Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The Far East: China, Volume IX

893.01/5–549: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China (Stuart)

Washington, May 13, 1949—8 p. m.

589. Reurtels 936, May 4, and 943, May 5 re question recognition, foll info for your guidance:

1. In accordance general approved position of Dept, recognition any new govt shld be based on foll three factors:

a. de facto control of territory and administrative machinery of State, including maintenance public order;

b. ability and willingness of govt to discharge its internatl obligations;

c. general acquiescence of people of country in govt in power.

Furthermore, recognition by US shld not be withheld as political weapon except in extreme cases when US natl interest served thereby.

2. Re question recognition Commies as in de facto as opposed de jure control, foil considerations appear pertinent:

a. US Govt on recent occasion (Israel) recognized provisional govt as de facto authority and exchanged representatives prior to de jure recognition.⁴⁴

b. Recognition of de facto authority can legally be extended without withdrawing recognition from de jure govt. (Oppenheim’s Internatl Law, Vol. I, 7th Edition, pp. 145–146 par 75g)

c. Granting recognition de facto authority Commie regime would politically encourage Commies and discourage Natl Govt.

d. When Phibun Govt succeeded Khuang Govt in Siam, we asked and obtained assurances of intentions fulfill internatl obligations and accordingly did not withdraw recognition.⁴⁵ US has withheld recognition from Albania in view its refusal give similar assurances.

3. In discussing question possible recognition de facto authority Commie regime with diplomatic colleagues, foll questions shld be considered and Dept wld appreciate ur comments thereon:

a. Wld grant this recognition lead Commies to adopt more correct and reasonable attitude toward Amer official personnel and Amer rights and property generally? Or would they become more haughty and arbitrary?

b. Does this recognition offer best hope for protecting Amer interests?

c. Having reed recognition de facto authority wld Commies soon demand recognition de jure control which US might be unprepared grant in absence evidence of sense internatl responsibility?

4. Re Brit Amb’s point 3 (urtel 943, May 5), during Span Civil War Brit made arrangements with insurgents in April 1938 for exchange of agents possessing quasi-official character while at same time retaining diplomatic relations with Span Govt. Brit Govt made it clear such concessions involved no recognition Franco administration. US withheld recognition Span Nationalist Govt until April 1939⁴⁶ by which time all semblance Loyalist Govt had disappeared.

5. Replies recd so far in response Depcirtel May 6 as follows: Paris and The Hague indicate full agreement and cooperation Rome expresses desire maintain common front and states Ital Amb will act-in concert with Amer, Brit and Fr colleagues Ottawa enthusiastically commends policy recommended Canberra states no intention at present recognizing Commies but adds circumstances might change and could give no commitments for future London noncommittal but states matter will be given full consideration.

6. Reurtel 927, May 4,⁴⁷ Dept spokesmen have replied foil sense to questions re US relations with Commies: Commies have not as yet established “central govt” in any sense of word and are not seeking recognition. Natl Govt only Govt in China which has claim recognition. Consular establishments Commie controlled areas remain open and functioning where possible as repeatedly indicated. As functioning bodies they are on practical basis handling purely local problems with local authorities. This in no sense implies recognition or approval actions these local authorities. Facing facts it only natural expect these relationships shld be as amicable as conditions permit.

7. Dept continues of opinion we shld strongly oppose hasty recognition Commies either as de facto or de jure authority by any power and shld continue our efforts obtain full agreement concerned Fon powers (particularly Brit) to desirability presenting common front this question.

Acheson

44. See President Truman’s statement on May 14, 1948, Department of State Bulletin, May 23, 1948, p. 673.
45. See ibid., March 14, 1948, p. 360; and May 23, 1948, p. 686.
46. For recognition of the Spanish Nationalist Government, see telegrams from the Secretary of State to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, April 1 and 3, 1939, Foreign Relations, 1939, vol. ii, pp. 771 and 772, respectively.
47. Not printed.