Executive Secretariat Files
Note by the Executive Secretary of the National Security
Council (Souers) to the Council
[Washington,] February 3, 1949.
NSC 37/2
The Current Position of the United States With Respect
to Formosa
At its 33rd Meeting the National Security Council considered a draft report
on the above subject (NSC 37/156) and adopted the enclosed
conclusions for consideration by the President.
The National Security Council recommends that the President approve the
conclusions contained herein and direct that they be implemented by all
appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under
the coordination of the Secretary of State.
The National Security Council also has in preparation studies regarding
further U.S. actions with respect to Formosa which may be deemed desirable
in the interests of U.S. security.
[Annex]
Report by the National Security Council on the Current
Position of the United States With Respect to Formosa
[Washington,] February 3, 1949.
- 1.
- When the situation in China has developed to the point where we
know what governing groups we will have to deal with in Formosa, the
U.S. should seek to develop and support a local non-Communist
Chinese regime which will provide at least a modicum of decent
government for the islands. We should also use our influence
wherever possible to discourage the further influx of mainland
Chinese. The U.S. should also seek discreetly to maintain contact
with potential native Formosan leaders with a view at some future
date to being able to make use of a Formosan autonomous movement
should it appear to be in the U.S. national interest to do
so.
- 2.
- This Government should make it discreetly plain to the governing
authority on Formosa that:
- (a)
- The U.S. has no desire to see chaos on the mainland spread
to Formosa and the Pescadores;
- (b)
- The U.S. has not been impressed by Chinese administration
on the islands and believes that if there is continued
misrule the Chinese authorities would inevitably forfeit the
support of world opinion which might be expected to swing in
favor of Formosan autonomy;
- (c)
- U.S. support for the governing authorities of Formosa will
inevitably depend in a large measure upon the efficiency of
their regime and the extent to which they are able to
contribute toward the welfare and economic needs of
the-Formosan people and permit and encourage active Formosan
participation in positions of responsibility in
Government.
- (d)
- The U.S. cannot remain unconcerned over possible
developments arising from the influx of large numbers of
refugees from the mainland and the consequent effects,
including the increasing burden on the island’s economy, and
is disturbed at the indication of the Chinese belief that
the building up of military strength on Formosa will in
itself provide an effective barrier to Communist
penetration;
- (e)
- The U.S. expects that the lessons to be drawn from
developments on the mainland and from previous Formosan
reactions to Chinese rule will not be overlooked by the
Chinese authorities in dealing with the problems of the
island and with the Formosan people.
- 3.
- The U.S. Government, through the most flexible mechanisms
possible, should conduct a vigorous program of economic support for
the economy of Formosa, designed to assist the Formosans in
developing and maintaining a viable, self-supporting economy.
