned, for example, the situation which might arise in China with regard to British officials and other subjects should recognition be long delayed. Mr. Butterworth stated that in his opinion the U.S. would probably not give in to such blackmail tactics calculated to force us into recognizing the Chinese Communists but would undoubtedly make every effort to reduce our hostages to fortune by continuing to emphasize the evacuation of our nationals from China.
(The conversation then turned to a discussion of economic relations with Communist China.38)