Fined Report by Major General David G. Barr, Director of the Joint United States Military Advisory Group in China 49
[Here follow four sections, “Introduction,” “JUSMAGChina,” “Special Activities”, and “Miscellaneous”.]
V. Future Plans
18. Continuation of JUSMAGChina
- General—JUSMAGChina was forced to leave China long before its mission was accomplished. Whether that mission, to create a modern [Page 496]armed force in keeping with the needs and resources of China, could ever be accomplished is questionable. Even with a considerable outlay of American personnel and large supplies of military aid over a long period of years, an armed force comparable in effectiveness to that of even mediocre United States troops probably cannot be produced within a decade.
- United States policy—The policy of the United States has been to oppose Communism. If this policy is continued on the mainland of Asia, the present Chinese Nationalist Government or a non-Communist successor, with all its weaknesses, is the only possible agent. There is no alternative short of armed intervention. Active military support of this Government by the United States will require advisors who can, for all practical purposes, command the Chinese Armed Forces, and will require a large amount of aid in the form of arms, ammunition and materials. The cost of this will be great, perhaps excessive; whether too great is beyond the scope of this report. Regardless of United States policies, desires and willingness, no advisory group can accomplish much unless actively desired by the Chinese and fully supported by them.
- Conditions—Should JUSMAGChina be reactivated, the following
conditions are essential:
- That United States policy be one of active opposition to Communism on the mainland of Asia.
- That United States policy be for the continuation of military aid to China for a prolonged period, the distribution of this aid to be controlled by the United States.
- That the prohibition against operational advice be relaxed and that advisors be furnished in accordance with needs.
- That the Chinese actively desire an advisory group and that there be definite written agreement between the governments concerned, as to mission, scope and functioning and as to responsibility for logistic support.
- Views of Deputy Director—See recommendations A and B, page 23, Annex 4.50
19. Continuation of JUSMAGChina
I recommend that JUSMAGChina be reactivated only if the following conditions are met in full:
- That United States policy is one of active opposition to Communism on the mainland of Asia.
- That United States policy is to continue military air [aid] supplies to China for a prolonged period, the distribution of this aid to be controlled by the United States.
- That the prohibition against operational advice is relaxed and that advisors are furnished in accordance with needs.
- That the Chinese actively desire an advisory group and that there is definite written agreement between the governments concerned as to its mission, scope and functioning and as to responsibility for logistic support.
20. JCS directive
I recommend that, in event of reactivation, the present JCS directive be revised to accomplish the following:
- Provide a single Director who will have command responsibility for the coordination, operation and common administration of the group and who will not at the same time be chief of an advisory division.
- Authorize operational advice and entry of advisors into combat areas at the discretion of the Director.
21. Allotment of advisors
I recommend that, in event of reactivation, advisors be provided on a scale approximately as follows:
- To the Ministry, to the Supreme Staff, and to the Headquarters of the Major Forces: the minimum to further the development attained during the past two years. If reactivation took place in the near future, this group of top level advisors would number about 150.
- To general and special service schools: approximately four officers and two enlisted men per school.
- To training centers and units in training: three officers per center and one officer and one enlisted man per division and per regiment.
- To Air Force and Navy installations: on a scale comparable with the above with due consideration for their existing strength and resources.
22. Allotment of overhead
I recommend that, in case of reactivation, common services, exclusive of air-lift, be furnished by the Department of the Army and that air-lift be furnished by the Department of the Air Force; that the administrative overhead, exclusive of air-lift, be a minimum but that initial plans provide about 400 military for this purpose.
I recommend that, in event of reactivation, supply be based on the Far East Command with maximum direct delivery to the largest JUSMAGChina group and that theater stocks be held to minimum consistent with scheduled deliveries.