The enclosure is accordingly circulated herewith for the information of the
National Security Council and for use by the NSC Staff in preparing a
supplementary report on Formosa pursuant to NSC Action No. 179–d.63
[Annex]
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal)
Washington, 10 February
1949.
Subject: The Strategic Importance of Formosa
In accordance with your memorandum dated 7 February 1949, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff have considered the action (No. 179b) adopted by the National Security Council on 3 February 1949
in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff are requested to furnish the Council
an estimate of the extent of the threat to United States security in the
event that diplomatic and economic steps to deny Communist domination of
Formosa prove insufficient, and recommendations as to what, if any,
military measures should be taken in that event.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that, under the assumptions
set forth above, the extent of the threat to the security of the United
States would be serious. Their appraisal of the strategic implications
[Page 285] of Communist domination of
Formosa, contained in their memorandum to you dated 24 November
1948,64 is directly applicable. Points made therein may be
summarized as follows:
-
a.
- Loss, present and prospective, of availability of
strategically valuable areas of China would enhance the
strategic value to the United States of Formosa in view of the
potentialities of that island as a wartime base capable of use
for strategic air operations and control of adjacent shipping
routes;
-
b.
- Unfriendly control of Formosa and its adjacent islands would
be of even greater strategic significance since this would
result, in the event of war, in an enemy capability of
dominating the sea routes between Japan and the Malay area and
an improved enemy capability of extending his control to the
Ryukyus and the Philippines, and
-
c.
- Unfriendly control of Formosa would further be detrimental to
our national security interests in that Formosa would be lost as
a potential major source of food and other materials for Japan,
which might well be a decisive factor as to whether Japan would
prove to be more of a liability than an asset under war
conditions.
In general terms, it having become more apparent than ever that the
United States faces the prospect of strategic impotence on the continent
of Asia, our military capabilities in the Western Pacific must rest
primarily on control of sea lanes and maintenance of strategic air
potential from strategically tenable island positions. Enemy control of
Formosa would seriously jeopardize our capabilities in these respects
while constituting, on the other hand, a major contribution to enemy
capabilities.
In their appraisal of 24 November 1948, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reached
the conclusion that it would be most valuable to our national security
if Communist domination of Formosa could be denied by the application of
appropriate diplomatic and economic steps. In this conclusion, resort to
military measures was tacitly excluded.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff are still of the opinion that any overt
military commitment in Formosa would be unwise at this time. In spite of
Formosa’s strategic importance, the current disparity between our
military strength and our many global obligations makes it inadvisable
to undertake the employment of armed force in Formosa, for this might,
particularly in view of the basic assumption that diplomatic and
economic steps have failed, lead to the necessity for relatively major
effort there, thus making it impossible then to meet more important
emergencies elsewhere. In this connection the distinction between the
Formosan problem and the Iceland situation, where direct action is
contemplated, if necessary to prevent Communist control, lies in the
fact that Iceland is directly vital to our national security [Page 286] while the importance of Formosa cannot
be said to be in that category.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe, however, that Formosa’s strategic
importance is, nevertheless, great. Consequently, they are of the
opinion that some form of military support should be made available now
for assistance in vigorous prosecution of the approved diplomatic and
economic steps set forth in NSC 37/273 for
developing and supporting in Formosa a non-Communist Chinese regime.
This support should not involve commitment to the employment of force.
It should consist of the stationing of minor numbers of fleet units at a
suitable Formosan port or ports, with such shore activity associated
therewith as may be necessary for maintenance and air communication and
for the recreation of personnel.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their memorandum to you dated 20 December
1948, agreed that American naval forces should not at that time be
established ashore at Formosa. They stated, however, that their
agreement was without prejudice to future determination, if developments
so justified, that this decision should be modified. The present
proposal would involve only minor modification as necessary for the
continued basing afloat of mobile fleet units.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff are aware of the possibility that unfavorable
diplomatic repercussion might result from undue resort to what might be
termed a show of force. They realize also that it may be difficult to
negotiate successfully the necessary arrangements for basing fleet units
in Formosan waters. On balance, however, and in view of the threat to
United States security implicit in Communist domination of Formosa, they
believe that every reasonable effort should be made to keep Formosa in
friendly hands, and that diplomatic risks and difficulties are thus
justified.
Accordingly, they recommend favorable consideration of the proposal
outlined above that, beginning as soon as appropriate arrangements can
be made, minor numbers of fleet units be maintained at a suitable
Formosan port or ports, with shore activities associated therewith
limited to those necessary for maintenance, air communication and
recreation, and that the mission of these units be that of exerting, in
support of approved diplomatic and economic objectives, all possible
stabilizing influence without the employment of force.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Louis Denfeld
Admiral, U.S. Navy
