Pursuant to the recommendation by the Secretary of State contained in NSC
37/6,3 the Secretary of Defense was requested to
obtain the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the United States
military interest in Formosa along the lines set forth in paragraph 7 of NSC
37/6.
The enclosed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject are circulated
herewith for the information of the National Security Council in reviewing
the present policy in Formosa, as suggested by the Secretary of State in NSC
37/6.
The enclosure is also being referred to the National Security Council Staff
for use in connection with the preparation of a report on United States
Policy toward Asia, pursuant to NSC 48.3a
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)
Washington, 17 August
1949.
Subject: The Position of the United States with Respect
to Formosa.
In accordance with your memorandum, dated 9 August 1949, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff submit the following comments, together with specific responses
to the questions in NSC 37/6, a memorandum from the Secretary of State
to the Executive Secretary, National Security Council, dated 4 August
1949, on the subject of “Current Position of the United States with
Respect to Formosa”.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have, as requested, reviewed their memorandum,
dated 10 February 1949,* and their clarifying
memorandum of 22 March 1949,†
both on the strategic importance of Formosa. They remain of the opinion
that Formosa is strategically important to the United States for the
reasons set forth in the second and third paragraphs
[Page 377]
of their memorandum of 10 February 1949.
Since that date, the continuing sweep of Communist conquest in China has
strengthened this view.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, must reaffirm their earlier opinion
that the strategic importance of Formosa does not justify overt military
action, in the event that diplomatic and economic steps prove
unsuccessful to prevent Communist domination, so long as the present
disparity between our military strength and our global obligations
exist, a disparity that may well increase as a result of budgetary
limitations and the commitments implicit in the North Atlantic
Treaty.
Therefore, replying specifically to the major question in paragraph 7 of
the Secretary of State’s memorandum of 4 August 1949, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff do not regard Formosa and the Pescadores as of sufficient
military importance to the United States, under the circumstances set
forth above, to commit United States forces to their occupation under
conditions short of war and on the assumption that in the absence of
military measures these islands will sooner or later come under
Communist control.
With respect to the suggested possible variations of the situation as it
might be encountered:
-
a.
- Occupation, in the face of military opposition from
Nationalist forces or later attack from the mainland by the
Communists, is definitely not recommended since such a situation
could easily lead to the necessity for relatively major effort,
thus making it impossible then to meet more important
emergencies that might develop elsewhere; and
-
b.
- Occupation by agreement with the existing authorities on the
islands, with implicit responsibility for the maintenance of
internal security and external defense, would not be so direct a
step toward military embarrassment as the variation in
subparagraph a above. This form of
occupation, however, assuming that it could be arranged under
our present relations with the Chinese Nationalists, is also not
recommended since it would be a commitment which could hardly be
reversed if quite possible developments demanded further
military commitment, extending again to relatively major
effort.
Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion, on balance, that
if Communist domination of Formosa cannot be denied by diplomatic and
economic steps, military measures instead of or in support of diplomatic
and economic efforts would be unwise, they must point out, as they have
previously stated, that future circumstances, extending to war itself,
might make overt military action with respect to Formosa eventually
advisable from the over-all standpoint of national security. They
believe that it is better, however, to face this future contingency as
one of the many military problems that must be considered in the event
of incipient or actual overt war than to risk
[Page 378]
undue military commitment in the Formosan area
under present circumstances.
With respect to the requested comments from the military point of view on
other pertinent aspects of the Secretary of State’s memorandum, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff believe:
-
a.
- That the probabilities of the Formosan situation make it more
than ever necessary that every effort be made to forestall any
weakening of the over-all United States position with respect to
the Philippines, the Ryukyus, and Japan, in view of the greatly
magnified importance of retention of our off-shore control in
the Western Pacific area as a result of developments on the
Asiatic mainland;
-
b.
- That the Formosan situation, as a part of the whole Asiatic
problem, is pertinent to the consideration that is now being
given to our over-all Asiatic policy by the National Security
Council; and
-
c.
- That the suggested possibility of future joint or concerted
Formosan action with other governments within or without the
framework of the United Nations would, from the military
viewpoint, have serious implications in that our military
involvement in Formosa might differ little in degree from that
envisaged as a result of unilateral occupation.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Omar N. Bradley
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
